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Introduction 
Approximating Mistrust
Florian Mühlfried
When in 1968, the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (2014) wrote a book 
about trust, he noticed a surprising lack of empirically-backed knowledge about 
this phenomenon at the heart of social life. This deficit has long since been 
remedied as, over the last few decades, a significant variety of publications on 
trust have emerged. Trust, now, is seen as the glue of society, a substance sup-
porting social cohesion and the functioning of institutions – particularly im-
portant under the conditions of modernity, which is characterized by a reliance 
on externalized expert systems beyond the reach of most (Giddens 1990).  
Mistrust, in contrast, is noticeably understudied. If scrutinized at all, it is 
usually treated as the flip side of trust, as an annoying absence, a societal fail-
ure, or an obstacle to be overcome.1 But mostly, there is just silence. For what 
reasons? Perhaps it is simply the inertia of not thinking about mistrust as a case 
sui generis or because many do not like to concede that mistrust is not an ex-
ception to their social rules, but the norm. But maybe, this silence is indicative 
of a blind spot in a larger agenda. This is not to be taken from granted, however. 
After all, the simple fact that something is understudied does not mean that it 
is relevant – not all social phenomena are equally worth studying and the mere 
fact of escaping the attention of most social scientists is not a good enough 
reason to demand further examination. One way to shed light on the silence 
1 | This is slowly changing, however, and some ground-breaking publications have re-
cently been published or are about to be published. The first to treat mistrust/distrust 
as more than the evil twin of trust was ‘Distrust’ by Russell Hardin (ed.) 2004. In 2016, 
a monograph dedicated to ‘Figures of Mistrust’ was published in German by Sinje Hörlin 
and a special issue of the journal Tracés on ‘The Ar t of Mistrust’ in French by Olivier 
Allard, Matthew Carey et Rachel Renault. Finally, Matthew Carey’s book, ‘Mistrust: An 
Ethnographic Theory’ is scheduled for release in October 2017 – unfor tunately I could 
not read it during the time of writing. My own analysis of mistrust is widely inspired by 
and based on the work of the above-mentioned authors.
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surrounding the phenomenon of mistrust is to look at some other notions that 
have also been long overlooked by social anthropology and ask whether there is 
a common reason for the neglect of these concepts.
Maybe the most prominent example for a very present yet diligently over-
looked phenomenon is the state. Nowadays, there is hardly any anthropological 
study that does not implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the presence of the state. 
Yet, until the 1970s the state was largely absent in ethnographic depictions of 
the world at large. This void is indicative of anthropology’s colonial past and the 
accompanying tendency to neglect the power relations in which it is embedded. 
It is an active investment into an absence that is at stake here, the maintenance 
of the impression that something is not there.
In other cases, it is precisely the investigation of social phenomena con-
strued as absences that are lacking in anthropological endeavours. Whereas, 
for example, sharing is a popular topic in recent anthropology, practices of not 
sharing are mostly overlooked or taken as inherently problematic – think of the 
often-invoked ‘parallel worlds’ or ‘ethnic ghettos’ as obstacles to arriving at a 
common sense of citizenship. In the field of interreligious relations, too, much 
attention has been paid to the sharing of sacred sites as venues for (real or po-
tential) cooperation and the fostering of solidarities (Albera and Coroucli 2012, 
Hayden and Walker 2013, Barkan and Barkey 2015). Practices of not sharing 
sacred sites, however, largely go unnoticed, although in certain cases, keeping 
the sacra apart may contribute to getting along well (Mühlfried forthcoming). 
Not sharing is often seen as problematic because it entails detachment from 
one’s surroundings, at least spatially, it not emotionally. Detachment is another 
such concept that has only recently been brought to the fore. In a book dedicat-
ed to this issue, the editors write (Candea et al. 2015: 1): 
Engagement has, in a wide range of contexts, become a definitive and unquestionable 
social good, one that encompasses or abuts with a number of other seductive cultural 
tropes, such as participation, democracy, voice, equality, diversity and empowerment. 
Conversely, detachment has come to symbolise a range of social harms: authoritaria-
nism and hierarchy, being out of touch, bureaucratic coldness and unresponsiveness, 
a lack of empathy, and passivity and inaction. Yet as this book argues, in a wide range 
of settings detachment is still socially, ethically and politically valued, and the relation-
ship between detachment and engagement is not simple or singular.
With almost no changes, the same could be said about mistrust – only the word 
‘engagement’ would have to be replaced by ‘trust’ and ‘detachment’ by ‘mis-
trust’. Could it be that this coincidence helps to answer the question whether 
the omission of the notion of mistrust from academic discourse is indicative of 
a bias in social anthropology?
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It seems that both mistrust and detachment are neglected by social anthro-
pology because both concepts are taken to denote absences: in the first instance 
of trust, in the second case of relations. Trust and relations represent notewor-
thy presences, mistrust and detachment negligible absences, indicative only 
for the lack of trust or relations. The absence of trust and relations are equated 
with social failure. Within this logic, mistrust and detachment foster the disen-
tanglement of citizens from each other and from institutions like the state. In a 
similar vein, practices such as fraud are seen as problematic because they entail 
the manipulation of social bonds for selfish aims. The neglect of these relations 
could indeed indicate a hidden agenda prevalent in social anthropology, namely 
the fetishisation of social cohesion. The problem then is not so much relational 
thinking, as the editors of ‘mistrust’ (Candea et al. 2015) are hinting at, but the 
focus on socially constitutive practices with the branding of the ‘other’ practic-
es as (negligible) deviations.
This presupposition brands social anthropology as a ‘moral’ endeavour ded-
icated to improving understanding and thus fostering proximity. And for this 
reason, mainstream anthropology of morality discredits and pays no attention 
to ‘disentangling from constitutive relationships’ (Zigon 2014: 1) – a stance 
which stems, according to Jarrett Zigon (ibid), from a ‘reliance on philosophical 
frameworks (…) of the neo-Aristotelian and Foucauldian bent’. Jörg Wiegratz 
(2016: 4) also sees a ‘heritage of the takes on morality by major thinkers from 
Marx to Smith, Durkheim and Weber’ as blocking our perception of social 
practices deemed problematic. It is thus necessary 
to ‘unblock’ existing research (…) from one of its core limitations: its focus on pro-social 
actors and practices, i.e. matters of altruism, solidarity; vir tuousness, reciprocity, co-
operation, care, social obligations and the like, and its neglect of the morals of actors 
and practices that are regarded by such approaches as bad, harmful, immoral or amoral 
(ibid: 8-9).
From my perspective, the agenda pursued here – unblocking our view on ‘so-
cial practices deemed problematic’ – is not new, but neglected. A case in point 
is Marcel Mauss’s (1990 [1925]) authoritative work ‘The Gift’. As an epigraph 
to his work, he cites few stanzas from the poem Havamal, part of the Edda. 
Among them:
You know, if you have a friend
In whom you have confidence
And if you wish to get good results
Your soul must blend in with his
And you must exchange presents
And frequently pay him visits.
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But if you have another person
Whom you mistrust
And if you wish to get good results,
You must speak fine words to him
But your thoughts must be false
And you must lament in lies.
(ibid: 2)
Whereas the ‘exchange of presents’ mentioned in the first part is the centrepiece 
of Mauss’ following elaborations, the ‘right way to mistrust’ declared in the 
second part is not paid any attention to in the book at all.2  Hence, while topics 
such as mistrust and fraud appear, they are of no particular interest in contrast 
to techniques of bonding such as the exchange of gifts. The positive connota-
tion of bonding is also reflected in the etymology of the word ‘trust’, which is 
‘probably the reflex of an unattested Old English *trust (perhaps cognate with 
Middle High German getrüste company, troop, and the Frankish etymon of 
post-classical Latin trustis retinue, bodyguard (…))’ (OEC 2015).3 According to 
this genealogy, trust is needed for the establishment and functioning of mili-
tary and protective units. So we find that the very word that today represents a 
positively inflected emotion was once used for agents of, or protectors against 
violence. Mistrust, then, would be seen to undermine the essence of forma-
tions such as troops and bodyguards and thus be seen as unsocial from the 
point of view of governments.
Before getting into the actual ethnographies of mistrust, a few things need 
to be said in order to define mistrust as an empirical phenomenon, and this 
will be done in the following sections. These sections centre on the questions 
of how a.) mistrust relates to trust, b.) mistrust works, c.) mistrust differs from 
distrust d.) mistrust translates to the world, and e.) mistrust affects culture. 
These elaborations partly draw on references to the chapters in this volume.
How Does Mistrust rel ate to trust?
Without trust, Luhmann reminds us, we would not get out of bed in the morn-
ing, as ‘[u]ndetermined anxiety, paralysing horror’ would befall us (Luhmann 
2014: 1). That is not to say a mistrustful person would remain bed-ridden as, 
in all likelihood, even the most mistrustful people would develop strategies to 
reduce the complexity of the word – an essential function of trust for Luhmann. 
Like trust, mistrust constitutes a relation to the world, but the nature of the 
2 | I owe this reference to Daniel Künzler who has found it in Ogino 2007.
3 | My thanks go to Bruce Grant for this hint.
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relation is markedly different. If trust reduces the fear of failure in transac-
tions and facilitates decision taking, mistrust initiates a search for ‘defensive 
arrangements’ (ibid, in German ‘defensive Vorkehrungen’), i.e., ways to spread 
risks and weaken dependencies.
Both trust and mistrust are attitudes of engagement (Hartmann 2011: 57, 
in German ‘Einstellungen des Engagements’), which is why they cannot be un-
derstood as opposites (Reemtsma 2013: 37). They both emerge in situations of 
uncertainty; once certainty is obtained, trust and mistrust are obsolete. Trust 
also does not necessarily disappear with the advent of mistrust. 
A striking example of the coexistence of trust and mistrust is provided by 
Jan Beek in this volume, who analysis cases of romance scammers in Ghana 
defrauding their victims by writing credible love letters. The scammers try to 
create credibility by drawing on globally shared idioms of romantic love. Once 
they have established rapport, they ask for money. Usually, their recipients react 
by scrutinizing the online representations of their ostensible lover and signal-
ling their mistrust. At a certain stage, however, some women decide to suspend 
mistrust and to invest into trust, not least by sending money. As apparent in 
the email conversations, their mistrust never disappears but lingers on, flaring 
up again and again.
On a more abstract level, trust and mistrust have to be seen as mutual-
ly constitutive: mistrust needs to be possible for trust to come into existence 
(Reemtsma 2013: 37). The opposite of trust as a way of being in the world is 
rather crippling fear, or the ‘paralysing horror’ described by Luhmann. Trust 
and distrust are modes of relating to human beings and the world as a whole. 
In the case of trust, people invest in the strengthening of their relations, in the 
case of mistrust in the weakening of these relations or in alternative relation-
ships. The effect, Luhmann argues, is the same: the reduction of complexity. 
Although he concentrates on the elaboration of trust as a functional means 
for reducing complexity, he also states the following: ‘Whoever doesn’t trust, 
(…) has to rely on functionally equivalent strategies for the reduction of com-
plicity (…). Mistrust, too, supplies simplification, at times gross simplification’ 
(Luhmann 2014: 93).4 Yet, a mistrustful person must assume that a transac-
tion may fail – in contrast to a trustful person who expects a positive outcome. 
A mistrustful person also does not know whether the effects of an encounter 
will be good or bad and is more prepared for unknown outcomes. This simple 
observation indicates that mistrust may precisely reside in the acknowledge-
ment of complexity. Taking this into account, the relationship between mis-
4 | Jan Philipp Reemtsma (2013: 36) similarly sees trust and mistrust as complemen-
tary modes of reducing the unreliability of expectations (‘Reduktion von Erwartungs- 
unsicherheit ’).
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trust and the task of complexity reduction is more nuanced and needs to be 
addressed empirically before coming up with sweeping generalisations.
Some of the chapters to this volume tackle this relationship, bringing argu-
ments both in favour and against the idea that mistrust means simplification. 
The most outspoken critique of this paradigm is Michael Bürge who argues 
that mistrust ‘urges people to inquire (...) into things as they are and possible 
alternatives and, thus, to engage with complexity’ (page 110). His ethnography 
is situated in northern Sierra Leone, where trust is a scarce resource both so-
cially and politically. Missing trust, Bürge argues, people try new practices and 
endeavour into unknown venues, at times even increasing their engagement 
with the particular individual with whom they had not been able to create trust.
Nicolai Ruh, by contrast, argues that ‘mistrust is a functional equivalent of 
trust in that it allows the reduction of complexity against the background of un-
certainty’ (page 32), drawing conclusions from research into the political crypto 
community. ‘Crypto community’ denotes a network of globally dispersed inter-
net activists who develop cryptographic tools with the goal of preserving social 
principles like autonomy, accountability and trust. What unites these activists 
as a community is their commonly shared experience of ontological mistrust, 
resulting from state-sponsored cyber surveillance that became public in the 
wake of the NSA scandal, as well their in-depth knowledge of the working prin-
ciples of digital technologies.
My own chapter provides plenty of examples how profoundly mistrustful 
persons tend to investigate the reduction of complexity by dividing the world 
into ‘trustworthy’ and ‘untrustworthy’. My focus is on a mode of mistrust ori-
ented towards radical detachment, that is, the attempt to distance oneself from 
the environment as much as possible, resulting in the sacrifice of one’s life. In 
order to outline the cultural syntax underlying such radical practices, I concen-
trate on three groups originating from the Caucasus over a period of two cen-
turies: the bandit-come-rebels Abreks, elevated in the nineteenth century to re-
sistance fighters, the ‘thieves in law’, a criminal elite caste originated from the 
Soviet prison camp system, and Caucasian jihadists committing suicide bomb-
ings in the Caucasus and beyond. While concluding that in all these groups 
mistrust translates into a gross simplification of the world, I nonetheless argue 
that such kind of simplification is only one mode of mistrust.
Lost trust in the world may lead to apathy and depression; if it translates into 
action, it may lead to extreme violence (see above). It may also spur investiga-
tion; a critical examination of the world with the aim to come to terms with it 
(unlike the characters above). The German word ‘Auseinandersetzung’ reflects 
this well: it indicates separation (‘auseinander’, similar to the prefix ‘dis-’ in 
‘distrust’) that triggers a process of investigation, albeit not a ‘friendly’ one, 
which is captured in the fact that this word also denotes quarrel. This is when 
mistrust becomes distrust. The effect of the ‘distrustisation’ of mistrust is sim-
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ilar to the Cartesian idea of doubt as it fosters a radical and incredulous investi-
gation of facts. It differs, however, as the locus of investigation is not a radically 
detached ego, but an entangled ‘participant observer’. The ruthless distruster 
acts in the world just as we social and cultural anthropologists act in the ‘field’.
One of the few thinkers who came to acknowledge the creative potential 
of mistrust in the production of knowledge was Friedrich Nietzsche. Against 
the grain of most other thinkers who see mistrust as an annoyance, for him 
mistrust is a virtue: ‘the more mistrust, the more philosophy’ (Nietzsche 1954 
[1887]: 211).  Trust, for Nietzsche, leads to inertia, whereas mistrust necessitates 
tension, observation and reflection (Nietzsche 1974 [1886|87]: 282). Once more, 
Nietzsche advocates a revaluation of values. And it is it this kind of revaluation 
in respect to the notion of mistrust that is at stake here.
How Does Mistrust work?
Instead of lying in bed and doing nothing, it is thus much more likely that a 
mistrustful person would rise and make some arrangements with the world, 
albeit in a distanced manner. This ‘defensive arrangement’ (Luhmann 2014: 
1) should allow for a ‘tempering’ or ‘domestication’ of unknown forces.5 The 
mistrustful person does not know if these forces are beneficial or malevolent. 
A well-studied way of dealing with such a challenge is the tradition of hospital-
ity (e.g. Pitt-Rivers 1968), which was established to help come to terms with the 
presence of a stranger, an unknown power with which it is difficult to establish 
trust (see also Luhmann 1998: 643). However, the stranger can be domesticated 
by means of integrating him or her into the rules of hospitality. The potential 
danger emanating from the stranger is not completely averted but integrated 
into the most central part of the household, at least temporarily. This creates 
bonds of solidarity permitting the host to participate in the power of the guest.
In addition to domestication, distancing represents another ‘defensive 
arrangement’ arising from mistrust. Such a distance is, of course, relative. 
It concerns reserving things, thoughts, emotions or spaces in such a way to 
limit the access of others. Not all resources are shared, some are kept behind 
in case the transaction fails (as the mistrustful assumes). In this way, not only 
risks are spread, but a particular mode of interaction is defined, a mode based 
on reservations. Interactions with the world are not avoided (as in case of being 
befallen by ‘paralysing horror’), but never entered at full stake, in order not to 
deplete one’s reserves (Hauschild 2008, 2003).
5 | For attempts to ‘temper’ or ‘domesticate’ the state, see e.g. Hann 1990 or Mühlfried 
2014.
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It is probably this trait of never totally subscribing to something or someone 
that makes a mistrustful person so objectionable. He or she does not seem to be 
willing to substantially share his or her thoughts, emotions, passions, riches, or 
belongings. Thus, it is difficult to know whom one is dealing with. Yet, ‘hold-
ing back’ forms the backbone of most transactions, as Annette Weiner (1992) 
has shown: value is crated by keeping certain objects out of circulation. In this 
sense, ‘defensive arrangements’ are part and parcel of everyday interactions.
Sometimes, the ‘defensive arrangements’ born out of mistrust are rather 
explicit. Ilya Utekhin in his contribution to this volume draws our attention 
to the inventiveness of the inhabitants of communal apartments in (Soviet 
and post-Soviet) Russia, who were constantly worried that their property may 
be damaged by their involuntary cohabitants. Some locked their fridges with 
chains, others kept their own toilet seat in the bathroom. For Utekhin, the be-
havioural patterns discernible in communal apartments are intrinsic to Rus-
sian culture, which places mistrust alongside denunciation as a particular way 
of relating to authorities.
In other cases, mistrust ‘surfaces’ in and then shapes the process of an 
investigation. This has been observed by Stephanie Bognitz, whose analysis 
is based on cases of mediation in post-genocide Ruanda, where mediation has 
been re-introduced in 2004 as institutionalized and regulated space for dispute 
settlement governed by law. Mediation embodies various modes of practices 
and articulations for actors in dispute. In the process of mediation, develop-
ing mistrust is not necessarily supressed, but rather fostered as a means of 
producing new encounters resulting in new possibilities for action, ultimately 
legitimising the idea that law is capable of dealing with mistrust.
Instead of ‘surfacing’, mistrust rather remains tacit yet omnipresent in Mel-
anie Brand’s analysis of domestic violence counselling in South Africa. During 
the initial counselling encounter, the stories women tell to legitimize their stay 
at a shelter are met with mistrust by the counsellor, who suspects they may be 
falsified. This mistrust, however, never becomes explicit. The kind of commu-
nication employed by the counsellors with their clients is thus marked by tacit 
mistrust. I suggest that in order for mistrust to remain tacit and not to become 
explicit – for example, in the form of accusations – mistrusting actors need to 
be able to walk a thin line, engaging in concealment and information-generat-
ing practices simultaneously. Here mistrust as a ‘defensive arrangement’ finds 
its expression in a distinct double-layered communicative strategy, in which 
one layer has to remain invisible – just like in some conjuring tricks that work 
with double-layeredness in a very concrete sense.
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are Mistrust anD Distrust tHe saMe?
Some authors try to differentiate the workings of mistrust and distrust. For Vic-
tor Vakhstayn (2016), mistrust is embedded in a general state of being like the 
state of nature outlined by Hobbes, whereas distrust is directed towards some-
thing or somebody. This definition is theoretically valid, but highly difficult 
to operationalize empirically, as it would involve an unreasonable amount of 
guesswork to differentiate between mistrust as a ‘state’ (of society or of mind) 
and a relational process. In quotidian usage, mistrust and distrust are used in-
terchangeably (Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms 1984: 263), which 
seems to suggest that in the logic of practices, they are interwoven into one fab-
ric. Leonardo Schiocchet (this volume) argues for heuristically differentiating 
between empirical expressions of mistrust and distrust as an absence of trust. 
Distrust, for him, never exists in practice as an ideal type, whereas mistrust is 
a suitable sociological category that allows for ethnographic approximations.     
This book deals both with mistrust as a mental and emotional state or atti-
tude and with distrust as it manifests itself in relational practices of a certain 
kind. We do not try to disentangle attitude from behaviour and pay particular 
attention to individual and collective experience in informing states of mistrust 
and practices of distrust. Hence, we treat mistrust as a complex phenomenon 
including affective (emotional, attitudinal) as well as cognitive (knowledge, per-
ception) aspects. The starting point for most endeavours, however, is cases of 
distrust, understood as ways of relating to the world based on mistrust. It is 
only when the mistrustful person described by Luhmann gets out of bed that 
mistrust becomes observable, hence when mistrust manifests itself in distrust 
without disappearing as a conviction, feeling, and motivation. This means that 
relational practices are in the fore of this book. We care for what people actually 
do or say when they mistrust, and how distrust affects their being in the world.6
On the semantic level, the concept of mistrust is intimately related to the 
notions of doubt, suspicion, and detachment. For this reason, the book contains 
conceptual interventions on the semantic fields of (1) doubt, suspicion and mis-
trust (2) mistrust, distrust and suspicion, and (3) mistrust and detachment. 
In contrast to the other chapters to this volume, these interventions are not 
embedded in ethnography, but situated on a meta-level. Therefore, they are not 
to be mistaken with staple contemporary anthropological journal articles but 
should be read as essays encouraging research on the given topic. Rather than 
6 | The illustration on the front cover depicts the queen of the Isle of Lewis Chess Game, 
which is presumably about 1000 years old. She seems to be paralyzed by horror and 
the question is: will she remain seated or will she get up? Only if she got up would she 
qualify as an object of study in the given thematic scope. This. however, looks a rather 
unlekely prospect, given the expression of her face.
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looking for indelible ethnographic proof of the chapter’s suggestions, these are 
better understood as propositions, or starting points for new research avenues.
The first intervention is provided by Mathijs Pelkmans, who has recently 
opened up the field for ethnographic investigations and anthropological con-
ceptualisations of doubt (2013), showing that a focus on doubt is indispensable 
for grasping the role of ideas in social action. In this text, Pelkmans takes off 
from the current ‘post-truth’ context, which is characterized by apprehension 
and loss of trust in experts, and, by implication, a loss of faith in ‘truth’. In this 
situation of uncertainty, a new breed of politicians, who are often referred to as 
‘populists’, try to capitalize on widespread sentiments of distrust towards the 
political establishment and the media by doubting existence of ‘facts’. This in 
turn, increases the doubt of their opponents in their credibility. 
Leonardo Schiocchet, who came to be interested in the dynamics between 
suspicion and trust while doing fieldwork in Palestinian refugee camps in Leb-
anon, and then among Palestinians in different places in Brazil, Denmark, 
Austria, the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Palestine), investigates the tension 
between mistrust, distrust and suspicion under the title ‘Essay on the Anthro-
pology of the Fiduciary’. Semantically, he differentiates mistrust and distrust 
by referring to the first as ‘misplaced trust’ and the latter as ‘the absence of 
trust’. The quest for trust, he argues, is especially urgent in cases of its absence 
and manifests in processes of ‘entrustment’ that are to be located both within 
the real of mistrust and of trust.
The relation of detachment to mistrust is tackled in the afterword written by 
Thomas Yarrow who is one of the editors of the previously mentioned book on 
‘Detachment: Essays on the Limits of Relational Thinking’ (Candea at al. 2015). 
By revisiting the chapters of this volume, Yarrow takes up the question raised 
in this introduction whether the common unwillingness to study practices of 
detachment or mistrust empirically and address them in their own right is 
indicative of the current state of social sciences. In a socio-political climate of 
increasing mistrust in what was once accepted as truth, Yarrow furthermore ar-
gues, Foucauldian inspired deconstructions that have sought to make apparent 
a misplaced trust in experts should be reconsidered.
How Does Mistrust rel ate to tHe worlD?
Whether mistrust is always a mode of reducing complexity is still an open 
question. What can be said with certainty, however, is that mistrust is usually 
relational, a way of perceiving and relating to people, institutions or things. 
Thus, mistrust does not oppose engagement, but is rather a particular form 
of it and one that deserves attention in its own right. In contrast to trust that 
creates proximity, mistrust results in the cultivation of distance. Paraphras-
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ing Weiner (1992), the working of mistrust is characterized by the ‘paradox of 
withholding-while-participating’ (a close relative of Weiner’s ‘paradox of keep-
ing-while-giving’).
As Alexei Yurchak (2006) demonstrated in respect to the late Soviet Union, 
irony can be a means of participating in a ‘distanced’ way. The citizens he is 
dealing with do not subvert or resist the state outwardly. At the same time they 
are not zealous or faithful followers. In order to understand them, one has to 
relinquish dichotomies of resistance and compliance. Yurchak’s way of looking 
at irony thus bears some similarities to the way of making sense of mistrust 
outlined here: both phenomena are situated beyond the narrow frameworks of 
being-in-favour or being-against, and both phenomena entail forms of restraint 
and investment at the same time – forms which are fairly impossible to disent-
angle. The withholding of mental or material reserves during interactions are 
other relational forms of mistrust, as is the taming of the unknown in the form 
of hospitality referred to earlier.   
Is mistrust thus always relational? Or are there also absolute forms of mi-
strust, resulting in the will to break free from all ties? Is it possible to comple-
tely detach one’s identity from a surrounding that is profoundly mistrusted? 
Time and again, people have tried to completely disentangle themselves from 
the word. The musician Sun Ra, for example, claimed that he was born on pla-
net Saturn (Grass 2009); by locating his identity in the elsewhere, he stopped 
belonging to the world he was living in. Religious groups like the Indian Jains 
try to detach their existence from this world as far as possible, some of them 
by fasting to death (Laidlaw 2015). Death, in the end, is the ultimate break with 
the world, and thus the symbolism of death often surrounds groups that try 
to break away from a world that does not deserve any trust (e.g. the Manson 
Family).
With the relocation of identity, trust is relocated, too.7 This leads to a dou-
bling of the world. The world ‘out there’ is radically distrusted and delimited 
from one’s own world, in which trust is placed, for instance in the world of 
the family or the village. The sociologist Charles Tilly refers to these second 
worlds as ‘networks of trust’ (Tilly 2005). Often, these networks are based on 
metaphors of kinship, such as brotherhoods. The new brothers and sisters are 
united by mutual trust and mistrust towards the environment. Mistrust may 
thus lead to a displacement of trust.
The relation to the ‘outer world’ in trust networks differs. In some cases, the 
world is simply avoided (like in the case of secret brotherhoods like the Walden-
sians), in others it is ridiculed (such as in Sicilian fish markets). Keeping worlds 
7 | Only very few groups such as the Jain ascetics do not relocate identity but tempt to 
get rid of identity (hence the world, hence themselves) altogether. In most cases, the 
detachment of identity is a relational process.
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separate is often hard work, as demonstrated by the cryptographers studied 
by Ruh (this volume) who work against the intrusion of the state into private 
digital spheres. In other cases, the outside world is legitimate target of crimes 
(as for the Mafia or for politically motivated hackers). In yet other cases, it is to 
be destroyed (as for jihadists). Disentanglement, here, is again relational, and 
more often than not, the new world is embedded in the same semantic system 
as the old world (Mühlfried this volume). Radical forms of mistrust are difficult 
to live.
How Does Mistrust tr ansl ate to Culture?
On the 25 anniversary of the German reunification on 3 October 2015, the Ger-
man-based, internationally operating Volkswagen Company published a full-
page advertisement in leading German newspapers stating the following: 
Actually, we wanted to say at this place how happy we are that Germany became one 
country again. Actually, we wanted to say how proud we are to have shaped this country 
during the last twenty-five years together with all. Actually, this would have been the 
right time to say thank you – for the trust of our costumers in our vehicles and the great 
popularity that Volkswagen enjoyed in these years in Germany. Actually, we wanted to 
pay tribute to the work of our employees and suppliers all over Germany. All this would 
have actually been right. But we would like to say only one sentence now: we will do all 
and everything to regain your trust.8
This ‘trust campaign’ of the Volkswagen Company was a reaction to a large-
scale cheating scandal referred to as diesel-gate by some: the company manipu-
lated the emissions of their cars so that less pollution would be noted in testing 
conditions. With these practices becoming public, the Volkswagen Company 
was obviously highly concerned about having converted the trust of their buy-
ers into mistrust, and that this might affect their reputation and sale. They 
were afraid, in other words, that mistrust may motivate their former clients to 
cut their ties and to turn away.  
The concern of Volkswagen is far from unique. When in 2013, Edward 
Snowden blew a whistle and revealed to which extent people worldwide are sur-
veyed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and their partners, the scandal 
that followed was often said to undermine the trust of the citizens in the state 
– a trust which is proclaimed an absolute prerequisite to its functioning. Again, 
mistrust was frequently depicted as undermining essential relationships, in 
8 | See: https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article147187813/VW-entschuldigt-sich-mit- 
riesiger-Werbekampagne.html
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this case with the state. Germany has been hit by another crisis recently that 
triggered similar concerns after a terrorist right wing group, referring to itself 
as the ‘national-socialist underground’ (NSU), was discovered in 2011. Subse-
quent police investigations revealed that state officials had been so deeply em-
bedded in the structures of violent neo-fascism in Germany that many were 
either part of the movement themselves or were aware of the organisation but 
did not intervene. This scandal, too, was believed to corrode trust among citi-
zens toward the state by many commentators in numerous articles.
Although mistrust would have been a reasonable reaction to all these crises, 
the undermining potentialities of mistrust have been brought to the fore in 
discrediting ways. Mistrust, according to the dominating voices, only seems 
to be able to destroy, not to constitute. But is this really so? As indicated above, 
mistrust may lead to a translocation of trust into trust networks. Here, mi-
strust is constitutive, but immediately replaced by trust towards the insiders. 
The question is, then, whether or not mistrust itself may be shared and if this 
sharing creates bonds. This is another open question that cannot be answe-
red here, given the lack of empirical evidence on hand. As some studies in 
this book indicate, however, mistrust does seem to posses some constitutive 
potential. In Ilya Uetkhin’s chapter on communal apartments in soviet and 
post-soviet Russia, the everyday interactions of the inhabitants are shaped by 
a high degree of mistrust, resulting in a mutual process of surveillance. Both 
the shared mistrust and the mutual surveillance transforms the inhabitants of 
communal apartments into members of communities of mistrust, defined by 
common practices and perceptual patterns. These communities may be seen 
us unhealthy, but they are still, nonetheless, communities. 
In other cases, performances of mistrust articulate the needs and claims of 
unheeded communities (Somparé and Botta Somparé this volume). This was 
the case when, during the Ebola epidemics in Guinea, state-sponsored cam-
paigns to curtail the crisis were met by attitudes of reticence and resistance in 
urban and rural communities. Resistance mostly revolved around the idea that 
the disease did not exist and was the result of a conspiracy organized by the 
state with the help of the international institutions. The epidemic constituted 
a specific configuration where mistrust was seen as the proper way to engage, 
and thus express mistrust towards the authorities, and, in more general terms, 
mistrust toward intellectual elites, who were perceived as corrupt and uninte-
rested in the well-being of local people.
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Be yonD aCaDeMia
I would like to conclude this introduction with some remarks beyond the scope 
of academia. As an entry point, let me reformulate the opening question: is the 
popular discrediting of mistrust indicative of political concerns? I would argue 
it is for two reasons. First of all, there seems to be a general anxiety – shared, 
among others, by academics, journalists, politicians, and civil society members 
– that taking mistrust seriously means legitimising so-called Wutbürger (‘angry 
citizens’) and Trump voters. Both groups express open mistrust towards me-
dia coverage and political representation. Wutbürger started to flood German 
streets around 2010 and are nowadays mostly organized in far-right non-par-
liamentarian protest groups such as Pegida (abbreviation of ‘Patriotic Europe-
ans against the Islamization of the Occident’). They often refuse to talk to the 
media because they mistrust their intentions and claim to be more legitimate 
in expressing the concerns of the people (Volk) than the government. Trump 
voters have equally expressed their mistrust in the media, electoral and polit-
ical system before the elections and put their trust in Trump to overturn this 
system. Both Trump voters and Wutbürger are often said to live in a post-factual 
world by their adversaries, a world where mistrust-driven sentiments are val-
ued higher than objective evidences. Taking their mistrust seriously is not be 
equated with taking their political positions seriously, however. And perhaps, 
acknowledging the sentiments of mistrustful people could contribute to more 
accurate election forecasts the next time.
Secondly, there is a concern that looming mistrust in the wake of the NSA 
crisis or diesel-gate may undermine the very basis of our polity: the state and 
the market. This would explain the frequent appeals of politicians and cor-
porate spokespersons to regain the trust of citizens. For them, the worst-case 
scenario seems to be that when citizens lose their trust, they refrain from civic 
participation (or consumption) and thus stop ‘feeding’ the state (or the market). 
Hence, it is inertia that is mostly feared. This inertia, however, is not to be con-
fused with mistrust. As Luhmann has elaborated, trust and mistrust are func-
tionally equivalent strategies of engagement. It is the lack of trust and mistrust 
that results in inertia. Mistrust is not only a reasonable reaction towards the 
revelations, it may also be the first step towards critical political engagement.
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Trusting the Math and Mistrusting Humans 
How Politically Sensitized Engineers of Cryptographic Systems 
Cope with Ontological Insecurity in the Digitally Augmented 
Life-World
Nicolai Ruh
While I pray that public awareness and debate will lead 
to reform, bear in mind that the policies of men change 
in time, and even the Constitution is subverted when 
the appetites of power demand it. In words from histo-
ry: Let us speak no more of faith in man, but bind him 
down from mischief by the chains of cryptography.
Edward SnowdEn (citEd by GrEEnwald 2014: 24)
Politically aware designers and implementers of cryptographic systems con-
ceive of the internet as the ‘nervous system of the 21st century’, one that per-
meates virtually all aspects of the social fabric.1 This diversified community is 
united by a shared epistemic perspective on the digitally augmented life-world. 
This specific approach to the world is informed by their expert knowledge 
about the internet’s technological foundation principles. These constitutive 
conditions that underlie digitally mediated social relationships are invisible for 
the common internet user. It is this exclusive knowledge within the tech-com-
munity that leads to a collectively shared awareness of trust problems that are 
idiosyncratic for the way information is being (re-)produced and distributed 
in a network environment. This chapter pursues the goal of providing new in-
sights into the social functions of mistrust as well as into its relationship with 
the phenomenon of trust. The chosen field of research is of specific interest 
1 | The analogy of the internet being the nervous system of the 21st century was for-
mulated by Cory Doctorow in his article ‘The internet is the answer to all the questions 
of our time’. See: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/15/internet-ans 
wer-questions-of-our-time
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in this regard, since the builders of cryptographic systems pursue their goal 
of solving trust problems within the context of a fundamentally mistrustful 
communication environment. As it turns out, trust and mistrust fulfil inter-
related functions in this field. I argue that developers and implementers of 
cryptographic systems do not fully suspend trust, but source out specific ele-
ments of nescience to the sphere of mathematics. My thesis is that by doing so, 
they create an isolated domain of calculability and provability that allows them 
to cope with the complexities and fundamental insecurities of an increasingly 
digitally organized life-world.
The goal of modern cryptographic protocols is to allow communicating par-
ties to communicate securely over a fundamentally insecure channel. Cryp-
tographic protocols therefore make sure that no third party (‘man-in-the-mid-
dle’) has the ability to either impersonate itself as a trusted end-point (reflecting 
the concept of ‘authenticity’), manipulate the data from one point of the com-
munication channel to the other (the concept of ‘integrity’), or record the data 
in transit (the concept of ‘confidentiality’) (Schneier 2000: 85). The security of 
asymmetric cryptographic systems rests on the (yet unproven) assumption that 
mathematical problems exist that are computationally unfeasibly to solve, even 
for the most sophisticated and technically best equipped attacker (which today 
most likely is the NSA). The exchange of private keys over an insecure channel 
(public key cryptography) and the employment of digital signatures to ensure 
the authenticity and integrity of the communication rest on two assumptions. 
Firstly, that it is easy for the communication parties to compute a mathematical 
calculation in one direction and, secondly, that it is computationally infeasible 
for an attacker knowing the result of the calculation to redo the calculation pro-
cess in order to break the encryption. System designers develop cryptographic 
protocols against the assumption of an omnipresent ‘man-in-the-middle’ who 
is trying to intercept and manipulate information on its way from sender to 
receiver (Schneier 2000 ibid). It is this generalized mistrust in the sense of an 
awareness of the omnipresent potential for an internet user’s experience to be 
manipulated by unknown third parties on the invisible and intangible techni-
cal layer that developers of cryptographic tools take as a starting point for the 
conceptualization of trust models based on the assumed hardness of specific 
mathematical problems.2
In the following, I will examine how politically sensitized developers and 
implementers of cryptographic tools cope with what I term ontological inse-
curity. Drawing on the concept of ‘ontological security’ (Giddens 1990), I will 
2 | This generalized mistrust also finds its expression in cryptographers’ terminology 
for anticipated adversaries: ‘Eve’ stands for any possible eavesdropper and ‘Mallory’ 
for any malicious entity which is trying to forge the content of information or to impose 
itself as a communicating endpoint (see Schneier 2000: 85).
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develop the concept of ontological insecurity in order to describe the specific 
epistemology of the analysed actors towards trust relationships in the digitally 
augmented life-world. What is revealed is that this way of approaching trust 
is characterized by a fundamental questioning of the givenness of specific 
pre-conditions for trust relationships. These problems only become visible un-
derneath the level of the actual communication experience – the level of the 
networks and protocols that make up the internet. 
From a Sociology of Knowledge perspective, I will show that generalized 
mistrust has a constitutive function for establishing reliability in a life-world 
that is increasingly inhabited by a multitude of unknown actors with opaque 
interests. Cryptographic systems are a reaction towards a social environment 
that is increasingly pervaded by fundamental insecurities and characterized 
by a lack of acquaintance of its inhabitants with regards to its underlying trust 
conditions. It will become clear that from the perspective of politically sensi-
tized system developers, the reliance on mathematical assumptions constitutes 
the last remaining trust anchor for a new social contract that is implied in 
the introductory quote by Edward Snowden.3 Snowden’s epigraph points to a 
fundamental erosion of trust assumptions towards human institutions. I will 
point out that this fundamental mistrust goes as deep as to the ontological 
layer of our epistemic approach to the world that is increasingly structured by 
digital technologies. Snowden’s urge for a new social contract based on cryp-
tography implies that mathematics contains within itself specific qualities that 
allow cryptographers to replace trust in human institutions with systems that 
regulate social behaviour in an unambiguous and tamper-proof manner.
This chapter is structured in the following way: After a brief portrayal of 
the community of politically sensitized engineers of cryptographic systems, 
I will contextualize their epistemic perspective of ontological insecurity in the 
context of the specific characteristics of the digitally augmented life-world. 
I will then discuss relevant literature on trust and mistrust. Subsequently, 
I will critically discuss these concepts in their relation to the characteristics 
of the digitally mediated life-world. Based on these theoretical considerations, 
I will delineate the approach of generalized mistrust as a strategy of engineers 
of cryptographic systems to cope with the problem of ontological insecurity and 
the associated lack of acquaintance with regards to the trust modalities in this 
new social sphere. In the final part, I will briefly outline a worldview within 
which mathematics and the associated ideas of transparency and provability be-
3 | In this quote Snowden paraphrases a statement by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson’s 
original quote goes as follows: ‘In questions of power, then, let no more be said of con-
fidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.’ This 
statement is part to the Kentucky Resolution from 1798. 
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come the cornerstones of a post-social contract that locates the feasibility of so-
cial principles in a sphere beyond the social realm (Knorr Cetina 2001, 2007).
tHe CoMMunit y of PolitiCally sensitizeD engineers 
of CryP togr aPHiC systeMs
When I talk about the community of politically sensitized engineers of cryp-
tographic systems, I am referring to a highly diversified network of people and 
institutions. This community is comprised of complex expert systems that in-
clude cryptographers from the field of applied mathematics, system develop-
ers, coders, and hackers. These technically versed experts work on different 
parts of cryptographic systems. Mathematicians develop cryptographic primi-
tives that encompass mathematical problems, which build the foundations of 
cryptographic protocols. Cryptographers develop the protocols that specify the 
modalities in which communication between parties takes place. System de-
velopers draft the applications in which the protocols are embedded and im-
plementers write the code that transfers these concepts into running software. 
The boundaries between the areas of responsibility are fluent in practice. Many 
of these experts work on different aspects of cryptographic systems and have a 
broad understanding of the underlying problems. However, what became appar-
ent during my research was the existence of experts in each of these specific do-
mains whose expertise is decision-relevant for the other community members. 
This is due to the complexity of the field and the diverse professional knowledge 
that flows into the design and implementation of cryptographic systems.
Coming from a qualitative research perspective, I approached the field 
openly following the snowball principle in arranging interviews. I entered the 
field by looking at two organizations: the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) in Ger-
many and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) in San Francisco. Berlin 
and San Francisco turned out to be two hot spots of tech-activism with strong 
networks among the respective communities. The CCC is Europe’s largest as-
sociation of hackers and, according to the club’s website, it offers ‘information 
about technical and societal issues, such as surveillance, privacy, freedom of in-
formation, hacktivism, data security and many other interesting things around 
technology and hacking issues’.4 Attending the Chaos Communication Con-
gress in Hamburg in 2014, as well as attending other conferences, provided me 
with new insights into the existence of strong networks between the CCC and 
various other projects and organizations like the Tor Project5, the Free Software 
4 | This quote is taken from the club’s English website, see: https://ccc.de/en/
5 | Tor is an onion-routing network that allows for anonymous communication online. 
See: https://www.fsf.org/
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Foundation (FSF)6, and the EFF to name but a few. What unites these institu-
tions is their members’ strong believe that cryptography is a key technology for 
preserving social norms like privacy or freedom of speech. 
The EFF is the most prominent civil rights organization focusing on digital 
rights issues in the United States. The organization employs lawyers, activists, 
and IT-experts. Aside from litigation work, EFF’s tech staff is working on tech-
nical solutions for surveillance issues. The ‘Let’s Encrypt’ project for example 
was realized by the EFF in cooperation with the Mozilla Foundation.7 During 
my research I conducted interviews with people from various crypto-related 
projects that I encountered in the immediate surroundings of these organiza-
tions. What unites these people is the commonly shared awareness that their 
work as system engineers has strong political and moral implications. A com-
monly shared attitude within the community is the idea that technological 
design decisions have regulatory effects on a societal level. Lawrence Lessig 
– a legal scholar and former member of the EFF’s Board of Directors – made 
famous this notion with the concept of ‘Code is Law’ (see Lessig 2006). One 
system implementer I talked to in San Francisco argued that a lot of people 
within the community would tie normative assumptions to this notion of code 
having similar regulatory effects as legislature. He further stated that many 
community members would adhere to specific idealizations of how the internet 
should be. The following quote by Bruce Schneier, a prominent figure within 
the politically sensitized cryptographic community, exemplifies a self-concep-
tion that I encountered quite frequently within the community: the self-under-
standing that there is a moral responsibility facing system developers: to design 
the internet according to specific social norms. In the wake of the publication 
of the NSA’s and GCHQ’s secret surveillance programs, Schneier addressed the 
engineering community with the words:
Government and industry have betrayed the internet, and us. By subverting the internet 
at every level to make it a vast, multi-layered and robust surveillance platform, the NSA 
has undermined a fundamental social contract. The companies that build and mana-
ge our internet infrastructure, the companies that create and sell us our hardware and 
software, or the companies that host our data: we can no longer trust them to be ethical 
6 | The Free Software Foundation (FSF) promotes user freedom. It is a non-profit or-
ganization whose developers publish free and open software under the GNU Public Li-
cense, see: https://www.torproject.org/
7 | For fur ther information about the EFF see the organizations website, available on-
line under the URL: https://www.eff.org/. For fur ther information about ‘Let’s Encrypt’, 
see: https://letsencrypt.org/ 
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internet stewards. This is not the internet the world needs, or the internet its creators 
envisioned. We need to take it back.8
In this moral wake-up call Schneier is referring to the fact that US-companies 
like Google and Facebook, who, either voluntarily or under legal pressure, co-
operated with intelligence agencies by sharing user data. Framing this coopera-
tion as the breaching of a global social contract is characteristic for the idealiza-
tion of this technology. In fact, many of these morally sensitized tech-experts 
grew up with the pre-commercialized internet of the 1980s and early 1990s and 
still uphold the promises, hopes and expectations that a lot of internet pioneers 
invested in the technology in its early days. One commonly shared idealization 
of the internet is the idea that digital networks enable the free flow of knowl-
edge and thereby prevent censorship and increase individual autonomy.9 Tied 
to this assumption is the promise that computers can improve humanity’s un-
derstanding of the world. This idea became an important pillar of the ‘hacker 
ethics’ that was formulated by Steven Levy in his 1984 book ‘Hackers: Heroes 
of the Computer Revolution’ (Levy 2010) and has since been circulated within 
the politically sensitized engineering community.
Before I proceed with a discussion of the concepts of trust and mistrust as 
different strategies of coping with uncertainty, I will delineate the problem of 
what I term ontological insecurity. I argue that politically sensitized developers 
of cryptographic systems perceive the current IT-infrastructure to be charac-
terized by radical uncertainty with regards to the actual properties of trust rela-
tionships. I will show that their systems approach this problem of uncertainty 
in a specific way.
tHe ProBleM of ontologiCal inseCurit y 
in tHe Digitally augMenteD life-worlD
Digital information technologies increasingly affect virtually all spheres of the 
contemporary life-word. Especially proprietary internet services like Facebook, 
Twitter, and Google have become natural tools for sharing personal informa-
tion and gathering information about what is going on in the world. However, 
the fact that internet users produce more and more data means their utterances 
8 | Schneiers’ ar ticle ‘The US government has betrayed the internet. We need to take it 
back’ was published in the Guardian on September 5th 2013, see: http://www.theguar 
dian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying 
9 | This idea was famously formulated by John Gilmore – one of the early cypherpunks 
– in his statement ‘the Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it’. See: 
http://www.toad.com/gnu/
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of life become more traceable and subject to further scrutiny by a variety of 
social actors like governments, private corporations or criminals. A large part 
of these manifestations of life is being emitted unwittingly in the form of so 
called metadata. Metadata is a by-product of computation and provides infor-
mation about when, where and with whom communication took place. The 
looming ‘Internet of Things’ – the meshing up of everyday ‘smart’ objects with 
the internet and the algorithmic evaluation of personal data – has added a new 
quality of how knowledge is generated and how it takes effect in contemporary 
life. According to Couldry and Hepp this data driven stock of knowledge shapes 
the ‘ontology of everyday interaction’ in a way that social actors often are una-
ware of and do not have control over (Couldry and Hepp 2017: 126). I argue that 
the temporally and spatially decontextualized procession of our utterances of 
life by globally dispersed unknown entities increasingly restructures our sys-
tem of orientation in the world in ways intangible for the networked individual 
(Ruh forthcoming).
Bruce Schneier refers to this imperceptible, spatially and temporally un-
bounded social dimension of the life-world in his blog post ‘Data Is a Toxic 
Asset’.10 He argues that personal data is being emitted over insecure networks, 
stored on vulnerable infrastructure and analysed by entities that the individual 
is unaware of. The equation of data emission with environmental pollution 
that resonates in the title of Schneier’s blog post is a common interpretation 
scheme among crypto-advocates. In that vein, one San Francisco based sys-
tem developer I spoke to argued that he considers data to be something ‘that 
can possibly harm you in the future.’ Like radioactive contamination, it would 
take effect underneath the level of an individual’s experience with its disastrous 
consequences surfacing only in the future. One year prior to the leaking of the 
‘Five Eyes’ surveillance programs by Edward Snowden, Julian Assange high-
lighted the physical delimitation of our utterances of life and the invisible social 
dimension of the current internet infrastructure: 
When you communicate over the internet, when you communicate using mobile phones, 
which are now meshed to the internet, your communications are being intercepted by 
military intelligence organizations. It’s like having a tank in your bedroom. It’s a soldier 
between you and your wife as you’re SMSing. We are all living under martial law as far 
as our communications are concerned, we just can’t see the tanks – but they are there 
(Assange 2012: 33).
10 | The post is accessible on Schneier’s blog ‘Schneier on Security’, see: https://
www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/03/data_is_a_toxic.html
Nicolai Ruh30
This risk awareness is characteristic for ‘reflexive modernity’ in that the sourc-
es of the underlying problem are framed as being invisible and its possible 
effects to be locally as well as temporally unbounded (see Beck 1992). The im-
perceptible, locally and temporally unbounded dimension of the life-world is 
one feature of what I term ontological insecurity. However, ontological insecu-
rity – as I deploy the concept – has a further dimension that is characterized by 
a general suspicion towards the truthfulness of digitally mediated information 
and a generalized mistrust towards social institutions. 
The publication of the Snowden material not only demonstrated the extent 
to which intelligence agencies are tracking global internet traffic in a passive 
manner but also gave insights into how these well-funded arcane institutions 
actively undermine the current IT-infrastructure in order to set up covert 
false-flag operations and corrode trust within oppositional communities. For 
instance, it turned out that one of GCHQ’s strategies to damage a target per-
son’s reputation is to hack their social network and email accounts in order 
to send fabricated information to friends, colleagues and neighbours. These 
strategies of deception are explicitly aimed at ‘using online techniques to make 
something happen in the real or cyber world’.11 In addition to the exploitation 
of the internet’s current infrastructure, the very providers of the underlying 
technology are frequently criticized for their opaque algorithms and their at-
tempts to manipulate the way internet users experience social reality. One fa-
mous example of the manipulation of internet users’ perception is Facebook’s 
secret psychological mood experiment on nearly 700,000 users in 2012. The 
social network hid specific emotional words from peoples’ news feeds in order 
to analyse the influence of emotional expressions for users’ behaviour to ‘like’ 
and distribute posts (Kramer et al. 2014). 
The suspicion of the deliberate distortion and algorithmic manipulation of 
digitally mediated representations of reality by diverse social actors has become 
a recurring topic over the recent years (van Dijck 2014). The most current de-
bate over the manipulation of internet users’ perception and experience is cen-
tred around accusations made by US-intelligence agencies against the Kremlin 
and President Putin regarding the influencing of the US-election campaign in 
2016 by ordering the leaking of confidential material from the Democratic Na-
tional Convention and influencing public opinion in favour of Donald Trump 
11 | This quote is taken from the publication of a GHCQ document entitled ‘The Ar t of 
Deception: Training for Online Covert Operations’. In his ar ticle ‘How covert agents in-
filtrate the internet to manipulate, deceive, and destroy reputations’, published on the 
website The Intercept, investigative journalist Glenn Greenwald analysed the document 
and came to the conclusion ‘that these agencies are attempting to control, infiltrate, 
manipulate, and warp online discourse, and in doing so, are compromising the integrity 
of the internet itself.’ See: https://theintercept.com/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/ 
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with the help of ‘fake news’ distributed by automated social-bots. What makes 
these allegations critical is the problem of evidentialization of authorship, the 
challenge of providing proof for the manipulation of information in an online 
environment.12 One consequence of the problem of providing proof for the au-
thorship of a hacker attack is that it is easy for state actors to instrumentalize 
these attacks for political ends.
The omnipresent potential of the manipulation of internet users’ experience 
of trust relationships is another feature of ontological insecurity. This involves 
the technical ability to distort the perception of digitally mediated representa-
tions of reality. I use the concept to refer to a specific attitude towards the world 
that informs a generalized mistrust against social entities of all kinds. The 
concept is, in some sense, related to Anthony Giddens’s notion of ontological 
security. For Giddens, ontological security is closely connected to the concept 
of trust (Giddens 1990: 92). He defines ontological security as the ‘confidence 
that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the 
constancy in the surrounding social and material environment of action’ (ibid: 
92). Giddens conceptualizes ontological security as a psychological phenome-
non in the sense of an unconscious emotional state of mind that brackets out 
reasonable feelings of insecurity in an increasingly complex life-world that is 
characterized by existential threats. 
He distinguishes two types of actors that exclude ontological security in 
their way of looking at the world: philosophers and schizophrenics. These two 
categories of actors who take over a perspective of ontological insecurity differ 
in what Schutz and Luckmann call the ‘specific epochē’ that characterizes their 
cognitive style of approaching reality (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 27). In the 
mental sphere of scientific reasoning, the philosopher renders problematic on-
tological assumptions about the world whereas in his everyday attitude these 
problems are being excluded. For the schizophrenic however, doubts about the 
givenness of ontological security pervade what Schutz and Luckmann (with 
reference to Edmund Husserl) call the ‘natural attitude of everyday life’ (ibid: 3). 
As a consequence, the schizophrenic ties a relevance of action to his problema-
tization of the world. Giddens points out that the anxieties of the schizophrenic 
are ‘hardly expressive of a mental lack’ but are ‘more the result of emotional su-
persensitivity than irrationality’ (Giddens 1990: 93). Against this background, 
I argue that the attitude of generalized mistrust shown by system engineers is 
the result of a specific approach to the world that is informed by their percep-
tion of ontological insecurity. This perception of ontological insecurity is not 
really an emotional gut feeling; rather it stems from their expert knowledge 
12 | For an in depth discussion about the political and technical problems of eviden-
tialization see Bruce Schneier’s blog on the DNC hack: https://www.schneier.com/
blog/archives/2017/01/attributing _the_1.html
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about the foundational principles of the digitally augmented life-world. In this 
regard, it is telling that a lot of activists who were referred to as ‘tin-foil-hats’ 
by community outsiders saw their deepest fears about the manipulation and 
surveillance of global internet communication vindicated in the wake of the 
Snowden publications. 
In the following, I will look at the prevalent literature on trust and mistrust 
in order to contextualize my observations. I argue that mistrust is a functional 
equivalent of trust in that it allows the reduction of complexity against the back-
ground of uncertainty. Furthermore, I contend that in the case of engineers 
of cryptographic systems the specific function of mistrust is to enable them 
to establish a context of action that is characterized by calculability. Extreme 
negative expectation allows them to suspend ambiguity with regards to the an-
ticipated intentions of the mistrusted entity. As we will see, in the case at hand, 
this strategy of suspending ambivalence is supplemented by a flanking strategy 
of ‘trusting the math’ and thereby transferring the element of nescience to an 
isolated province of meaning.
trust anD Mistrust as at tituDes 
to De al witH unCertaint y
Social scientists have paid scarce attention to the phenomenon of mistrust. 
When we look at definitions of mistrust, we can find some common positions in 
the existing literature. First of all, mistrust is commonly characterized as a sub-
jective attitude that is grounded in a specific mode of experiencing the world. 
This is also one main feature that is commonly assigned to trust. Martin En-
dress locates mistrust on the extreme negative end of a scale that describes an 
individual’s inner attitude towards the experience of the latent fragility of social 
reality. According to Endress, mistrust is the result of a juggling act emerging 
from having to deal with aspects of the life-world that are taken for granted and 
aspects of the life-world that have become problematic and make necessary new 
strategies for action and sense-making (Endress 2002: 8). In this characteri-
zation, we find a characteristic that can also be found in Luhmann’s approach 
towards trust as well as mistrust. Luhmann argues that trust and mistrust both 
presuppose a certain degree of acquaintance or familiarity with aspects of the 
life-world. Only if we have a certain degree of knowledge about the constitutive 
conditions of social situations, we can develop an attitude that is characterized 
either by trust or mistrust. According to Luhmann, acquaintance is a precondi-
tion for the development of expectations of a specific type (Luhmann 1973: 83). 
Simmel also emphasizes the importance of knowledge as a precondition for 
trust. He argues that trust takes place in a state of uncertainty between knowl-
edge and nescience (Simmel 1992: 383). Guido Möllering digs deeper into the 
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space between knowledge and nescience characterizing it as a ‘leap of faith’. He 
thereby focuses on the irrational element of trust, arguing that ‘trust combines 
weak inductive knowledge with some mysterious, unaccountable faith’ (Mölle-
ring 2001: 413). Udo Thiedeke also emphasizes the irrational element of trust 
by stating that trust – due to the lack of knowledge – makes reasonable calcula-
tion impossible (Thiedeke 2007: 175). 
If trust and mistrust both refer to specific attitudes that stem from an un-
certainty with regards to specific aspects of the life-world, then the question 
remains: what are the qualitative differences between those two attitudes and 
what are their functionalities? It is a common argument in the literature that 
trust is an attitude characterized by the suspension of doubt. According to Lu-
hmann, trust is characterized by the acceptance of risk with the goal to reduce 
social complexity (Luhmann 1973). He points out that mistrust is not the flip-
side of trust but its functional equivalent. Following Luhmann, trust and mis-
trust both reduce social complexity. He argues that the attitude of mistrust is 
characterized by a maximum negative expectation. This radical negative expec-
tation would then rule out specific types of action and allow for instrumentally 
rational behaviour (ibid: 78). 
On the basis of these considerations, I argue that in a life-world that is in-
creasingly characterized by ontological insecurity, instrumental rationality, 
provability and calculability can become highly desirable features.13 This argu-
ment will become more evident when we take a closer look at how crypto-advo-
cates contextualize their work in the bigger picture.
gener alizeD Mistrust as a Constitutive eleMent 
for tHe PreConDitions of trust 
In the following, I will delineate the productive dimensions of generalized mis-
trust for the construction of cryptographic solutions for trust problems in the 
digital age. It will be shown that generalized mistrust indeed reduces social 
complexity. In the case of the developers of cryptographic tools, the premise of 
a fundamentally hostile communication environment functions as a starting 
point for developing protocols that provide the ‘integrity’, ‘confidentiality’, and 
‘authenticity’ of communication as a precondition for trust. Within this per-
spective, the concept of trust still plays a crucial role in that the designers of 
13 | One counter strategy in dealing with ontological insecurity can be identified in 
the fundamental abandonment of the expectation of truthful behaviour. This attitude is 
characterized by the acceptance of the lie as a persuasion strategy. It f inds its political 
expression in the often-quoted term of ‘post-factuality’ that was elected ‘Word of the 
Year’ in Germany in 2016.
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cryptographic tools externalize trust towards specific assumptions about the 
mathematical features of their protocols. We will see that the ‘leap of faith’ that, 
according to Möllering, is characteristic for dealing with uncertainties, is still a 
relevant feature within crypto-activists approach to the world. 
However, I argue that generalized mistrust towards any possible interme-
diary in the communication process creates an isolated sphere of predictabil-
ity and provability. This isolated domain allows designers of cryptographic 
protocols to develop technical tools that substitute acquaintance towards the 
constitutive principles of the life-world with reliance on specific features of its 
underlying technical infrastructure. These features of ‘confidentiality’, ‘integri-
ty’, and ‘authenticity’ are aimed at providing the preconditions for the accurate 
experience of trust relationships in the digitally augmented life-world in that 
they force humans towards trustworthy behaviour. In this regard, mistrust al-
lows cryptographers to shift from trust to reliance in that the features of their 
protocols claim to be mathematically provable in an objective sense. 
In order to get a clearer picture of how system engineers conceptualize trust 
problems in an increasingly digitalized life-world, we need to take a closer look 
at how crypto-advocates locate their work in a bigger societal context:
People are used to a world where most of the time they can just assume that their trust 
relationships are functional. They assume that you can walk into a hospital, that there is 
a person sitting at the desk, that that person (…) is authorized to take your information. 
You give them your information and you assume that it will be communicated with the 
doc. (...) In the world we come from (…) trust and fraud, malice is the cost of making 
business. We institute some level of procedure to make sure that that’s happening. We 
are now transitioning to a world where (…) operating on a level of assumed trust is no 
longer viable. (…) It costs you personally and the people that you interact with and so-
ciety at large too much to just simply assume trust. Verifying trust manually is also too 
expensive. We cannot possibly do that. So what we need is our machines to verify the 
trust for us. (…) We need a machine that you trust to simply go in and check all of the-
se relationships. And just do it quickly, seamlessly and only tell you if something is a 
mess and do that in a reliable way (…). So what the fundamental nature of cryptography 
is, is to embed in systems trust relationships and then verify that those trust relation-
ships are correct before proceeding through mathematics. That’s the fundamental goal. 
(Interview with founder of Silicon Valley star t-up, Skuchain. June 2015, Mountain View, 
California.) 
This quote is part of an interview I conducted with the founder of the Silicon 
Valley start-up Skuchain. The initial idea behind Skuchain was to make it pos-
sible for end consumers to trace the supply chain of consumer products via dig-
ital signatures that mathematically proof the origin of the single components 
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of a particular good.14 It therefore utilizes the Blockchain technology, which is 
at the heart of the crypto-currency Bitcoin. 
This interview snippet embeds the work of politically motivated cryptogra-
phers and designers of cryptographic systems in the context of a fundamental 
cultural paradigm shift with regards to the functioning of trust relationships 
in the digitalized world. It captures and condenses the bigger societal picture 
of their endeavour: to build cryptographic tools in order to restore the function-
ality of trust relationships in a world where ‘operating on a level of assumed 
trust is no longer viable.’ This brief extract describes the fundamental problem 
facing designers of cryptographic tools. According to this argumentation, the 
risks underlying trust assumptions have increased in a digitalized world to a 
level that makes the suspension of doubt as an irrational element of trust im-
practicable. Therefore, my interview partner argues for a solution where ‘our 
machines verify the trust for us’ in a ‘reliable way’, since ‘verifying trust man-
ually’ would be too expensive. 
Following his argumentation, trust in the analogue world of physical en-
counters is an implicit phenomenon that is characterized by mutually shared 
implicit knowledge about the nature and contexts of social relationships. In this 
world of physical encounters, relationships characterized by trust rely on the 
ability of individuals to know the social entities that are engaged in a specific 
context of action. In the quotation above, this would be the receptionist who 
communicates medical information to the doctor. The founder of Skuchain 
considers this acquaintance with regards to typified role expectations (Goff-
man 1959) as a prerequisite for an attitude of trust. He further specifies the 
function of cryptographic systems. They basically fulfil two purposes: they (1) 
‘embed in systems trust relationships and then (2) verify that those trust rela-
tionships are correct before proceeding through mathematics’. The interviewee 
further points out, that cryptographic protocols undertake this task underneath 
the level of the actual communication experience in that these technologies 
inform the communicating parties only if ‘something is a mess’. In the first 
approach, we can characterize this process as the substitution of human cogni-
tive processes based on acquaintance or familiarity towards the life-world with 
erecting and enforcing mathematically provable protocol sequences. We will 
see that most cryptographic tools do not make trust dispensable but rather pro-
vide the pre-conditions for trust that are becoming fundamentally problematic 
in a communication environment that does not guarantee the properties of 
‘authenticity’, ‘integrity’, and ‘confidentiality’ in any tangible way.
14 | Over the course of my field work the star t-up’s focus shif ted towards the deploy-
ment of financial products (Brackets) that are aimed at facilitating B2B Trade and Sup-
ply Chain Finance. See https://www.skuchain.com/
Nicolai Ruh36
For a better understanding of how this substitution process works we have to 
take a closer look at how designers of cryptographic tools translate mistrust from 
a social into a technical problem. Politically sensitized IT-experts treat increasing 
tendencies of centralization and intermediation of the global communication 
infrastructure to be fundamentally problematic, since this trend facilitates the 
surveillance and manipulation of information flows on a mass scale. These ex-
perts know about the general insecurity of software applications and the specific 
vulnerability of centralized systems. The incomprehensibility of the multitude of 
possible malicious actors that try to attack and undermine centralized systems 
on a global scale leads to a commonly shared threat model among cryptographers 
and system developers. This threat model is characterized by a general mistrust 
towards any known and unknown entity with the ability to successfully attack a 
communication network. One activist put it the following way:
Any entity that sits between (or next to) the user and the endpoint they’re communicat-
ing with represents a potential threat. The list of threatening actors includes institutions 
of all sor ts (businesses, universities, etc.), governments, internet service providers, 
malevolent network administrators, and random hackers (Slepak 2014: 13).
This incomprehensibility of possible attackers makes necessary specific strat-
egies for anticipating and preventing possible attacks, since the anticipation of 
the motivation of each single attacker is impossible. One strategy of cryptog-
raphers and system developers is to transfer this generalized mistrust from 
the social sphere to the level of the technical infrastructure. In a talk held at 
the Chaos Communication Congress 2014 in Hamburg, Seth Schoen – Senior 
Staff Technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation – called upon the hack-
er community to develop a broader understanding of the fundamental techni-
cal insecurity that the digitally augmented life world is based upon. He stated:
We need a much stronger vision that the things around us are communications networks 
that are actually attacking us all the time on a large scale, routinely. That these networks 
are untrustworthy and that we need to protect our communications against them, for 
many reasons, for many threat models, against many attackers, in many different situa-
tions. And there isn’t just one reason for that. There is a whole panoply of reasons why 
we ought to think of networks as untrustworthy and why we ought to think of network 
protocols as needing to protect communication against the networks. (…) The network 
operator, everyone along the path has the full ability to spy on everything that you do, and 
to modify it and to inject things.15
15 | This quote is part of a transcription of Schoens’ talk on ‘Let’s Encrypt’ held on the 
Chaos Communication Congress 2014. See: https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_6397_-_ 
en_-_saal_6_-_201412301400_-_let_s_encrypt_-_seth_schoen#video&t=209
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Schoen characterizes the digitally augmented life world as being permeated 
by an omnipresent network infrastructure that is attacking trust relationships 
between end users permanently and routinely on a large scale. In this technical 
portrayal of the life-world, human adversaries and their motivations fade into 
the background and the infrastructure itself becomes the source of ontological 
insecurity. It is this fundamentally unsafe technology that allows for fraudu-
lent and malicious behaviour and therefore reinforces a generalized mistrust 
towards any entity that potentially sits between the communicating parties.
Blinding out the motivations of an attacker reduces social complexity and 
has tremendous implications for conceptualizing a trustworthy network infra-
structure on a global level. First of all, treating all possible nodes of a network 
as untrustworthy imposes the same rules on everybody. Secondly, transferring 
mistrust from the social to the technical sphere creates an isolated domain, 
in which trust problems become calculable. It is crucial to understand cryp-
tographer’s reference to the extra social realm of mathematics and physics in 
this regard. Without going into the theoretical and technical details of mod-
ern cryptographic protocols, it is important to understand the equalizing role 
that cryptographers assign to mathematics when developing solutions for trust 
problems on a global level. 
trusting tHe MatH to Cre ate an isol ateD DoMain 
of ProvaBilit y 
As mentioned in the introduction, the goal of cryptographic protocols is to safe-
guard the principles of ‘authenticity’, ‘integrity’, and ‘confidentiality’ of digitally 
mediated communication against the assumption of the hardness of specific 
mathematical problems. These mathematical problems are embedded in the 
cryptographic primitives that form the basis on which cryptographic systems 
are built upon. Developers and implementers of cryptographic systems usually 
utilize established cryptographic primitives that are listed in so-called ‘cipher 
suites’ according to particular areas of application.16 Politically aware system 
developers deduce an empowering aspiration from these assumptions. Jacob 
Appelbaum, a former developer of the Tor Project, put this capacitating and 
equalizing quality of mathematics the following way: ‘One must acknowledge 
with cryptography no amount of coercive force will ever solve a math problem’ 
(Assange 2012: 61).
It is important to understand these dimensions of ‘empowerment’ and 
‘provability’ as interrelated elements for crypto-activists’ goal of providing 
16 | One such cipher suite that is recommended by the NSA is called ‘NSA Suite B Cryp-
tography’. See: https://www.nsa.gov/what-we-do/information-assurance/
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‘authenticity’, ‘integrity’, and ‘confidentiality’ as a precondition for trust. The 
equalizing quality of cryptography not only rests on the assumed hardness of 
specific math problems, but also on Kerckhoffs’ principle. It states that the se-
curity of a cryptographic system is reliant on the secrecy of the private key 
and on the disclosure of the cryptographic algorithm (Kerckhoffs 1983). Only 
cryptographic systems that can be studied in public and that withstood attacks 
over time are believed to be secure. As a consequence, the same cryptographic 
primitives are being deployed on a global scale. Politically motivated system 
developers see this as equal fighting chances for everyone. Many crypto-advo-
cates therefore characterize cryptographic systems as bipartisan technologies. 
One spokesperson of the Chaos Computer Club put it the following way during 
a debate in Berlin:
There is an inherent refusal [among state officials] to accept the fact that math does not 
care about your intentions. And computers most of the time do not. They are unable to 
dif ferentiate whether what they are currently doing is good or bad.17
This statement is a reaction towards state officials’ demand for the regulation of 
strong cryptography in the context of fighting organized crime and terrorism. 
Cryptographers argue that undermining the cryptographic standards would 
weaken the overall global IT-security and pose a threat to the global communi-
cation infrastructure.18 In addition to these empowering and equalizing quali-
ties that activists assign to mathematics, relying on mathematics creates an iso-
lated sphere of clarity and calculability that allows cryptographers to shift from 
trust to certainty. Within the academic cryptographic community, there has 
been a strong tendency towards the promotion of formal security definitions. 
It is a common narrative within the academic community that modern cryp-
tography has shifted from an ‘art’ to a ‘science’ and that one crucial condition 
for this scientific turn is the creation of highly contextualized formal security 
definitions. Koblitz et al (2001) define a ‘security proof’ or a ‘reductionist secu-
rity argument’ the following way:
17 | Linus Neumann, one of CCC‘s spokespersons, made this statement at the ‘Open 
Debate on the Politics of Encryption’, a podium discussion held in Berlin in July 2016. 
See: ht tps://cdn.net zpolitik.org/wp-upload/2016-07-20_Open-Debate-on-the-Poli 
tics-of-Encryption.mp3 
18 | As a reaction to US- and British government officials’ claim to restrict the use of 
strong cryptography after the attacks on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo 
in January 2015, leading cryptographers published an expert assessment with regards 
to the feasibility of these proposals. The experts concluded, that weakening the cryp-
tographic standards would pose a threat to the overall IT-security. See: https://www.
schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-keys-under-doormats-CSAIL.pdf
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What a ‘security proof’ – or, as we prefer to say – a reductionist security argument [57] – 
actually does is show that an adversary cannot succeed in mounting a cer tain category 
of attack unless a cer tain underlying mathematical problem is traceable. (Koblitz et al. 
2011: 20)
This form of generalized mistrust as a scientific epistemology reduces social 
complexity in that it brackets out the motivation of an attacker by creating an 
isolated domain of definition. Security proofs only take into consideration clear-
ly defined categories of attacks as well as assumptions about the computational 
capacities of an attacker and his or hers sophistication in solving particular 
mathematical problems.19 At this point it is important to note that the formali-
zation of security proofs is part of a discourse within the academic community 
that aims at locating cryptography in the field of the natural sciences. This 
community only partially overlaps with the politically sensitized community of 
system developers and implementers. The latter is more concerned with ‘real 
world problems’ than with formal definitions (Rogaway 2015). However, I argue 
that the basic idea of the provability of specific security parameters against a 
generalized attacker still is an important aspect of their mind-set. In the wake 
of the publication of the Snowden documents, Bruce Schneier addressed the 
engineering community with the words ‘Trust the math. Encryption is your 
friend.’ He argued that properly implemented, cryptography would remain the 
last tool to protect the internet user even against the most potent adversary.20 
One system implementer I spoke to in San Francisco told me that this notion of 
trusting the math was taken over by the engineering community as ‘a gospel’.
Koblitz et al (2001) however, notice that in practice, cryptography still has 
a strong subjective element in that intuition plays a crucial role in conceptual-
izing cryptographic systems. This intuitive element stems from the fact that 
applied cryptography is a future oriented endeavour that has to take into consid-
eration possible computational developments or mathematical breakthroughs. 
Cryptographers thus have to take into account the temporal aspect of the digi-
19 | It is important to note that basic research in cryptography takes place in a high-
ly opaque research environment. Aside from public academic research there exists a 
highly arcane cryptographic community within the intelligence community that has a 
longstanding tradition, which predates public research for decades. It is assumed that 
this highly funded arcane community might be ahead of the game with regards to spe-
cific mathematical breakthroughs or in the field of applied quantum computing. Break-
throughs in the latter field of research would render most of the current cryptographic 
primitives unusable.
20 | Schneier’s ar ticle is called ‘NSA Surveillance: a Guide to Staying Secure’, see: 
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2013/09/nsa_surveillance_a_g.html
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tally augmented life-world.21 Koblitz et al (2001) therefore characterize cryptog-
raphy as a highly speculative field of research:
Part of the reason why cryptography has such a strong subjective element is that spec-
ulation is central to the field. When deciding on the basic type of cryptography to use 
(RSA or ECC, for example), when choosing the type of a protocol for a given application 
(e.g., whether or not to use identity based encryption), and when selecting parameters 
(for instance, random generation versus enhanced efficiency), one has to make a guess 
about future developments in order to evaluate the fundamental issue of safety of the 
system. One has to ask: what types of adversaries are we likely to encounter, and what 
will be their most likely avenue of attack? Will there be any breakthroughs in bringing 
down the asymptotic running time to solve any of the supposedly intractable mathe-
matical problems? Will quantum computing (…) ever become practical? What new ‘side 
channel’ attacks (…) might be devised? (Koblitz et al. 2011: 32)
This contrasting of the ideal model of cryptography as a highly formalized dis-
cipline that is characterized by mathematical clarity on the one hand, and the 
rather ‘fuzzy’ practice of cryptographic work, which takes place in a complex, 
contingent and dynamic environment is an observation that is not addressed in 
academic work that aims at reductionist definitions (Goldreich 1999; Katz and 
Lindell 2008).
I argue that the problematizations in Koblitz et al (2001) indicate a field of 
tension that people working in the field of applied cryptography have to cope 
with: the necessity of reducing the complexity of the ‘real world’ against the 
background of ontological insecurity and yet still having to take into consid-
eration contingent aspects of future developments that are not theoretically 
graspable. One San Francisco-based system implementer told me that, over the 
years, awareness has grown within the community that the reliance on predic-
tions that are based on the assumption of calculable regularities (e.g. Moore’s 
Law that describes how computation power will increase over a longer period of 
time) has turned out to be highly problematic. He explained to me that this in-
sight would be the result of system developers increasingly having to cope with 
‘once-solved problems’ that are a consequence of lock-in phenomenon and false 
speculations made against the backdrop of a highly complex and contingent en-
vironment. Furthermore, the community of system implementers has to strug-
gle with the fact that transferring mathematical problems into executable code 
carries with it the risk of human failure. In fact, programming errors in the 
form of ‘bugs’ turned out to be the most frequent causes when cryptographic 
systems fail in practice. 
21 | Practically speaking they have to take into consideration that the NSA is storing 
encrypted data in order to decrypt it when it has the possibilities in the future.
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It is important to note that there are strategies within the engineering com-
munity to cope with the problem of intended and unintended human decisions 
and their unpredictable consequences. For example, the community is work-
ing on concepts like ‘machine provable computation’ and ‘machine provable 
compiling’ (MacKenzie 2001). These reductionist strategies aim at bridging the 
‘semantic gap’ between ‘pure math’ and software as a ‘social construct’ by ‘get-
ting rid of or at least detecting human idiosyncrasies’ as the system developer 
put it. This mathematization of the translation process – as I would term this 
strategy – is informed by the idea to create an isolated domain of calculability 
in a complex and contingent environment. Developers and implementers of 
cryptographic systems thereby pursue the goal of eradicating the ‘leap of faith’ 
– the gap of knowledge – that is characteristic for trust and switch to a position 
of transparency and calculability. 
However, the strategy of mathematically purifying applied cryptography at 
least currently seems to have its limitations. Confronting him with Schneier’s 
appeal to ‘trust the math’ against this set of problems, the system implement-
er replied: ‘It is such a contingent claim, that I don’t believe it anymore, even 
though I depend on it.’ It is telling that a lot of cryptographic systems that have 
found widespread application, were designed within an activist community 
that is not directly associated with the academic world. The papers that describe 
these protocols often lack the formalized ‘security proofs’ that have become a 
standard within the academic world.22
I interpret this lack of security proofs as the suspension of doubt that under-
lies the call to ‘trust the math’. I argue that this ‘leap of faith’ fulfils specific so-
cial functions. It strikes me as fundamentally relevant for understanding their 
perspective that many politically sensitized system builders, while reflecting its 
flaws, continue to adhere to this notion of math being the last remaining an-
chor for trust. I argue that this suspension of doubt – the exclusion of the prob-
lems behind assumptions about the reliability of the underlying math – enables 
activists to reduce the complexities associated with having to deal with unpre-
dictably potent adversaries while at the same time still being able to uphold 
22 | In his paper ‘The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work’ that he addressed at the 
academic crypto-community in the wake of the Snowden publications, Phillip Rogaway 
criticized the academic community for not taking into consideration real world problems 
when formalizing security proofs. Rogaway, who himself is part of the academic world, 
pointed to his observation that the politicized community would develop practicably 
usable systems that do not come with security proofs. In his paper, which was positively 
received within the political community, he called on the academic world to cooperate 
with the practitioners and provide them with proofs for their models. He argued that, 
although lacking formal security proofs, these systems would work in practice and that 
security proofs could be stated ex ante (see Rogaway 2015).
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the concept of a generalized attacker. This reduction of complexity also allows 
developers of practical applications to focus on specific features that address 
problems of the digitally augmented life-world. Furthermore – and probably – 
most importantly, it allows them to hold on to the empowering qualities that 
they assign to mathematics.
As a last point, I will illustrate how politically motivated designers of cryp-
tographic systems develop trustworthy alternatives for centralized systems that 
take into consideration the temporal dimensions of the digitally augmented 
life-world that I described at the outset. I will portray the features of Perfect 
Forward Secrecy and Plausible Deniability in order to show how these actors 
transfer a generalized mistrust towards any social entity into protocols that aim 
at establishing the foundations for a post-social contract that makes trusting 
institutions dispensable. 
‘PerfeCt forwarD seCreCy’ anD ‘Pl ausiBle DeniaBilit y’ 
as fe atures of a Post-soCial Contr aCt
What unites the projects aiming at rebuilding the internet is removing the ne-
cessity of having to trust any centralized institution or any specific node in the 
network. In this vein, one Berlin-based system developer told me that he does 
not want to have to trust anybody anymore. The projects try to achieve that goal 
by developing decentralized, distributed systems that supplement trusted third 
parties with cryptographic systems that allow the verification and proof that 
certain trust assumptions are correct. Digital signatures, for example, allow 
the receiver of a message to use a secret signing key to compute a mathematical 
value out of a sender’s message and public key. This allows the receiver of the 
message to verify the authorship of the sender. 
In recent years, politically motivated designers of cryptographic ciphers 
developed sophisticated versions of digital signatures that especially take into 
account the above mentioned temporal aspect of the digitally augmented life-
world. The developers of the OTR-protocol (Off-the-Record), for example, intro-
duced two features that found widespread application: Perfect Forward Secre-
cy and Plausible Deniability (Borisov et al. 2004).23 Perfect Forward Secrecy 
describes a feature of the protocol that prevents an attacker who intercepted a 
long-term private key from getting access to the stored encrypted data of end 
users by introducing session keys that expire after the communication took 
place. After it had become known to the public that the NSA is storing vast 
amounts of encrypted communication with the goal of analysing it retroactively 
23 | In the initial paper on OTR, the authors use the term reputability when referring to 
Plausible Deniability.
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after the encryption had been reversed, this feature became highly supported 
by the politically sensitive engineering community. 
Plausible Deniability is a communication feature that was developed against 
the background of protecting dissidents against coercion. It allows commu-
nicating parties to mathematically authenticate their communication parties 
during the communication but to make it impossible for any of the parties 
to verify to a third party that communication took place. This feature is one 
example of the constitutive quality of mistrust that arises both from the im-
plications of the digital communication infrastructure and from assumptions 
about mistrustful behaviour of social actors. One activist put this the following 
way: ‘If laws and courts were rational and just, and governments responsible 
and ethical, plausible deniability would not be a necessary, or even a desirable 
feature’ (Slepak 2014: 4). This line of argumentation is common within the cy-
pherpunk community24 – the idea that human institutions are fundamentally 
untrustworthy and that cryptography is a tool that forces these institutions to 
act in a trustworthy manner. 
A prominent theme within the politicized community is the differentiation 
between the laws of physics and the laws of men. One San Francisco-based 
activist told me that ‘if the laws of men fail then the laws of physics still work’. 
The probably most famous example of the idea to use cryptographic protocols 
in order to force institutions towards trustworthy behaviour is the functional 
principle of WikiLeaks’ dropbox for whistleblowers. It exemplifies how funda-
mental mistrust towards any social entity and the outsourcing of trust to the 
sphere of mathematics is mobilized with the goal to establish a political envi-
ronment where trusting institutions is replaced by the idea of making their 
behaviour verifiable. WikiLeaks’ dropbox utilizes a set of cryptographic proce-
dures (OpenSSL, Tor among others) that allow sources to anonymously upload 
information that they perceive to be in the public interest. It is the architecture 
itself that takes fundamental mistrust into human institutions as a starting 
point. In that the communication between the dropbox and the uploading party 
is cryptographically anonymized, it incorporates the feature of Plausible Deni-
ability and it stops any third party, including WikiLeaks, from identifying the 
source. 
24 | Cypherpunks are a globally dispersed community of activists who seek to achieve 
social change through the proactive use of privacy-enhancing cryptographic technolo-
gies. The movement dates back to the late 1980s. Cypherpunks initially communicated 
their ideas with the help of electronic mailing lists. Their fundamental ideas are captured 
in ‘The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto’ by Timothy C. May and the ‘Cypherpunk’s Manifesto’ 
by Eric Hughes. Modern cypherpunks include Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks. 
For May’s Manifesto see: https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html 
and for Hughes’ Manifesto see: https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html 
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The idea of embedding social relationships in a framework of mathemat-
ical clarity and thereby restoring fundamental human rights in a world that 
is perceived to be increasingly governed by opaque interests is what is at the 
heart of crypto-activist ideas of a new social contract. Edward Snowden’s call 
for a social contract based on cryptography has to be understood against this 
background. This argumentation about the unreliability and contingency of 
human institutions, which are prone to manipulation by interests of power is 
a theme that I encountered quite often during research. One system developer 
I talked to in the Bay Area argued that he is not too much interested in ques-
tions of the US-Constitution, which he considers to be an important but also a 
contingent historical outcome. Instead, he was interested in asking ‘what does 
the physics say in a five hundred year sense’. He is thereby referring to the 
dynamic interplay between cryptography and cryptanalysis (the breaking of 
cryptographic ciphers) that is driven by mathematical breakthroughs. Against 
the background of this perspective, the validity of social norms like privacy is 
not reliant on a public consensus or any other form of exercise of power but on 
the question whether these social norms proof to be universally executable in 
a scientific sense. 
This outsourcing of the practicability of social norms into the realm of 
mathematics and physics leaves unanswered questions of consensus. It dis-
guises the concrete motivation of the designers of these protocols as well as 
their political agenda. Lawrence Lessig pointed out early on that cryptography 
would be a Janus-faced technology, since it would allow for systems that en-
force anonymity and systems that allow for the unambiguous identification of 
individuals (Lessig 2006: 52). The answer to the question of whether there is 
a global public agreement on the desirability of decentralized systems is also 
far from unambiguous. Cryptographic systems that work on the premise of 
generalized mistrust and that replace trust in human institutions with trust in 
mathematically enforced protocols also blind out questions of accountability. 
A current example of the problem of accountability in so-called ‘trust-
less systems’ is the case of the DAO hack. It was still heavily discussed in the 
tech-community during my last fieldtrip to the Bay Area in December 2016. 
The DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) was an extreme example 
of a libertarian cypherpunk technology that completely replaces trust in hu-
man institutions with a technological system that enforces contracts on the 
basis of mathematical verifiability. The DAO was a stateless decentralized au-
tonomous organization based on the Blockchain technology. The organization 
was crowd-funded and only existed in the form of software code which has 
been made available open-source by its anonymous backers. The company was 
autonomous in the sense that there existed no Board of Directors or any oth-
er human institution that had any legal authority or executive control over its 
businesses. Richard Waters of the Financial Times described the company as 
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‘a form of investor-directed venture capital fund’ since its designated business 
was to invest in other businesses. The idea behind the company was to get 
rid of any interference by a third party that might take money for favouring 
the investment into a particular business.25 The decisions about specific in-
vestments were supposed to be made by the companies’ stakeholders based 
on a consensus model. Stakeholder rights to vote were tied to their shares that 
were expressed in the form of ‘Eth’, a crypto-currency based on the Ethereum 
Blockchain. 26 The consensus model as well as the enforcement of decisions 
was governed by so-called ‘smart contracts’ that were also part of the Ethereum 
Blockchain. However, in June 2016, unknown hackers exploited a vulnerability 
within DAO’s source code and directed one third of the funds to an anony-
mous account. This led to panic among the company’s stakeholders who had 
altogether raised an equivalent of 120 million USD. The DAO hack raised an 
intense dispute within the Blockchain community that centred on questions of 
accountability. It was heavily discussed what social entity could be held liable 
for the financial loss of DAO stakeholders given that contracts in the DAO en-
vironment are being established anonymously and enforced through software 
code.
ConClusion
The goal of the chapter was to examine how politically aware designers and 
implementers of cryptographic systems cope with ontological insecurity in 
the digitally augmented life-world. What we find is that this digitalized social 
sphere is characterized by its temporal and spatial delimitation. Furthermore, 
this vastly complex environment is characterized by a lack of acquaintance of 
its inhabitants with regards to the concrete nature of social relationships that 
unfold within this physically intangible sphere that is occupied by a diverse set 
of unknown actors with unpredictable intentions. In this social realm, trust be-
comes fundamentally problematic since it presupposes some sort of familiarity 
with the constitutive conditions of social relationships. I pointed out that the 
politically aware community of developers and implementers of cryptographic 
systems is tied together by a commonly shared epistemic perspective that is in-
formed by their in depth knowledge about the technological underpinnings of 
this social sphere. This specific epistemology informs a shared problem aware-
25 | For Waters ar ticle ‘Automated company raises equivalent of $120M in digital cur-
rency’ see: ht tp://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/17/automated-company-raises-equiva 
lent-of-120-million-in-digital-currency.html 
26 | Ethereum is a crypto-currency based on the Blockchain, but has slightly dif ferent 
functionalities than Bitcoin.
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ness within this ‘community of communities’: these actors share knowledge 
about the omnipresent possibility of the manipulation of trust relationships be-
tween end users by unknown third parties. This knowledge creates a general-
ized mistrust towards any possible intermediary with the ability to undermine 
these trust relationships. 
Furthermore, it became clear that this perspective of generalized mistrust 
has a productive quality for dealing with trust problems on a global scale. 
Translating generalized mistrust into a technical problem allows this commu-
nity to establish an isolated domain of calculability. Creating this clearly cir-
cumscribed sphere that presupposes a generalized and omnipresent attacker 
allows these experts to make social trust problems calculable and to reduce 
social complexity. Within this realm of provability and calculability, system de-
signers and implementers ostensibly suspend the irrational ‘leap of faith’ that 
according to Möllering is characteristic for trust. However, it also became clear 
that the unpredictable, erratic element of trust is still efficacious. The build-
ers of cryptographic tools transfer the element of doubt from the social sphere 
towards trusting the empowering quality and the hardness of mathematical 
problems. As it turned out, questions about the hardness of mathematical prob-
lems cannot be answered unambiguously in a complex and unforeseeable real 
world environment. Not only do these questions depend on incalculable fu-
ture breakthroughs in the field of mathematics, but also on highly contingent 
‘human idiosyncrasies’. Nevertheless, outsourcing the element of trust to the 
mathematical domain fulfils specific social functions that probably have not 
been covered exhaustively in this article. Here, I focused on the observation 
that ‘trusting the math’ allows the builders of cryptographic systems to shift 
from an attitude of mistrust to a perspective of unambiguity when implement-
ing the concepts of ‘integrity’, ‘authenticity’, and ‘confidentiality’ as the precon-
ditions for trust on a protocol level.
Another interesting unanswered theoretical question is the one of a possi-
ble threshold between trust and certainty. Providing the ‘integrity’, ‘authentic-
ity’, and ‘confidentiality’ of an encrypted email still allows Alice to subvert the 
expectations of Bob. She could unintentionally send him false information or 
tell him a lie. Smart contracts however, enforce a predefined agreement without 
leaving the agreeing parties any room for deviant behaviour within the logic 
of the protocol.27 Here, it might be interesting to take a closer look at specific 
cryptographic technologies in order to analyse the junction between trust and 
certainty. The idea to establish a social contract that is characterized by math-
ematical unambiguity can be found in its most pronounced manifestation in 
cryptographic systems developed within the cypherpunk community. These 
27 | Note that the DAO hack was a software hack that utilized a weak spot in the code, 
not in the protocol itself.
Trusting the Math and Mistrusting Humans 47
systems fundamentally aim at replacing the necessity for trusting human 
behaviour by mathematically enforcing and disabling specific behaviour that 
the systems’ designers deem to be (un-)desirable. As the example of the DAO 
hack showed, transferring authority from human institutions to mathematics 
leads to questions of responsibility and accountability that have not yet been 
answered. 
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How Not to Fall in Love 
Mistrust in Online Romance Scams
Jan Beek
Hello my name is Seidu just saw your profile and just cant believe it we still have 
people like u on earth,well I can see my destination and i can hear my call,no more 
hesitation this time i am going for all out cause i know where light this road leads to 
and i therefore will rise and believe this dream will come true and will soul the sky.I 
love to get in touch with some one special just like u, .would love the one to gui-
de me and stay by me and set me free therefore know it will come to pass.but i wish 
I could read your mind and u could read mine as well. (…) take care love and light. 
(Email from Seidu, 20101)
These lines are from an email that Seidu, a 24-year-old Ghanaian scammer, 
sent to Lina, a 50 year old woman from Lithuania.2 It marks the beginning of an 
exchange of romantic emails. Seidu took on a fictional persona, a construction 
worker from Alaska called Albert Duncan. After one month of writing ever 
more passionate love emails, he wrote that his son got ill during his business 
trip in Ghana and his credit cards had stopped working. Naturally, he asked his 
newfound love for money. This is a standard script – referred to in scammers’ 
vocabulary as ‘format’ – for a romance scam.3 Since the 2000s, romance fraud 
has become one of the most widespread and successful forms of cybercrime.
When I was given access to Seidu’s email account, what astonished me 
most was how many of the women responding to his emails perceived them as 
credible and to what extent they imbued them with emotions and meanings. 
A Chinese woman writes: ‘I feel I come back to the teenager when reading and 
1 | Spelling unchanged.
2 | Names, dates and locations have been anonymized.
3 | A ‘format’, the word scammers use for a genre, consists of both the story and the 
procedure of a cer tain type of fraud. In other words, a format is both about content, 
for instance a tale about hidden gold, and the script, for instance the use of an arc of 
suspense in romance scams.
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writing to you (…). We love each other even before we meet in person, unbeliev-
able for me! But I hope we will love each other more an more after meet, and 
have a lasting relationship, live with each other, and our John (Seidu’s fake son) 
forever.’ A woman in the US writes: ‘You have made the sunlight shine in my 
life, more than you’ll ever know.’ A British woman first recognized that Seidu 
was a scammer, but then apologized and sent money again because she felt so 
enamoured. These women were convinced that they had fallen in love. In other 
words, they thought they had started a genuine romantic relationship. Yet these 
feelings solely originate in an online email correspondence with someone who 
lives far away. 
From an anthropological perspective, our astonishment about people be-
lieving so strongly in emails from someone they have never met offline is as 
interesting as the respondents’ genuine reactions. This astonishment suggests 
a shared understanding of online interactions as being initially untrustworthy 
and as not being able to foster genuine romantic emotions by themselves. It 
is this mode of generalized mistrust that scammers have to engage with in 
romance scams. They have to convince their targets to suspend their mistrust 
to such an extent that they send money to someone they have never met face-
to-face. 
Based on a close reading of email correspondence and fieldwork in Ghana, 
this paper explores romance scams as a particular form of online, transnation-
al interaction. As the interaction largely consists of writing and reading, the 
first question is how scammers write romantic texts that are both credible and 
fascinating to their audience. Secondly, this chapter examines how the women 
believe in, doubt or reject those stories in the course of the email interaction. 
Scammers persuade their targets by drawing on and adapting an idiom of ro-
mantic love to create this credibility. Despite the aforementioned quotes, how-
ever, the whole interaction takes place in the shadow of mistrust. The women 
responding to these emails are constantly engaged in practices of mistrust and 
only temporarily suspend them. 
Mistrust is a key aspect of online communication, especially on online 
dating platforms, because users are painstakingly aware of the differences be-
tween front and back stage. Each user on these sites carefully crafts their online 
persona, and is well aware of the discrepancies between it and their private 
self. Scholars explore online interactions with Goffman’s concept of dramat-
ic interactions, which he originally developed to explore face-to-face interac-
tions such as restaurant visits (Hogan 2010; Robinson 2007). For Goffman, 
actors constantly suspend their disbelief, or to phrase is differently, suspend 
their mistrust. They do this because they are interested in upholding a ‘veneer 
of consensus’ in any given situation (Goffman 1959: 3). In offline interactions 
in order for the collusion between performers and audience to succeed, the 
passage between ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ – in which ‘illusions and im-
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pressions are painstakingly fabricated’ – should be hidden and closed (Goff-
man 1959: 69-70). On dating platforms, however, the back stage’s existence is 
obvious to all, because all users metaphorically walk this passage when they 
craft their online persona. Additionally, the other’s back stage is not closed but 
absolutely barred due to the anonymity of the interaction. Users largely have 
auctorial freedom concerning their online persona’s gender, age, location and 
backstory. In other words, these sites allow an unchecked presentation of the 
self; to confirm this it is enough to try the sites yourself. As Mühlfried argues 
in this book’s introduction, mistrust is a mode of relating to other actors, and 
the level of complexity in online interactions make it a dominant mode in this 
landscape. In contrast to the interactions that Goffman describes, interactions 
on dating platforms are characterized not by a ‘veneer of consensus’ but by a 
veneer of mistrust. Such transnational email correspondences are also a site 
at which different understandings of the relationship between front and back 
stage clash; or, in other words, what degree of inconsistencies people accept 
between the performances on these two stages.
The online conversations enabled by dating platforms are supposed to lead 
to an offline date. Yet to even consider such a date, users have to be prepared to 
suspend mistrust beforehand, a decision predicated only on texts and pictures, 
which they have received online. All users have to deal with this problem. When 
looking closely at the email exchange between Seidu and his various victims, it 
becomes obvious that playing the role of a lover in a romantic relationship with 
a foreigner is a tremendous challenge for him. He is a young Ghanaian with 
limited schooling and has to play the role of a romantic lover for women from 
very different societies so convincingly that his texts evoke real emotions. Like 
regular users on online dating sites, he has to create a narrative about himself 
and the potential relationship that is both credible and fascinating, a narrative 
that convinces them to suspend their mistrust. To enable this suspension, he 
draws on globally circulating narratives of romantic love and introduces Gha-
naian romantic practices to non-African audiences to evoke fascination. Above 
all, by engaging in narration – in storytelling – he establishes a relationship 
between him and his reader that in literary studies has aptly been described 
as a ‘narrative contract’ (Gabriel 2004: 21). It is this particular relationship that 
grants the storyteller certain privileges and entices readers – similar to the sus-
pension of disbelief – to suspend their mistrust.
However, these scams are not one-way persuasion strategies but dynamic 
online interactions. While scammers like Seidu try to tell convincing narra-
tives, the readers are oscillating between maintaining mistrust and believing 
in the scammers’ tales. Exactly because the women’s feelings of mistrust en-
dure, the concept of mistrust seems to be more applicable than the concept of 
gradual developing trust. While a superficial reading of these exchanges would 
suggest that the responding women believe in these emails, these women are 
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actually well aware of the differences between front and back stage peculiar 
to online interactions. Their lingering mistrust becomes apparent when the 
scammer asks for money, at which point the great majority of responding wom-
en explicitly point out the unknowable back stage and stop the interaction. The 
few women transferring money are aware of the possibility that they are being 
scammed, they continue to mistrust the scammer. Yet they prefer to continue 
to suspend their mistrust and to remain in the front stage of the interaction 
because of the emotional rewards it provides. In his paper on the anthropolo-
gy of trust, Corsín Jiménez (2011: 193) argues that trust is an inherent quality 
of relationships which always also contains – and reverts into – mistrust. All 
relationships are necessarily imbued with both qualities, and the relationship 
between scammers and their readers brings to the fore the dynamic tension 
between the two in the course of the interaction.
This paper explores scams as interactions between one particular scam-
mer, Seidu, and the women who respond to him, based on a close reading of 
these emails.4 The Ghanaian police provided me with access to the account 
that contained these email conversations. The Police officers had confiscated it 
during their criminal investigations of Seidu for fraud.5 In the course of these 
investigations I spoke both to him and to one of the defrauded women. Howev-
er, this paper will largely focus on the way he and the women interacted online 
via text. Using a confiscated email account for research purposes is ethically 
difficult. While one side perceived these conversations as private and part of a 
genuine relationship, the other did not. To deal with this dilemma, this paper 
anonymizes all participants and only selectively quotes the correspondence. It 
aims at a non-normative exploration and looks to bring the agency of both sides 
to the fore.
First, the paper will introduce both actor groups and explain the basic work-
ings of romance scams. Secondly, it will discuss the scammers’ emails and 
their textual practices of telling stories that are credible and fascinating in a 
framework of underlying doubt. Thirdly, it will explore the way the women 
react to these emails and develop the dynamics of maintaining and – some-
times – suspending mistrust. Finally, the paper then discusses the distinct un-
derstandings of front and back stage – and of mistrust – on both sides of the 
transnational, online interaction.
4 | This study was supported by the Africa’s Asian Options (AFRASO) project at Goethe 
University Frankfur t, sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. For 
critical comments, I am grateful to Florian Mühlfried, Ute Röschenthaler, Frank Schul-
ze-Engler, and the two anonymous reviewers, especially their ideas concerning the ‘nar-
rative contract’.
5 | This happened during my 16-month-long fieldwork on police work in Ghana (Beek 
2016b).
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sCaMs anD roManCe
Originally created in the USA in the late 1800s, advance fee fraud as an Afri-
can phenomenon spawned in the late 1980s in Nigeria. While the first scam-
mers mostly told stories about oil and used regular mail, scammers further 
developed both stories and means of communication, and these fraud schemes 
spread to other African countries. More recently, African entrepreneurs have 
carried this fraud schemes to Asian countries. Many scholars understand the 
origins of scamming as a response to the political and economic marginal-
ization of young people in Africa. Research on scamming has mostly focused 
on economic scams, and studied these as a symptom of the excesses of global 
capitalism or corruption in Nigeria (see Smith 2008, Apter 2005). Yet romance 
scams had already emerged in the early 2000s, with the advent of online dat-
ing sites. Since then, the format has become more diversified, targeting both 
women and men in various dating scenes (Burrell 2012: 73). Since the 2010s, 
romance scams are probably the most prevalent and prolific format. The com-
mon means of communication are emails, phones with fake European num-
bers, instant messaging and web 2.0 dating platforms.
In some poor neighbourhoods in urban Ghana, many young people engage 
in cyber fraud, what they call ‘browsing’. They experience a huge gap between 
their meagre income and their necessary expenses, and a gulf between their 
expectations of advancement and the available opportunities. As one scammer 
explained to me: ‘The middle class is a mirage!’ The jobs they want are ei-
ther not available or are only available with connections. Many of the people 
engaged in scamming today did not get into this practice with the intention 
of becoming criminals. During their youth, they wrote letters, emails or chat 
messages to foreigners out of curiosity. As Burell has shown (2012: 42-5), many 
young Ghanaians experience internet cafés as spaces in which they can con-
nect with people from the exotic world of the abroad, even if many also hope to 
receive gifts. A few of them become full-time scammers. They either operate 
out of internet cafés or, as soon as they have gained sufficient funds, out of their 
own apartments with laptops. Scammers work in loosely connected groups of 
‘friends’, and depend on each other for knowledge on the inner workings of 
these schemes and additional support when frauds become more complex.6 Of-
ten they pass on clients to other scammers to proceed with the storyline in such 
cases. In a typical romance scam targeting a male victim, the first scammer es-
tablishes contact via email, then a female friend of his does phone calls. Cassi-
man (2016) writes in great ethnographic detail about the aspirations and every-
day struggles of young scammers. She explores not only how their connections 
6 | In a way, all scammers work jointly on new narratives, not as an organized effor t but 
as an effect of co-authorship in their loose groups.
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to ‘paypals’ (victims) abroad is enabled by their friendships among each other, 
but also how the money they earn destabilizes these social connections. 
Seidu, the author of the emails explored here, has a biography similar to 
that of his peers. When I met him at the police station, he presented himself as 
a career criminal who is unafraid of the police. At court, his lawyer described 
him as an innocent family man who had suffered tremendously in prison. In 
his early emails, he writes to his mother and claims to do well in school, while 
he is already fully engaged in writing scam emails. He often converses with 
friends more experienced than him, who send him texts that he can use, out-
line storylines he can tell and give him stolen private photo albums from Amer-
ican men. Over the years, Seidu became quite successful and managed to ac-
quire a car and a house. Still, his earnings fluctuated dramatically; at one time 
he wrote to one of his friends: ‘brother i need ur aid now, im in very desperate 
situation, only god knows (…) i dont even have money to send my wife to hospi-
tal’. He also has many falling outs with his friends, decrying them as ‘heartless’ 
when they do not support him in times of need or fail to return his loans. In 
contrast to these intense, emotional letters, he uses business vocabulary when 
conversing with his friends about his scams. Women who respond to his emails 
he calls ‘clients’, and his interactions with them ‘transactions’ or ‘deals’. 
The victims of romance scams are even a more diverse than the scammers. 
Worldwide, online dating platforms have become an important medium to 
search for a partner. Both men and women, hetero-, bi- and homosexuals, peo-
ple from all countries, educational backgrounds and income levels fall victim 
to romance scams. Romance scams remain largely invisible because victims 
feel ashamed and do not report it. Scholars estimate that about 230,000 people 
fell victim to romance frauds up to 2011 in the UK alone (Whitty and Buchanan 
2012: 182). The U.S.-based IC3 reports yearly losses of fifty-five million USD, 
although the real amounts are probably much higher.7
Seidu’s email account provides insight into his scamming practices from 
2006 to 2010. During this time, he signed up for more than fifty online dating 
sites, including American, German, Chinese, Lithuanian sites, as well as Indi-
an matrimonial sites. He wrote more than 1,000 emails and had several hun-
dred targets. Seidu searched for people that fit a certain profile, namely wom-
en in their 50s. Whitty (2013: 675) interviewed victims and argued that many 
of them held idealized romantic beliefs. Based on the knowledge provided in 
these emails, the women did not seem special in any way but had hopes that 
everyone can relate to. The main commonality among these women seemed to 
be that they desperately longed for an affectionate relationship, either because 
they had never had one or had experienced failed partnerships. 
7 | Internet Crime Complaint Centre. 2012. Internet Crime Report.
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writing CreDiBle anD fasCinating love eMails
During his career as a romance scammer, Seidu employed the same gener-
al format. He uses a fake name, Albert Duncan, and claims to be an affluent 
construction worker from Alaska. He claims that he is divorced with a young 
son and enjoys a middle class lifestyle.8 Having been disappointed too often, 
he writes, he looks for a woman with ‘moral values’. In 2009, Seidu’s first sent 
users the message that I have quoted in the introduction. This message sounds 
very lyrical, and this is not surprising considering the source; except for the first 
and third sentence, the text is directly copied from the R. Kelly song ‘spirit’.9
In one of the rare papers to cover romance scams, Whitty (2013: 667; 671) 
claims that romance scams work by using marketing techniques and by exploit-
ing certain cognitive biases (see also Koon and Yoong 2013). Instead, I would 
suggest that romance scam messages work just like regular messages at online 
dating sites. In a word, scammers have to craft texts that are both believable and 
fascinating. They, like all other users, have to make two claims believable: the 
claim that the writer has genuinely fallen in love and that his online persona 
does not deviate too much from his offline one. 
Interestingly, Seidu does not achieve this by copying regular messages from 
other users but by adapting romantic narratives directly from popular culture, 
romance novels, self-help literature about romantic relationships and other 
sources. His addition to the text of R. Kelly’s song is minor but important. In 
the first sentence, he alludes to the victim’s profile. Such explanations are com-
monly used persuasion strategies for online dating sites that create the illusion 
that both sides are connected. Still, his reference is very vague, and Seidu can 
use this text for all his targets. Many of his emails are directly copied from 
various sources. A text about the ‘qualities of a good relationship’ originates 
from a female American blogger.10 He appropriates another text from Amer-
ican religious literature for women.11 Most of his emails are a collage of such 
contemporary sources. In one email, Seidu even self-reflexively comments on 
8 | Burrell (2012: 72) argues that Ghanaians perceive such impersonations not as joy-
ful experimentation but as ‘flexible self-representation for the sake of persuasion’. In 
contrast, Cassiman (2016) employs the term ‘trickster’ to explore the exciting and dis-
rupting nature of impersonating someone else.
9 | Robert Kelly, ‘Spirit’, Album Happy People/U Saved Me, 2004. The error in the third 
sentence, ‘soul the sky’ instead of ‘soar the sky’, suggests that Seidu picked the text up 
by listening to the song.
10 | See: http://romancelessons.blogspot.de/2005/07/three-qualities-of-good-rela 
tionship_11.html
11 | David C. Cook (ed.), 2000: God’s Little Devotional Journal for Women. Colorado 
Springs: Honor books. 
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his use of intertextuality: ‘My goodness, perhaps I’m making this sound like a 
romance novel or a self-help book. I really hope not though. Just want to share a 
little about me and how I feel about u’ (Email from Seidu, 2009). Indeed, Seidu 
does not merely copy and paste but also adapts these texts to the expectation of 
his readership. In his four years of writing emails, he constantly improves his 
emails and revises his texts.
His texts also gain credibility because of the photos Seidu provides with his 
second email. These show a good-looking American man in his fifties, holding 
a recently caught fish in one photo and posing with his son in the other. These 
pictures were stolen from private photo albums and allow Seidu to appropriate 
the visuals of American family life. Such photos are markers of authenticity 
and give further credibility to his story.
In the various formats of email scams, African cybercriminals defraud 
their victims by crafting credible and fascinating stories. Appadurai (1996: 31) 
understands ‘imagination as a social practice’ and has argued that the fantasies 
circulating in mass media are at the core of emerging global connections (see 
Burrell 2008: 4-5). The way in which scammers use such fantasies prove his 
point. In the case of gold or inheritance scams, they draw on globally circulat-
ing narratives about Africa and wealth creation (Beek 2016a: 308).12 In the case 
of romance scams, they draw on globally circulating narratives about romantic 
love. These stories are believable for the victims because they derive from texts 
written by people with similar understandings of romantic love. 
In the context of the anthropology of love, romance scams are just one – and 
a very peculiar – instance of romantic love as a transnational phenomenon. The 
mere fact that Seidu started romantic relationships with women in the United 
States, Europe, but also India and China, is not surprising as such.13 He and the 
women responding to him seem to share a basic understanding of the idiom 
of romantic love. The anthropology of love has long established that romantic 
love is a social practice that nowadays is common in many, if not all societies, 
though specific understandings of it do vary (Hirsch and Wardlow 2006; Bo-
chow 2010). Anthropologists have also studied how transnational connections 
have reshaped romantic love (Padilla et al. 2007). Romance scams show to what 
an extent people in very different societies communicate through the shared 
idiom of romantic love.
12 | Seidu also sometimes describes the dire conditions and his opportunities in Gha-
na and thereby draws on imaginaries of Africa in the Global North. However, these allu-
sions are not at the core of his format.
13 | Interestingly, romance scams do not really fit the writing-back paradigm or a post-
colonial grand narrative because many of the correspondences are South-South inter-
actions. While in each interaction distinct practices and understandings of romantic 
love come to the fore, the ones from Europe or the U.S. are merely one of them.
How Not to Fall in Love 57
Yet writing scam emails consists of more than copying global discourses: 
it also requires innovation. Merely reproducing romantic texts would proba-
bly not be sufficiently interesting. While intertextuality imbues his texts with 
credibility, Seidu’s texts mainly instil fascination by introducing new elements 
to global narratives of romance. Additionally, only copying material would not 
provide sufficient text. While Seidu carefully crafts the first letters, and needs 
to write fresh content to fill hundreds of subsequent emails or messages on 
instant-messages services, such as the following:
Hello Fengyue, I really enjoyed your reply. Your responses were very eloquent and he-
art felt. (…) Pillars must be apart to support its structure, not too far apart, yet not to 
close for each position creates weakness unless these pillars are the perfect distance 
working in concert to support its portion of the structure.Wanting to find a balance in all 
relationships in all their various forms. I heard a saying years ago: “You have to become 
the person you want to attract.” I found this very insightful at the time. But through the 
years this statement has deepened, like it was seed, when I first heard it, planted in my 
soul. A time later, saying this statement.... it felt like a yearling tree, within me, I feeling 
a .....wow....or ahhhhhh.... and no       
(Email from Seidu, 2009).
This text is not appropriated from American or European blogs or pop culture. 
Instead, the vocabulary – with its dense and obscure metaphors – is very remi-
niscent of Pentecostalist preaching, Ghanaian self-help literature about roman-
tic love and flirting practices in Ghana.14 Seidu probably heard or read these 
lines in his everyday life and then used them in these emails. He thereby in-
troduces ‘original content’, meaning content that has not been uploaded to the 
internet before. He creates new narratives by combining content from various 
discourses. Indeed, his emails also draw from the genre of love letters in Afri-
ca, which has a distinct writing style and a long history (Breckenridge 2000; 
Fair 2004).15 In Ghana, valentine’s cards with lyrical language have become 
14 | The religious dimension is very much part of romantic practices and discourses 
in Africa. Rijk van Dijk (2015: 10) convincingly argues that ‘Christianity in Africa has 
become an important carrier of romance’. Even Seidu’s use of R. Kellys’ song ‘Spirit’ 
is a form of appropriating religious content into a romantic context, as it is not a love 
song but about a spiritual quest. Lindholm (2006: 7) sees romantic love as akin to other 
forms of desire for the sacred: ‘Romantic love is one modern form that this yearning 
takes, offering the experience of salvation in this world, even if only sporadically and in 
fantasy’ (Lindholm 2006: 17).
15 | However, these and other romantic practices are of course not disconnected from 
the ones in other regions. Thomas and Cole (2009: 5) argues convincingly that local 
ideals and practices of romantic love in Africa have long been influenced by and entan-
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popular (Bochow 2010: 151-2). Parikh (2004: 16) argues one reason Uganda has 
such a vibrant practice of writing love letters is because other globally recog-
nized romantic practices are not available; she describes these letters as having 
an elaborate language that is very inventive and borrows heavily from Chris-
tian sermons. Hunter’s (2009: 151) article on sex and exchange in South Africa 
includes a love letter between two youths; their style is similar to scamming 
emails, containing constant repetitions of key phrases like love and highly emo-
tional promises and appeals. This writing style stands in sharp contrast to the 
way that users from the Global North communicate on dating sites. Both Marx 
(2012: 100) and Dombrowski (2011: 261) have found that the first messages from 
Germans on dating sites are very reserved and avoid emotional language.16 Yet 
it seems to be exactly the scammers’ writing style that some women respond to 
emotionally. Scammers like Seidu do not only adapt globally circulating narra-
tives of romantic love but also bring West-African ones to new audiences. 
The longer the scam goes on, the more improvised, expressive and emo-
tional Seidu’s writing becomes. This also comes with a change of communica-
tion medium. After first using only emails, Seidu often begins to communicate 
via instant messaging in parallel; his emails are also increasingly written in the 
simplified grammar and language used there.17 In these conversations, Seidu 
mentions titbits of his fictional life, about his work, family meetings and sick-
ness that befall him. Yet for the most part his messages and emails consist of 
declarations of love:
u know i still love u and no matter what i still love u as my wive and i know u gonna be my 
queen so why worry. am with u and love is in control and nothing more trust am with u 
deeply. because u are the only one i ever  love if am not lieying to you. love is in control 
trust me i will change your situation and makes u happy. u just give me a chance to prove 
my self.be with me never ever worry am your husband trust me am with u all the time.i 
love u  so kisses hugs is for u now am Seidu your loving one    
(Email from Seidu, 2008).
gled with similar ones of European colonizers, of Islam or, more recently, of Bollywood 
films from India.
16 | Marx (2012: 106) also argues that these texts are written to avoid losing face if the 
respondent ignores it. Scammers have a decisive advantage because they use a fake 
persona that circumvents such fears. Instead, Seidu reveals everything about his fake 
online persona and declares his love as early as the second email.
17 | This writing style also masks his problems with grammar and or thography. Mov-
ing to dating sites of non-native speakers was probably also an attempt to hide these 
shortcomings.
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Each sentence varies the declaration of love, and highly affectionate words are 
perpetually repeated.18
As I have shown, his emails are an attempt to create credibility and fasci-
nation by drawing on certain narratives. Still, to most outside observer it re-
mains incomprehensible that people believe these texts. The main reason for 
the scammers’ success is that the activity that they are engaged in – name-
ly storytelling – grants them certain privileges and dissuades readers from 
questioning the storyteller’s claim to represent reality. While readers may well 
constantly scrutinize and disbelieve the claims in the scammers’ emails, they 
probably suspend their mistrust with regards to claims I make as an author 
about doing fieldwork in a Ghanaian police station and meeting all the people 
involved. Gabriel (2004: 25) describes such relationships as a ‘very complex 
contract between storyteller and audience which entails the granting of the au-
dience of attention, a temporary suspension of disbelief, a temporary curbing of 
criticism and inquiry, in exchange for delivering a narrative which makes sense 
(verisimilitude), yields pleasure or consolation (entertainment or catharsis), but 
sustains numerous hidden assumptions about legitimate and non-legitimate 
forms of representation’. As soon as readers of these emails accept them as a 
form of storytelling that represents reality, their suspension of disbelief with 
regards to the story also becomes a suspension of mistrust towards the story-
teller. However, whether the reader sticks to the terms of this narrative contract 
is constantly under threat. One of the highly emotional words that Seidu re-
peats three times in the last quoted email is ‘trust’. In many of his emails, trust 
comes up again and again. Trust haunts Seidu’s writings because he writes 
against the suspicions and mistrust of his readers, as will become apparent 
when we turn to their email responses.
resPonses: Maintaining anD susPenDing Mistrust
Romance scams are not one-directional messages but indeed dynamic interac-
tions, and the responses of the scammers’ counterparts are equally important 
to understand them. While the emails of these women are initially about them-
selves and their hopes, the emails also hint at doubt, suspicion and underlying 
feelings of mistrust. Or, employing the terminology of Luhmann (2014: 1), they 
18 | Seidu often writes: ‚we need to talk about anything and everything. every detail 
of the day. I want to hear and learn everything about you’. However, he rarely (or only 
superficially) responds to questions or details in the women’s emails. This suggests 
that these email conversations are more about imagining and narrating a romantic rela-
tionship than actually engaging in one. The highly emotional but generic texts probably 
allow readers to imagine very personal dreams and hopes. 
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engage in mistrust as a defensive arrangement (see also Mühlfried’s introduc-
tion to this volume). Even before Seidu has mentioned money, many readers are 
highly suspicious. Most of them have heard of romance scams and a few were 
even victims before. This is most visible in the low response rate that Seidu has, 
only a fraction of his initial messages even leads to a conversation.
This mistrust also surfaces when Seidu fails to craft a plausible persona of 
an American construction worker for his romantic narrative. He sometimes 
uses stolen photos that supposedly depict his house but show pink, antique 
furniture and a doll collection. One woman replied that ‘most men do not have 
lots of pink in their bedroom’ and do not ‘collect dolls’. While for Seidu these 
pictures appeared as plausibly depicting the bedroom of a romantically in-
clined American, the women he sent them to were irritated by pictures, which 
probably originated from the house of an older woman; one woman stopped 
their correspondence at that point. When called out on the photos, Seidu writes: 
‘everything i [you] saw in the picture is real. pink is my favorite, but blues count 
alots in my life,remember i belong to myself and nobody else. i was raised by 
mum and its all good to be romantic, thats me and love.’ By claiming that the 
colour blue is equally important for him he tries to underscore his alignment 
with conventional masculine role models. This makes apparent the complex 
gender politics Seidu is engaging in. The romantic self-help literature he uses 
is mostly written by female writers and therefore provides romantic fantasies of 
understanding men that resonate with his audience. However, using pictures 
that show his supposed bedroom with dolls and pink flowers contradict conven-
tional imaginaries of masculinity too openly.19 
Mistrust also surfaced because of Seidu’s emotional language and his pace:
I asked you if you wrote while drinking… Eric that is a fair question, your emails often 
star t out easy to understand, and then get confusing and hard to understand…. What’s 
up with that? You need to tell me what is going on with you… 
I’m so sorry – I just can’t take this seriously Eric. It is not possible to love someone you 
haven’t met or spoken to. It is a delusion, perhaps you are very lonely, for which I am 
sympathetic. (…)
You don’t really address what I say to you, you seem to think you can just make this 
happen. (...) I am a serious person and this just makes no sense at all...  
(Email from Maria, 2007).
19 | Yet this is a rare error in an otherwise competent front-stage performance. For the 
most part, Seidu is an adept transnational mediator of distinct notions of romance and 
gender, like many romance scammers. They have to recognize, select and adapt ele-
ments of romantic practice that are markedly dif ferent from their own, both geographi-
cally and regarding notions of gender.
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Maria’s doubts address various elements of Seidu’s email. While some wom-
en seem to accept his writing style and read it as romantically charged, Maria 
interprets it as symptoms of intoxication. Moreover, she probably joined the 
dating site with the expectation of dating someone offline, as a way to facilitate 
face-to-face interactions. Seidu acts as if online communication allows a ro-
mantic relationship and intimacy on its own, he quickly talks about ‘love’ and 
cybersex. Many women refuse this, stating that this is either ‘too fast’ (Email 
from Shannon, 2008) or, in Maria’s case, conflicts with their understanding 
of online interactions.20 In other email conversations, doubts and suspicions 
are never explicitly expressed. However, some women just stop responding. 
Mistrust is the dominant mode of engagement in these interactions, even if it 
is never mentioned. This becomes apparent as soon as Seidu asks for money.
After the conversation has been going on for approximately twenty days, 
Seidu writes that he will travel to Ghana with his son to work in a Gold mine. 
Whitty (2013: 679) calls this next phase of romance scams the crisis moment. 
After arriving and initial success, Seidu abruptly claims that he is in urgent 
need of financial help: he cannot access ATM machines in a ‘third world coun-
try’ or his son John gets sick and needs medical treatment. He closes with a 
declaration of love and mutual support: ‘bear in mind i can do the same thing 
when you are in trouble,my love is open to you but this is just matter of trust’ 
(Email from Seidu, 2007).21
While asking for money is obviously dangerous for the continuation of the 
relationship, when exploring it within the terminology of a narrative contract 
this is revealed to be even more crucial. Most women have suspended their 
disbelief because Seidu engaged with them as a storyteller whose texts they 
enjoyed. However, by asking them to act he changes this relationship and he 
attempts to change their role. As soon as they are no longer listeners but actors, 
their level of scrutiny changes accordingly. Indeed, this moment actually re-
veals that the women Seidu has conversed with still were actively maintaining 
mistrust throughout these interactions, even when they seemed totally con-
vinced by his love emails as stories:
Please do not email me again as I shall not be answering any more of your emails. 
I told you right from the star t I am sick of people asking me for money, it is the height of 
ignorance to ask someone you don’t know to help you, and rest assured I would never 
ask you for money or help, it is not appropriate to ask such a thing of a stranger. I told 
20 | Another woman also states quite explicitly the dif ficulties of intimacy in transna-
tional interactions: ‘eric.... you would die for me???? well, where are you babe???? do 
you expect me to believe that????’ (Email from Galina, 2009).
21 | Parallel to the email, Seidu simultaneously asks for help via instant messaging and 
on the phone, putting pressure on his target.
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you from the beginning I have had so many men with the same tale as you asking me for 
money and I WILL NOT BE CONNED.      
(Email from Samantha, 2008)
The women’s responses are remarkably similar by pointing out that they do 
not ‘know’ Arthur.22 They thereby point out the inherent structure of online 
interactions: that these are front stage performances, in which the backs stage 
in unknowable due to anonymity. Additionally, they often write that they have 
experienced or learnt about romance scams. This does not only mean that they 
were aware to what extent online front stage interaction may deviate from the 
back stage. It also suggests that during the whole online interaction they main-
tain a certain level of mistrust towards Seidu, irrespectively of the way they 
interacted on the front stage. 
Few women send money to Seidu, although some sent him about 2,000 
USD, and one gave him 40,000 USD in the course of a year. It is not surprising 
given that some women suspend their mistrust. The suspension of disbelief 
is an inherent part of storytelling, and online interactions also involve – and 
require – the ability to suspend mistrust. Yet these women are surprisingly 
not fully unaware that they are being scammed. In other words, their mistrust 
never disappears but lingers on, flaring up again and again, and they are simul-
taneously trusting and mistrusting the scammer.23
This comes out most clearly in the case of Mallory. After sending him sev-
eral hundred USD, Seidu asked her for money again. She responded: ‘I am 
sorry but I must end this relationship between us two. I am really under the 
impression you are not who you say you are, and for my own sake & safety I 
do not want this to go on anymore. (…) I am definitely not allowing you to ma-
nipulate me with your words.’ Nevertheless, she continues to send him more 
money. Even after many people have told her that she is being scammed, she 
writes in a later email: ‘I cant believe  you are stuck in a foreign country with 
no money, no food, I just cant believe it. (…) NOW YOU TELL ME WHY THE 
HELL I SHOULD TRUST YOU.’ This open question already suggests that she 
is – in some way – prepared to be convinced again. And she indeed continues 
to send money. Then, she finds Seidu’s profiles on other dating sites and posts 
on online forums, in which Seidu’s previous victims tell of their experiences:
22 | Many even explicitly refute his appeal to trust him: ‘your right I do not trust you, 
I know nothing about you, I do not even know if you are from Alaska, how am i supposed 
to know.....who you are.....you have given me nothing.’ (Email from Kelley, 2009)
23 | Hörlin (2016: 111) also provides a possible reading, when she writes that mistrust 
has both an affective and cognitive dimension, and that cognitive mistrust often coin-
cides with affective mistrust.
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You should check ALL your website you use, It was so easy the name clicked my brain 
into action, I musty agree i knew all the time you were up to something, but i didnt belie-
ve it, or was it i didn’t want to believe you could do it......But you did.   
(Email from Mallory, 2009)
These few sentences suggest she was aware that she was being conned, but 
that she did not ‘want to believe it’. In other words, in the course of their online 
interaction Mallory wilfully suspended her mistrust towards him. Despite her 
better knowledge, she suppressed her awareness of the back stage. She and 
other women sending money are not naively trusting the scammers’ emails. 
They are instead oscillating between maintaining mistrust and believing in 
their tales but then decide on the latter. Remarkably, the interaction between 
Mallory and Seidu did not even end at this point. However, while she was trying 
to send him money yet again, an employee of a Ghanaian bank warned her and 
she finally stopped.
It is difficult to grasp the reasons for this wilful suspension of mistrust 
and ignorance of better knowledge. It also stands in stark contrast to Gabri-
el’s (2004: 24) notion that a narrative is fundamentally broken as soon as ‘the 
narrative veil has slipped to allow us to catch a glimpse of the storyteller as 
deceiver’. Both the biographical situation of the reader and the appeal of sto-
rytelling itself lead to the continued suspension of mistrust. In Mallory’s case, 
the imagined romance with Seidu probably promises a way out of a life she 
experiences as desperate. Her marriage failed, she is on government support 
and suffers social isolation. She acquired the money she sent to him from loans, 
and her later pleas to him to repay her are distressing to read. Another woman, 
Verónica, had sent Seidu money once but then refused to send more. In her 
final email, she voices doubts but also writes: ‘i think i may have set myself up 
for a broken heart....but thats what happens when you take a chance, this will 
be a lesson well learned. (…) thanks for the past couple of weeks, you really 
knew all the right things to say.’ She herself points to narration or storytelling 
as the main reason for her behaviour. Despite her mistrust, she is grateful for 
the romantic fiction that Seidu enabled her to take part in. In the interplay of 
mistrust and fictional romantic love, she has decided on the former but still 
yearns for the latter. In a way, this is not too far from the way that we all deal 
with the realization that a story, in literature or film, deviates from the facts it 
claims to represent: we also focus on the deeper truth, hopes and anxieties it 
speaks about.
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tHe BaCk stage of tr ansnational, online inter aCtions
Interestingly, Seidu himself never stops telling his story of love and crisis.24 
When his pleas for money have been rebuffed, he always writes long letter de-
claring his love, in the hope that the respondent will decide to send him money 
after all. However, even when he seems to accept that he has failed, he performs 
his online persona:
u better don’t play on mind OK.u kept me insane .all long i believed u and u betrayed 
me for a penny .and i have learn t lots from u .after all u didn’t send me down here and i 
must fight for my return just have good with ur family and leave me alone ok bye. Seidu 
(Email from Seidu, 2007).
The last sentence suggest that he has given up, nevertheless he sticks to his 
story and even bothers to write this email in the first place. While his professed 
love certainly is not authentic, his feelings of being ‘betrayed’ perhaps are. This 
seems plausible because the situation of crisis is not a pure front stage perfor-
mance but resonates with his everyday life. In Ghana, people routinely rely on 
friends and family to borrow money in times of need. When Seidu encounters 
financial difficulties, he asks his friends for money in ways very similar to his 
scam script, as shown earlier. The narrative of a crisis is probably the least fic-
tional element of the scammer’s narrative but corresponds with the stories he 
tells in non-fraudulent emails. In his scams, he describes crisis moments that 
are familiar to him, that actually resonate with his own situation.
This hints at the fact that the relationship between front and back stage 
in romance scams may have more layers then discussed up to this point. As 
online interactions, scams are about the differences between online perfor-
mance and offline reality. As romantic interactions, however, scams are about 
the differences between an emotional and instrumental dimension of relation-
ships. Scammers like Seidu insist that helping a partner by giving money is 
part of the newly established romantic relationship. Indeed, beyond all fictions, 
romance scams are also interactions in which very different but genuinely 
felt understandings of romantic love clash. Cole (2009: 111) argues that in the 
Global North, romantic love is understood as clearly separated from material 
interests, while in Africa instrumental and non-instrumental forms of rela-
tionships are more intertwined (see also Hunter 2009: 152). This stands in 
24 | He only breaks character on one occasion. After Mallory stopped sending him 
money, he still tries to convince her to send more and writes in one of these exchanges: 
‘hey u really dont mean anything to me,i mean life must goes on and im in position to 
hurt u,may god forgive if ...’ (Email from Seidu, 2009). However, this threat is also a 
fictional story element, as he has no way of harming her.
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stark contrast to attitudes on dating platforms in the global North, on which 
financial independence is often an explicit condition of continuing with online 
dating (Dombrowski 2011: 265). In Ghana, receiving gifts or ‘chop money’ is 
an expected part of some forms of romantic relationships. Bochow (2010: 175) 
argues convincingly that gifts in relationships can be ‘speaking objects’ that 
affirm affection. However, money send via Western Union cannot carry such 
symbolic meanings.
By drawing the attention to different understandings and practices of ro-
mantic love in Ghana, this contribution does not want to imply that these – or 
any – are uniformly held nationwide or, even more implausible, apply to the 
whole of Africa. On the contrary, romance scams also violate expectations con-
cerning romantic relationships that most people in Ghana adhere to, because 
material gains are the exclusive aim in these interactions. While some people 
seem to concede more ambivalence to romantic relationships, in cases of fraud 
this ambivalence ends, as only one side is interested in material gains.25
Yet this also suggests that people involved in transnational, online inter-
actions from different locations of the world do have different ways of relating 
front and back stage in these interactions. Conducting research on young Gha-
naian internet users, Fair and others (2009: 36) have observed that they unself-
consciously toy with their online self-presentations. Burrell (2008: 19) argues 
that many Ghanaian youth do not necessarily perceive misrepresentations to 
request assistance from someone abroad as fraudulent, and that such requests 
are part of their understanding of wealth distribution. Seidu’s court proceed-
ings can be understood similarly. In the end, one of the women he had defraud-
ed managed to get him arrested. The court gave him a very lenient sentence, a 
fine of 1,050 cedis (approximately 500 USD). As I explored in elsewhere, people 
in Ghana have very different understandings of romance scams (Beek 2016a: 
316-8). This brings to the fore that people connected by online communication 
have different understandings of the way that love and material interests – but 
also offline reality and online presentations – ought to relate. Both as romantic 
and as online interactions, these scams reveal distinct ways of relating front 
and back stage. In other words, they reveal different expectations to what extent 
these have to be aligned. 
While the Ghanaians I spoke to about scamming never mentioned mis-
trust, all of them were deeply puzzled that people abroad believe in these sto-
ries. Like many others, one police detective explained the scammers’ success 
not by their creative writing, as I do, but by invisible forces: ‘When you receive 
25 | Cole (2009: 127) also argues that relationships in Africa increasingly are unable to 
fulfil both affectionate and material desires. Following this argument, romance scams 
enable relationships in which these desires are very clearly divided, being only about 
romantic desires on one and only about money on the other side. 
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this kind of mails in your inboxes, think twice, because of these people, these 
boys here. I don’t know whether the victims do believe or not. Thus, the scam-
mers are using black magic. Whatever story they tell you, you believe.’ In the 
view of many Ghanaians, Europeans are not persuaded by the texts but by the 
scammers’ use of local religious practices to charm readers, practices that are 
called Juju or Sakawa.26 Ghanaian perceptions of scamming do not focus on the 
emails but on ‘spiritual’ attacks and on the lack of certain – invisible – defences 
on the part of the Europeans. This explanation, or folk theory, of defences is 
very similar to the way I use the term mistrust here; this imaginary also sug-
gests that people adhering to it take the necessity of such defences, or shall I say 
mistrust, for granted when it comes to email interactions with strangers. This 
does not mean that Ghanaians have a different level of mistrust when it comes 
to online or romantic interactions. Especially when looking at the level of secu-
rity in Ghana, I do not agree with the Comaroffs (2006: 5-6) that crime and dis-
order are, in general, a part of everyday life in the Global South. To the contrary, 
people in relationships all over the world oscillate between mistrusting and be-
lieving. However, as a result of certain historical trajectories and specific social 
contexts, some people seem to be less scandalized by the distinctions between 
front and back stage and see mistrust as a more necessary part of everyday life. 
ConClusion
Romance scamming is foremost storytelling, and scammers invite readers to 
partake in this story. They create a romantic relationship based only on writ-
ing, between people that live far away. They craft the credibility of their tale by 
referring to globally shared discourses of romantic love and create fascination 
by referring to Ghanaian ones. Crucially, by framing their interaction as story-
telling, they imply a narrative contract that dissuades readers from scrutinizing 
their claims.
However, we as bystanders also tell a story about romance scams: The tale 
that the people responding to scammers naïvely trust them. Yet, when looking 
at these emails as interactions, it becomes apparent that the respondents to 
these emails are aware of the peculiar way that front and back stage relate in 
transnational, online interactions. Despite playing along, they maintain their 
mistrust throughout the interaction. In a few cases, they decide that they prefer 
to partake in the story even when this means sending money. Scammers do 
not exploit people’s trust but their ability to suspend disbelief as listeners and 
to wilfully suspend mistrust as actors. Mühlfried (introduction to this volume) 
26 | People also believe that many scammers have stopped using emails and now mul-
tiply their money only by such ‘spiritual’ means.
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argues that mistrust is a mode of relating to others that has defensive functions 
and aims towards the weakening of social ties. Romance scams show the extent 
to which many people yearn for and dream of meaningful, strong social ties. 
When they are taken in by a story that provides them with just that, they even 
dispense with these defences despite their better knowledge.
As transnational interactions, romance scams also suggest that there are 
distinct understandings of acceptable forms of misrepresentation in stories 
and of mistrust in social interactions. Both when it comes to romance and the 
internet, some people seem to be more aware – and subsequently less scandal-
ized by the fact – that the performances on the back stage deviate from – and 
are messier than – the stories people tell about themselves. They seem to un-
derstand the interplay between trusting and mistrusting as a part of every-
day life, and the latter is more recognized as a necessary practice in a complex 
world, both offline and online. 
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When Stories Seem Fake 
Tacit Mistrust in Domestic Violence Counselling in South Africa
Melanie Brand
While it is commonly agreed that trust plays a major role in counselling and 
therapeutic interventions, mistrust as a constitutive component has largely 
been overlooked in the literature.1 Drawing on ethnographic material obtained 
in urban South African women’s shelters and other institutions offering coun-
selling to victims of domestic violence, this chapter discusses counsellors’ 
generalized mistrust towards women’s stories of abuse and the ways in which 
mistrust materializes in the counselling encounter.
I suggest that in the context of domestic violence counselling, generalized 
mistrust brings forth a specific mode of interaction characterized by a tacit 
structure. To use an image from the realm of the magician, I refer to inter-
actions guided by mistrust as inherently doppelbödig (engl.: double-layered). 
Like the magic hat that hides objects in an invisible compartment, mistrust-
ing actors assume another person to purposefully hide “the truth”.2 As will 
be shown, suspecting a client of lying provoked counsellors to follow a hidden 
agenda themselves: quietly looking for clues in clients’ stories or behaviour, 
counsellors attempted to find out the truth that they assumed beneath the sur-
face of a made-up story. I suggest that in order for mistrust to remain tacit and 
not to become explicit – for example, in the form of accusations – mistrusting 
actors need to be able to walk a thin line, engaging in concealment and infor-
mation-generating practices simultaneously. 
In the course of my research on institutionalized domestic violence coun-
selling in South Africa, many of the counsellors I spoke to reported that they 
1 | Many thanks go to my colleagues who significantly helped to strengthen the text’s 
line of argumentation with their valuable feedback and constructive criticism. Special 
thanks go to Jay Campbell for assisting the copy-editing process.
2 | In this chapter, single quotation marks are used for highlighting quotations and 
emic terms, while double quotation marks are used in a distancing manner alluding to 
the term’s ambiguity. 
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were regularly confronted with women who used ‘fake stories of abuse’ in order 
to receive accommodation at shelters. Commonly, they cited the high levels of 
poverty, homelessness and a lack of social services as well as dysfunctional 
families, or the interplay of these factors, as source of the problem. Therefore, 
I consider how counsellors’ generalized mistrust is connected to socio-political 
structures and how it inspires specific practices at shelters in turn. Here, in 
particular, the procedures of ‘screening’ and ‘monitoring’ are discussed. It will 
be shown that these bureaucratically and therapeutically legitimized practices 
serve a double purpose. Firstly, they serve to determine if women meet the shel-
ter’s intake criteria and to outline the further course of counselling. Secondly, 
and less obviously, these practices give counsellors the opportunity to check 
the veracity of women’s accounts when in doubt. It will be shown that certain 
characteristics like incoherent stories or (too) common narratives are likely to 
foster counsellors’ suspicion and scepticism.
Counsellors and social workers offering support for victims of domestic 
violence agreed that the truth would always come out eventually, it would just 
take time. Mistrust in the area of my research is thus linked to the conviction of 
an objective truth that is out there and that can be revealed. As will be shown, 
when counsellors mistrust, they embark on a truth-hunt (see Brand forthcom-
ing).3
Focusing on how allegedly fake stories of victimhood cause counsellors 
to mistrust clients, I neither deny the importance of trust in counselling nor 
question counsellors’ general aim of creating trustful relationships with cli-
ents. Rather, attention is brought to the structural conditions that are likely to 
generate mistrust. In this respect, the overall high levels of mistrust in South 
African society must be taken into account in order to avoid making mistrust 
a characteristic unique to shelters. Given South Africa’s colonial history, expe-
riences of racial oppression throughout the apartheid era and current political 
scandals, the prevalent mistrust of citizens toward the government, authorities 
and politics in general is hardly surprising (see Askvik and Bak 2005). Numer-
ous newspaper articles as well as scholarly publications have discussed the phe-
nomena of absent trust and prevailing mistrust toward the various spheres of 
South African society. Take, for example, academic work on mistrust in trans-
national education projects (Le Grange 2003), in the health sector (Froestad 
2005, Richter 2015: 118-121), and of course in the context of security (Kirsch 
2010, Landman 2004).
3 | Parts of the empirical material and some of the observations that I discuss in the 
following appear in the German publication: ‘Praxeologien der Wahrheit im Kontext 
häuslicher Gewalt in Südafrika. Von Narrativen Identitäten, Authentizität und Evidenz’ 
(Brand for thcoming).
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Given the elusiveness of mistrust as a social phenomenon this contribution 
begins with methodological notes on how tacit mistrust can be the object of 
qualitative empirical research. After a brief overview of the current state of the 
literature discussing trust and mistrust in therapeutic settings, I lay out some 
conceptual considerations on mistrust. These considerations lay the ground-
work for the subsequent analysis of counsellors’ generalized mistrust in domes-
tic violence counselling. It will be discussed why mistrust is common amongst 
domestic violence counsellors and which indicators are likely to provoke suspi-
cion among counsellors towards women’s stories. Emphasis is placed on what 
counsellors do when they mistrust and how they use the practices of screening 
and monitoring in order to generate information. The text closes with a sugges-
tion to conceptualize mistrust as a trigger for double-layered interactions, thus 
introducing the German term doppelbödig as a heuristic metaphor. 
Me tHoDologiCal notes on rese arCHing taCit Mistrust
During a total thirteen months of fieldwork in urban South Africa, I spoke to 
social workers, counsellors and other professionals offering support services 
in the area of domestic violence, and when possible took part in their daily 
routines. At times, I was a silent observer, like at the Domestic Violence Court. 
At other times, I actively participated, for example, by volunteering at women’s 
shelters. As it became clear during fieldwork, service providers regarded estab-
lishing a personal and trustful relationship with clients as a prerequisite for 
successful counselling.4 However, it also became apparent that mutual mistrust 
affected counselling, especially during the initial counsellor-client encounter.
In her monograph on figures of mistrust, Sinje Hörlin (2016: 19-20) notes 
that endeavours to empirically research mistrust were complicated by the top-
ic’s implicitness and societal taboo. However, ‘truth’, ‘suspicion’ and a general 
doubtfulness about clients’ stories were re-occurring topics in most of my in-
terviews, frequently broached by my interlocutors without a targeted inquiry.
Furthermore, after having spent considerable time among counsellors and 
social workers, I learned to recognize their suspicion on the basis of specific 
indicators. Depending on the person and circumstances, these could be de-
tailed inquiries during screening, sometimes the tone of voice, or a question-
ing smile. In this vein, I conceive of mistrust as an attitude that gains social 
relevance in observable practices making tacit mistrust a viable topic for par-
ticipant observation. In quiet moments, counsellors would discuss cases with 
their colleagues and also with me. In staff meetings, information about clients 
4 | Most counsellors followed Carl Rogers’ (1951, 1961) humanistic, person-centred 
approach.
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was discussed in more detail. Such conversations presented an opportunity for 
insight into what would provoke counsellors’ suspicion, and, therefore, enabled 
me to recognize suspicion, scepticism and doubt in specific contexts. There-
fore, I suggest that long-term ethnographic research offers the opportunity to 
observe and to analyse tacit mistrust in everyday interactions on the micro-lev-
el. In order to do so, researchers must be able to identify context-specific expres-
sions of mistrust and their normative purport.
tHe Counsellor-Client rel ationsHiP in tHe liter ature
The relationship between therapist/counsellor and client has inspired a wide 
range of studies in different disciplines. A large corpus from the field of psy-
chology indicates the importance of the ‘therapeutic alliance’ – the relationship 
between therapist and client – for a positive therapy or counselling outcome 
(see Ardito and Rabellino 2011). In this respect, it has been shown that the 
therapist’s ability ‘to instill confidence and trust within the therapeutic frame’ 
(Ackerman and Hilsenroth 2003: 4) is crucial for the formation of a bond that 
in turn influences the therapeutic process positively. Compared to studies fo-
cusing on trust within the therapeutic context, less attention has been paid to 
the role of mistrust (see Cook et al. 2004). Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, 
mistrust in therapy or counselling was widely discussed in respect of ‘cultural 
mistrust’ analysing the relationship between “black clients” and “white thera-
pists” (Terrell and Terrell 1984, Nickerson et al. 1994). 
While it is widely acknowledged that clients’ mistrust towards therapists or 
counsellors impacts negatively on therapeutic performance, knowledge about 
how counsellors’ mistrust towards clients affects treatment is scare. From in-
terdisciplinary research conducted in medical settings we know that mistrust 
between physicians and patients increases reciprocally (see Cook 2004). Fur-
thermore, research from medical anthropology reveals the need to closely ex-
amine counsellors’ and therapists’ mistrust, which would point to a connection 
between mistrust and treatment insecurities (Merrill et al. 2002).
In this respect, it is important to take a closer look at the role of the coun-
sellor. The everyday work of the domestic violence counsellors I did research 
with was mainly characterized by two areas of responsibility: the offering of 
socio-psychological counselling, and the adherence to and practice of bureau-
cratic rules and procedures. As domestic violence counsellors at the same time 
offer social services and, rather autonomously, regulate access to these services, 
they fall under the rubric of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 2010, see also Kelly 
2016 for doctors allocating disability grants). This positioning in a double-role 
is fraught with conflict. With each role demanding and operating according 
to specific logics, practices, rhetoric and truth-assumptions, counsellors often 
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found themselves in dilemmas that called for nuanced decision-making. Given 
their moral identity as helpers (see Kolb 2014), having to restrict their services 
to women who met the legal definition of “the domestic violence victim”, con-
stituted a challenging aspect of their everyday work for many.
In this sense, the presence of generalized mistrust towards women’s stories 
of abuse allowed counsellors to reduce complexity, at least in the long run. The 
discussion of the empirical material will show that in developing habitualized 
practices and simplifications, like the use of stereotypes in decision-making 
processes, counsellors were able to discriminate between those who deserved 
assistance and those who did not. However, Niklas Luhmann’s (1979, 2014 
[1968]) understanding, according to which mistrust is to be seen as a functional 
equivalent of trust inspiring complexity-reducing strategies, fails to acknowl-
edge the analytical potential of mistrust. It is my aim to go beyond this concep-
tualization and to show that, at least with regards to action-theory, interactions 
driven by mistrust are fundamentally different to those based on trust. In the 
following, I will discuss how I use mistrust on a conceptual level.
ConCeP tual ConsiDer ations
In light of what little attention mistrust has received as a distinct phenome-
non in the social sciences, I will spell out some conceptual thoughts before 
engaging in the analysis of the ethnographic material. In the literature, diverse 
conceptualizations of mistrust can be found that mostly make sense of the phe-
nomenon in relation to trust, usually describing mistrust as its flipside (Van de 
Walle and Six 2014, Hörlin 2016). Moreover, it is commonly assumed that while 
trust is an inherently positive force fostering social integration and sociality, 
mistrust evokes social fragmentation and is, therefore, potentially dangerous 
or even contagious (Hosking 2014, Hörlin 2016: 9-14). In most of these studies, 
trust and mistrust are understood to form an equilibrium: diminishing levels 
of trust are thought to result in an increase of mistrust and vice versa.
However, to equate the absence of trust with the presence of mistrust would 
suggest that social actors are always engaged in either trust or mistrust rela-
tionships. This paints a rather simplistic picture of the social world. Philoso-
pher Edna Ullmann-Margalit offers a more nuanced perspective. According to 
her ‘if I do not trust you, this could mean either that I distrust you – that is, that 
I have reasons to positively distrust you – or, more minimally, that I just have 
no reasons to trust you (nor to distrust you either)’ (Ullmann-Margalit 2001: 
61). What Ullmann-Margalit describes as the absence of both distrust and trust, 
corresponds to Alfred Schütz’s notion of the ‘natural attitude’ in which ‘every 
state of affairs’ is taken for granted and remains ‘unproblematic until further 
notice’ (Schutz & Luckmann 1973: 4). I suggest that it is the ‘until further no-
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tice’ that arouses people’s suspicion and introduces the need to switch from a 
natural attitude to an attitude that allows the conscious problematizing and 
scrutinizing of one’s lifeworld. In this respect, I subscribe to the perspective 
of historian Geoffrey A. Hosking, who conceptualizes mistrust and trust as 
attitudes:
It is a more or less lasting view held about some object, event, or person(s) in the out-
side world. It is a frame of mind, outlook, or perspective which influences one’s beha-
viour or one’s disposition to act or think in cer tain ways. (…) The attitudes may well be 
shared by others, and in that way are part of the social fabric. (Hosking 2014: 27)
In line with Hosking’s definition, I argue that mistrust is an attitude (German: 
Haltung) that enables and demands from actors a critical engagement with 
the world and the people with whom they interact. Furthermore, mistrusting 
actors are inclined to perceive – or rather, to identify – specific phenomena 
as suspicious, as indicative of an allegedly purposefully hidden truth. Which 
phenomena are likely to arouse one’s suspicion is highly contextualized and de-
pendent on the situation as much as on one’s classification of past experiences. 
Being aware of their subtle differences, I treat the terms suspicion, scepti-
cism and doubt as part of the same semantic field and use them interchange-
ably. All three terms occur in the context of actors’ normative evaluations of 
phenomena or people and point to uncertainty and ambiguity. Hence, I regard 
suspicion, scepticism and doubt as part of a process in which actors form or 
lose convictions about reality (see Pelkmans 2013, and this volume). In compar-
ison, I conceive of generalized mistrust as a fundamental attitude that develops 
and persists over time.
For the analysis of counsellors’ mistrust towards clients’ stories, I prefer 
to speak of generalized mistrust in order to distance my observations from 
psychologizing accounts that focus on actors’ individual characteristics. Fur-
thermore, the term points to the socio-political conditions and constellations 
that may foster counsellors’ suspicion of certain narratives or a woman’s de-
meanour. As will be shown, service providers’ generalized mistrust is based 
on knowledge about cases in which women were identified as having accessed 
shelter services by means of fabricated stories. This knowledge was mostly 
based on first-hand experiences and was substantiated by experiences that had 
been made by other counsellors and service providers. Hence, generalized mis-
trust is an attitude that develops over time and that – as it is shared among 
counsellors across institutions – has become part of the social fabric.
As Luhmann observes, there are social systems in which participants’ mis-
trust cannot be avoided and may even be needed. He further suggests that these 
systems necessarily need mechanisms preventing mistrust from prevailing. A 
strategy for achieving this may be found in rationalizing acts of mistrust as 
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systemic necessities, professional duties or as factual interventions (Luhmann 
2014 [1968]: 100). Mistrust then becomes a feature of the system itself and is 
not attributed to actors individually. In this vein, at women’s shelters, practices 
of mistrust are framed as institutional requirements and become attributed 
to external structural causes, so losing their otherwise personal implications. 
Most importantly, they allow mistrust to remain tacit while enabling counsel-
lors to generate information.
As these conceptual remarks make clear, I regard mistrust as a social phe-
nomenon requiring analysis in its own right, without its being situated in nor-
mative orders ex ante. Unlike in most debates, in the case of counsellors’ gener-
alized mistrust towards clients, mistrust did not appear as a “bad” inclination 
that needed to be overcome in favour of fostering trustful relationships. To the 
contrary: it enabled counsellors to differentiate between those who qualified for 
support services and those who did not. In this way, mistrust was constitutive 
and linked to the allocation of meagre resources. However, as will be shown 
in the following, there was room for manoeuvre, for ‘being out of line’, and for 
making exemptions. It is these exemptions that highlight the conflicting posi-
tions of the counsellor as street-level bureaucrat.
With these considerations in mind, I will now turn to the analysis and dis-
cussion of my empirical material. To begin with, I will introduce the field of 
domestic violence counselling explaining the legal framework that forms the 
basis for victims’ rights to counselling and assistance.
tHe fielD of DoMestiC violenCe Counselling
In South Africa, violence is a phenomenon that permeates various spheres of 
people’s mundane reality. According to a survey commissioned by the South 
African Government in 2007, it is a country characterized by a ‘culture of vi-
olence’ and, furthermore, by a pervasive and normative acceptance of violence 
(CSVR 2010: 4). The survey emphasized that, especially among young men, 
violence was seen as a legitimate tool whereby to gain respect. Today, these ob-
servations still hold true. Among the high levels of interpersonal violence, the 
prevalence of (reported) cases of violence against women is particularly alarm-
ing. Despite progressive legislation and a vast number of initiatives tackling 
the issue on the national, provincial and local level, governmental attempts to 
counteract incidences of domestic violence have encountered severe difficulties 
in practice (Watson 2014, Moeketsi 2013, Bendall 2010). 
In comparison to the vague policies regulating the allocation of disability 
grants (Kelly 2016), the South Africa’s Domestic Violence Act (1998) seems to 
offer a relatively precise and extensive legal framework on first sight. According 
to the Act, domestic violence is not limited to physical assaults, but also in-
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cludes sexual, emotional, verbal, psychological and economic abuse as well as 
intimidation, stalking, harassment, damage to property and entering the resi-
dence of the complainant without consent. However, which actions constitute 
emotional or verbal abuse is open to interpretation. Moreover, some women’s 
shelters specifically render services to ‘women in crisis’. Again, what consti-
tutes a crisis is far from clear and rather elusive.
Reflective of the dominant transnational rights-based approach of mea-
sures against domestic violence against women (Merry 2003), in South Africa, 
awareness raising campaigns like ‘16 Days of Activism Against Gender-Based 
Violence’ encourage women who have experienced abuse to exercise their 
rights. Hence, in identifying oneself and, more importantly for the purposes of 
this contribution, in being identified as a victim of domestic violence by author-
ities and service providers, women become part of a collective subject – a status 
that entails certain rights and entitlements. As stated in the Service Charter 
for Victims of Crime in South Africa, as a victim ‘you have the right to re-
quest assistance and, where relevant, have access to available social, health and 
counselling services, as well as legal assistance.’ A victim of domestic violence 
therefore has the right to receive counselling and, if needed, the right to be ac-
commodated at a women’s shelter. In the province of Gauteng where I conduct-
ed most of my research, women’s shelters received governmental subsidies via 
the Victim Empowerment Programme that prescribes minimum standards for 
shelter services. Consequently, shelters are required to offer accommodation, 
toiletries and food as well as counselling and skills programs. These services 
are either offered free of charge or for comparatively small financial contribu-
tions. Given the high levels of poverty and homelessness in South Africa, for 
many women in need, staying at a women’s shelter offered securities and op-
portunities to improve their lives – regardless of whether they had experienced 
abuse or not.
Women who have experienced domestic violence may need a wide range of 
support including medical treatment, legal assistance, therapeutic services and 
emergency or long-term housing. These needs reflect in the highly diversified 
and specialized institutional landscape of domestic violence support services. 
Consequently, clients pass through different institutional contexts as they are 
referred for complimentary services from one institution to another.
With regard to the formation of generalized mistrust, the referral system 
plays an important role. For instance, being referred from the South African 
police to the Department of Social Development, to NGOs offering counselling, 
to women’s shelters or the Domestic Violence Court, women who have reported 
domestic violence will be passed along a chain of institutions, each encounter 
demanding their story of abuse to be told according to a distinct logic. As will 
be shown in the following, service providers suspected that in the process of 
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bureaucratic socialization incorporated by the referral system, women learnt 
how to relate and how to adjust their stories in order to increase credibility.
looking for an assuMeD HiDDen trutH.   
wHat Counsellors Do wHen tHe y Mistrust
When counsellors mistrust their clients, their suspicion and disbelief towards 
women’s stories gain social relevance in the form of ‘screening’ and ‘monitor-
ing’. These practices allow counsellors to ask for details and make further in-
quiries as part of bureaucratic and therapeutic routines employed to determine 
whether women qualify for shelter services. Thus, in this setting, mistrust is 
connected to the realm of the formal, to bureaucratic and therapeutic practices 
largely unquestioned by shelter clients. In the following, it will be discussed 
how counsellors make use of screening and monitoring as part of shelter proce-
dures. The discussion will show how counsellors’ everyday work is structured 
and influenced by both therapeutic and bureaucratic affordances. Furthermore, 
it will become clear how screening and monitoring allow mistrust to remain 
tacit during counselling.
The initial encounters between counsellor and prospective client largely 
follow a bureaucratic protocol. When women arrive at a shelter, firstly, a coun-
sellor or social worker fills in a drop-in form to gather basic information – a pro-
cess that can be seen as a short assessment. For example, women will be asked 
to provide their contact details and identification of which a copy will be made 
and retained in their file. For each woman who comes to stay at the shelter, a 
file is compiled in which all information relevant to her case is kept. If after the 
first assessment there are no apparent reasons not to admit a woman – for ex-
ample, if it is obvious to the counsellor that the woman is homeless or mentally 
challenged – a full assessment, called ‘screening’, will follow.
The screening process is structured by an ‘admission form’ and serves to 
establish if women qualify for shelter services. The form covers clients’ biog-
raphy and information regarding the current living and working situation. As 
part of the process, counsellors ask clients about their experiences and note 
relevant information in the form’s respective columns. Though the exact form 
will differ from one institution to another, it will usually ask for similar details. 
In the following, an admission form used by Samaria Women’s Shelter5 is dis-
cussed exemplarily. 
The first page of the admission form refers to personal, yet basic informa-
tion regarding children, employment, and former contact to shelters. The next 
5 | Names of institutions and individuals have been anonymized.
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two pages are focused on retrieving more sensitive information and are pref-
aced with an explanation: 
The following questions are very personal and are aimed at assessing the most appro-
priate counselling that you will require and not aimed at judging you in any way. Please 
be honest and discuss with your interviewer if you have any queries. This information will 
be kept confidential and only shared with your consent. 
The preamble is interesting as it explicates what for many women coming to 
the shelter is a concern: the fear of being judged or not taken seriously. Address-
ing the non-judgmental approach in such a bureaucratic way, however, clearly 
produces an ambiguous quality. On the one hand, it explicates and attempts 
to negate the client’s assumed fear and hesitation towards counsellors. On the 
other, it introduces the possibility of any judgement at all and may heighten 
women’s wariness by default.
In the subsequent section on abuse and trauma, women have to tell their 
individual ‘history of abuse’ covering physical, sexual, and emotional abuse as 
well as whether or not they have experienced domestic abuse in the past. An 
open section follows in which ‘any other traumatic experiences’ may be noted, 
as well as ‘any other comments you feel are important from a counselling point 
of view’. The questionnaire closes with information regarding if, when and 
where abuse was reported. The client then needs to sign the form confirming 
that questions were answered ‘honestly and openly’.
Samaria’s admission form explicitly refers to the need for truthfulness 
twice: first in the context of ‘assessing the most appropriate counselling’ before 
asking details regarding the ‘history of abuse’, and secondly at the end of the 
form where women must sign. This legally binding signature serves as a tech-
nique that aims to secure truthfulness via a contractual element. Moreover, 
women have to give specifics regarding if abuse was reported, adding the case 
number of the protection order if already applied for. Having opened a case at 
the South African Police Service was regarded an important indicator of truth: 
for counsellors, the more institutional involvement, the more likely for the cli-
ent’s story to be true. 
As was explained to me by social workers, the aim of screening is to identify 
whether clients meet the shelter’s intake criteria. Shelters receiving govern-
ment subsidies via the national Victim Empowerment Programme may only 
offer services to victims of domestic violence or human trafficking as part of 
the funding scheme. Furthermore, shelters set their own intake criteria. Most 
commonly, homeless women, substance users, sex workers and women with 
mental challenges did not qualify for shelter accommodation. Shelter staff ex-
plained that women with such difficulties were not fit to participate in shel-
ter programs and counselling due to having issues for which the shelter was 
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not equipped. Therefore, as opposed to what was stated in the preamble above, 
counsellors were constantly judging – in the sense of evaluating – clients 
during screening and the selection process.
The consequences of these intake policies are far-reaching and contribute 
to the further marginalization of women in precarious living situations. Al-
though a couple of homeless shelters exist in Gauteng, they are usually not 
regarded as a viable option for women. It is well known that women at homeless 
shelters are more likely to be exposed to sexual violence and theft. Given these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that homeless women try to be accommodat-
ed at women’s shelters by using fabricated stories. 
For many counsellors, having to exclude certain women from shelter ser-
vices because they were homeless did not sit easy. While talking to Lisa, a social 
auxiliary worker, her moral dilemma became clear. Hinting to the elusiveness 
of shelter regulations prescribed to limit services to women ‘in crisis’, Lisa ex-
plained: ‘We, we are not doing homeless women. [We are doing] women who 
are in crisis. Domestic violence. Homelessness can be a crisis as well (laughs).’ 
(Interview with author, Sept 2014) She added that domestic violence may lead to 
homelessness in the first place. Lisa’s reflections made it clear that the one-di-
mensional categorization of beneficiaries did not match the complexity of re-
ality she faced in her everyday-work. But, as shelter funding is dependent on 
governmental subsidies, shelters have to be careful when making exemptions 
and taking in women who do not match the criteria. 
Aside from external indicators, screening presents an opportunity for coun-
sellors to examine women’s ‘stories’ – as the narration of violent experiences 
are usually called. In the course of screening, women need to tell their biogra-
phies through the lens of violence and trauma and must share very personal 
and sensitive information with the counsellor in order to demonstrate that they 
are genuine victims of domestic violence. Inconsistencies and disruptions in 
clients’ narratives are usually regarded as indicators of lying. When I asked one 
of the social workers at a women’s shelter how she knew whether a woman was 
telling the truth, she stated that clients’ ‘stories would change and then differ 
after some time. Because they would not remember what they said last time 
and you would know they have been lying.’ (Interview with author, Jan 2014) 
In these cases, the admission form serves as evidence as it captures relevant as-
pects of women’s stories. The quotation also alludes to Alois Hahn’s (2010: 138) 
observation that it is usually assumed that liars are not capable of organizing 
their statements in a coherent manner. 
Furthermore, the observation of clients’ body language was a common 
technique amongst counsellors in order to identify if clients were lying. As one 
para-legal counsellor phrased it: ‘facial expressions give people away’ (Inter-
view with author, Feb 2014). Another social worker confirmed the need to pay 
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close attention to body language during screening as in most cases, it was too 
difficult to only tell from the story if a client had been honest. She explained:
Yo, it’s hard. It’s really hard. It’s dif ficult because you have to make thorough investiga-
tions to really determine if this person is really a victim or not. But merely telling from 
the story of what they are saying to you, it’s very hard. ‘Cause you have to look at the, 
some do have signs, you know, the signs of abuse, you could tell. Or this person has 
been abused psychologically or physically if you listen to her, the gestures, the physical 
gestures or whatever, this person has really been abused. And some, you could even 
tell already they are just making up stories but it’s not a simple thing to do. It’s dif ficult. 
(Social worker, Pretoria. Interview with author, Nov 2014)
At the heart of these truth-telling techniques lies the assumption of an “authen-
tic victim” showing specific observable behaviour. In this sense, being a victim 
was seen to be an embodied and hence observable experience.
For social workers and counsellors, telling “real” from “fake victims” apart 
was a challenging aspect of their everyday work. Most of my interlocutors re-
ported that they also relied on ‘gut feeling’ and years of experience. Staff meet-
ings as well as regular shelter network meetings, during which staff members 
from all shelters in the Province convened, would give counsellors the oppor-
tunity to exchange experiences and talk about difficult cases. These meetings 
were also useful in helping to identify ‘shelter hoppers’ – women, who repeat-
edly made use of shelters, sometimes even under the use of pseudonyms. In 
one of the shelters, a ‘black list’ was hung on the wall next to the telephone. 
The list featured names of clients who were not to be admitted to the shelter 
anymore. Next to some of the names, aliases that clients had used in the past 
were added to ensure none slipped through.
In some cases, however, it was not easy to differentiate between true stories 
and fiction as there was also an in-between, as a social worker reported:
The women who just come for accommodation and go from one place to another, they 
speak the language of the shelters because they know from experience which questi-
ons will be asked and which answers they have to give so that the social worker beco-
mes empathetic and wants to help that beautiful woman who has been beaten by her 
husband. Sometimes victims take advantage of their status. Sometimes their stories 
are very real and you are empathetic with the women. Mostly, their cases are real but 
not new. Many women re-use their stories and make them sound recent to get accom-
modation.        
(Social worker, Pretoria. Interview with author, Jan 2014)
The first part of the quotation shows that how to tell a story is a learnable skill 
(see Garro and Mattingly 2000: 25) and a skill that women may use. Women ei-
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ther learn how to tell their story as part of a bureaucratic socialization prompted 
by the referral process, making necessary for them to repeatedly narrate their 
experiences when facing different service providers. Counsellors also suspect-
ed women of having learned from each other through circulation of promising 
narratives. The counsellor’s quote above also points to the importance of know-
ing one’s rights and knowing the procedures at women’s shelters as this knowl-
edge facilitates placement at a shelter. The last part of the quotation refers to the 
problem of re-used stories that are told in a way that makes them ‘sound recent’. 
This phenomenon is especially interesting as the violent experience in these 
cases “really” was part of a woman’s biography although it may have occurred 
long ago. Here, altering the element of temporality introduces the possibility of 
what might be coined a “white lie”.
Another way to gain further information about clients is the procedure of 
monitoring. Monitoring takes place throughout a woman’s stay at the shelter 
and refers to the gathering and compiling of relevant observations with regards 
to her demeanour. It includes the counsellor’s impressions during one-on-one 
or group sessions that are noted in the client’s file. A client’s willingness to 
take part in counselling sessions could serve as another indicator of being a so-
called real victim. As a social auxiliary worker explained, people who were not 
abused would most likely not want to participate in programs. From their reluc-
tance, one could tell who the real victims were, as ‘real ones need healing’. Fur-
thermore, clients’ behaviour was discussed at shelter staff meetings. House-
mothers who, by turns, were present at the shelter for twenty-four hours and 
helped organize the routine of everyday life, reported incidences that occurred 
in the shelters’ after-hours or over the weekend. For example, if housemothers 
suspected that a client was depending on substances, they would share this 
information with colleagues during staff meetings. Counsellors could then pay 
special attention to the client concerned and decide whether to confront her 
with the allegations or to continue observations.
As already mentioned, the special attention paid to clients’ truthfulness 
is mainly grounded in socio-political reasons and related to shelters’ funding 
regulations. Due to State funding policies via the Victim Empowerment Pro-
gramme, shelters may not take in women who do not match the set criteria. 
However, counsellors will at times bend the rules to take in women they know 
do not qualify for their services. These could be women who are homeless or 
who are suffering from illness with nowhere else to turn to (see Shively 2011 for 
shelters in Turkey). At other times, counsellors would accept women at the shel-
ter even when they did not believe their stories. One woman, for example, came 
to the shelter claiming to be a refugee fleeing from the female genital mutila-
tion practiced in her home country. Although the social worker who handled 
the case told me after the intake session that she did not believe the story, she 
still decided to take the woman in. In this case, her decision-making was prag-
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matic: there was enough room at the shelter and the woman had mentioned 
that she only needed to stay for a week. The social worker explained there was 
no need to ‘dig deeper’ at this point since the woman was only passing by. What 
makes this situation interesting is that although the counsellor mistrusted the 
client, pragmatic motives kept her from further inquiries and from the attempt 
to reveal what was “really” going on. In this case, accepting non-knowledge had 
a productive function (see Kirsch and Dilley 2015).
Nevertheless, accepting clients who did not match the set criteria remains a 
risky undertaking as governmental funding comes with the need to account for 
all clients housed at the shelter. Information about shelter clients is regularly 
checked by the funding department. If shelters are caught ‘being out of line’, 
as one of my interlocutors phrased it, it may result in funding cuts, damaging 
the shelter’s operability. 
Aside from occasions in which counsellors decided to bend the rules, ser-
vice providers sensed an increase in people who fraudulently took advantage 
of social and welfare services. Emerald, a social worker who offers counselling 
and support to victims of crime at police stations, had been confronted on a 
regular basis throughout her career with cases in which she suspected fraud. 
Her following statement reflects the insecurity faced by many service providers 
when working with victims of crime:
That [clients who are lying] is also our challenge here in [this police station], ‘cause we 
find many of the cases where people just come in and say, I don’t have money, I am from 
somewhere far away and people have robbed me. And you never know, is it a true story 
or is this person just making this thing up. ‘Cause, sometimes, when you follow up the 
story to the end, you find out this person was just lying. And you find, we have assisted 
that person with money. The next day you meet her in the street just walking carefree, 
forgetting that she has been there crying, saying I don’t have money, I have been rob-
bed. So, the people themselves are also abusing the system.   
(Social worker, Pretoria. Interview with author, November 2014)
Emerald’s depiction shows that the experience of being lied to increases coun-
sellors’ general mistrust towards the stories they hear, as they can never know 
if they are being presented with “the truth” or a story that was made up to 
receive assistance. 
Furthermore, in the course of my research at the Domestic Violence Court 
and at an organization that offers free paralegal advice for applicants of protec-
tion orders, the professionals I spoke to expressed a general discontentment 
with the granting of protection orders. Arguing that they were facing a huge 
amount of applications, they claimed that, to a large degree, applicants ‘abused’ 
protection orders to push through hidden agendas, like taking revenge on 
ex-partners, ensuring child custody by discrediting the other parent or gaining 
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financial benefits.6 Therefore, generalized mistrust is not a unique character-
istic of domestic violence support services. Rather, it is a phenomenon linked 
to the rights-based definition of victimhood, according to which being a victim 
constitutes legal entitlement and a source of power. In this vein, studying clin-
ical trial settings in Johannesburg, Stadler et al. (2016: 504) view women’s lies 
as a ‘source of power and as a performance’.
If, during screening, it was detected that women were lying, counsellors 
reported they would still try to discuss the situation and find alternative solu-
tions. If possible, counsellors referred clients to more suitable organizations. 
As one of the counsellors concluded: ‘People will not be chased away immedi-
ately after lying was discovered but they will have to go soon’ (Social Worker, 
Pretoria. Interview with author, Jan 2014).
In a nutshell, a variety of factors play into the formation of counsellors’ 
generalized mistrust towards clients. These include the unavailability of wel-
fare services when a huge proportion of people are in need of assistance; fund-
ing dependencies and policies that bind shelter services to specific criteria of 
victimhood; the lack of resources to care for clients with special needs; and 
the widespread discourse of prevalent welfare fraud that is substantialized by 
counsellors’ personal experiences. As has been shown, indicators likely to raise 
counsellors’ suspicion include inconsistent and incoherent narratives, a lack of 
documentation or evidence, low levels of institutional involvement, “atypical” 
body language and reluctance to partake in counselling. Over-common narra-
tives that sounded “truer than true” aroused suspicion as well. These character-
istics match the truth-criteria Carolina Kobelinsky (2015) and Melanie Griffiths 
(2012) respectively observe for asylum-seeking processes in France and the UK. 
This observation again stresses the link between mistrust and the legal notion 
of victimhood according to which the victim status constitutes an entitlement 
to benefits. 
Furthermore, professionals’ use of stereotypes has been noted in other bu-
reaucratic contexts as well, as for example Anna Louban (forthcoming) exem-
plifies based on her study of humorous encounters between case-workers and 
migrants at the German foreigners’ registration office in Berlin. Moreover, the 
ways in which counsellors’ highly subjective notions of victims’ authenticity in-
fluences their interactions with clients corresponds with Kelly’s (2016) findings 
stemming from the field of doctors’ decision-making about the allocation of 
disability grants in South Africa. She shows that doctors’ decisions were influ-
6 | The magistrates and clerks who made these claims referred to their personal ex-
periences and impressions they had gathered throughout their careers. When asked 
why they believed somebody was just pushing through their own agendas, mostly, they 
referred to ‘gut feeling’ and the overall impression that there was something wrong with 
the applicant’s story, that the story in some sense was suspicious.
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enced by a multitude of characteristics, including personal norms and values, 
notions of justice, views about the welfare system and the institutional environ-
ment, to name but a few (see Kelly 2016: 12).
The discussion of ethnographic material highlighted that counsellors’ tech-
niques to gather information about clients occur within a bureaucratic and 
therapeutic context that serves to legitimize inquiries masking them either as 
institutional requirements or as information needed for effective treatment. 
Thus, the practices of screening and monitoring allow mistrust to remain tacit. 
In the following, it will be discussed how this tacit dimension of mistrust can 
be conceptualized from the perspective of action theory.
tHe taCit DiMension of Mistrust,     
or ‘listening witH tHe seConD e ar’
With regards to its implications for action theory, interactions guided by mis-
trust are inherently different from interactions guided by trust as the latter 
lacks the double-layer characteristic of the first (see Hörlin 2016). In order to 
illustrate this argument in more detail, I will borrow a German term from the 
realm of magic tricks and use it as heuristic metaphor: interactions guided by 
mistrust are fundamentally doppelbödig.7 Like the magic hat that has been pre-
pared to hide a coin underneath a false bottom – concealing it from the eyes of 
the audience – mistrusting actors assume the other person purposefully hides 
relevant information or “the truth”. At the same time, actors’ mistrust remains 
tacit, which in turn produces an interaction that is doppelbödig. 
With regards to the initial counselling encounter during which a counsel-
lor might become suspicious of a client’s story, the visible interactional layer 
would be the counsellor’s engagement in the usual shelter routine, including 
filling in the intake form and informing the client about rules. Purposefully 
hidden, however, remains the counsellor’s interest in digging deeper in order 
7 | The literal English translation would be ‘double-bottomed’ or ‘false-bottomed’. 
However, the English expression lacks the figurative component the German term car-
ries. For example, the German proverb ‘ohne Netz und doppelten Boden’ roughly trans-
lates to ‘without safety net and without double bottom’ and is used to express that 
something is done at great risk and without tricks. Looser translations would be ‘ambig-
uous’ or ‘double-layered’. However, both equally fail to capture the intentional covering 
or misrepresentation of information which is why the German term doppelbödig is better 
suited for the present analysis. In her analysis of cinematic representations of mistrust, 
Sinje Hörlin (2016: 115) also uses the term doppelbödig to characterize interactions 
in which actors do not wish to lay their cards on the table (to use yet another related 
metaphor).
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to further investigate the client’s story. As earlier discussed, the therapeutically 
and bureaucratically legitimized practices of screening and monitoring enable 
counsellors to engage in information-generating practices that go beyond what 
would have been necessary to fill in the intake form. These observations make 
it clear that once counsellors become suspicious and adopt an attitude of mis-
trust, the suspected Doppelbödigkeit is mirrored in their own behaviour provok-
ing implicit truth-telling practices.
Consider the following explanation from the social worker Emerald during 
our conversation on welfare fraud:
Melanie: I’ve come around this quite a lot that social workers grow very suspicious of 
the stories they hear.
Emerald: That’s what I predominantly tell my auxiliary [social worker]. So, you should 
listen to, you listen to the stories of your clients with the second ear because in most 
cases, you find that the person is just taking a free ride. So, you’d never know how to 
distinguish between a real victim and somebody who’s just making up the story. Becau-
se, we also did a research at a shelter and most of the people who are staying at this 
shelter, it’s supposed to be a homeless shelter for people who are homeless who don’t 
have any home, who don’t have any means of living. But the majority of people who are 
staying there were working. They had their own jobs, they could rent flats but they didn’t 
or they were making use of that homeless shelter to save for accommodation. Every day, 
they would wake up and go to work and come back and sleep in the shelter, pretending 
to be homeless. So you could see already.     
(Social worker, Pretoria. Interview with author, November 2014)
Emerald’s advice to her social auxiliary worker – to listen to stories ‘with the sec-
ond ear’ – perfectly illustrates how the quality of mistrust prompts interactions 
that are doppelbödig. Based on her experience of welfare fraud at a homeless 
shelter, Emerald illustrates the difficulty of telling so-called real victims from 
fake ones. Along with observing body-language, ‘listening with the second ear’ 
refers to looking for an assumed hidden truth. This truth-telling capacity is not 
part of formal curricula; in fact, younger social workers are trained by more 
experienced co-workers on the job.
But why were counsellors interested in keeping mistrust tacit in the first 
place? According to my understanding, the main factors contributing to the tac-
it nature of mistrust in domestic violence counselling are the following. On the 
one hand, counsellors are committed to professional ethics and a therapeutic 
paradigm that follows the ideal of non-judgmental counselling. While counsel-
lors’ generalized mistrust towards clients’ stories of abuse is tied to intricate 
institutional and socio-political circumstances, their moral identity as helpers 
(see Kolb 2014) and the overall importance of trust within counselling does not 
allow them to openly judge or question credibility. 
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On the other hand, counsellors in their position as street-level bureaucrats 
need to adhere to institutional, bureaucratic structures that regulate who is 
eligible for social services and who is not. Convinced that “the truth” would 
always come out, counsellors employ screening and monitoring practices in 
order to establish who qualifies for shelter services and who presents a fake 
story. Although following different logics, their roles as both therapists and 
bureaucrats motivate counsellors to keep mistrust tacit and to rather ‘listen to 
stories with a second ear’.
However, if counsellors sensed clients were lying, this did not automatically 
lead them to believe that those clients were so-called fake victims. In the course 
of my fieldwork, I came to understand that counsellors differentiated between 
fake victims who were seen to be ‘abusing the system’ and women who lied 
about their situation in view of shelters’ strict intake criteria and their own 
ill-matched current circumstances. Also, clients’ lack of trust towards helpers 
could be a reason for reluctance or dishonesty at the outset of a counselling 
relationship. A client who was ‘not ready’, who did not trust the counsellor, was 
likely to ‘use another person’s words’, as one counsellor reported. In any case, 
if counsellors caught women lying, this was never reported to authorities nor 
usually did it incur negative consequences. Depending on their evaluation of 
the situation, counsellors would rather refer women to other institutions or 
help them to find alternative solutions. Nonetheless, if counsellors felt women 
were fake victims who were abusing the system by trying to take advantage, 
they acted in a less cooperative fashion.
ConCluDing reMarks
Counsellors’ position as street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 2010) oftentimes puts 
them in a moral dilemma. Many of the counsellors I spoke to referred to their 
work as a calling grounded in faith. Therefore, the need to identify so-called 
fake victims was in conflict with their general aim of assisting people and help-
ing them overcome whatever challenges they were facing in life. Still, from 
both, the therapeutic and bureaucratic perspective, identifying “fake victims” 
forms an integral part of their everyday work. 
Counsellors’ generalized mistrust towards clients’ stories heightened their 
sensitivity to specific phenomena that they evaluated as suspicious and indic-
ative of a hidden truth. Through examining stories, body language as well as 
further contextual information, counsellors tried to draw the line between 
truth and lie and assessed whether women were eligible for support services. 
However, this differentiation was based on subjective interpretation, further 
complicated by counsellors’ double-role as therapists and bureaucrats. What 
constitutes a crisis? Under which circumstances do women deserve assistance? 
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What counts as emotional abuse? Clearly, the bureaucratic and legal guidelines 
suggested different evaluations from those of the person-centred humanistic 
approach at the basis of most counsellors’ professional paradigm. 
Given the complex and precarious living realities in the post-apartheid 
State, service providers regarded women’s attempts to benefit from shelter ac-
commodation and social support as a coping strategy. As a consequence, this 
has resulted in a balancing act in which counsellors must decide between lying 
that is acceptable and lying that is not. In this respect, their decision-making 
is context-specific and influenced by personal notions of neediness, but also 
informed by situational circumstances such as how much time they have on 
their hands or how many other clients are staying at the shelter.
In this chapter, I sougt to bring forward three arguments. Firstly, I under-
stand generalized mistrust as an important driving force in the initial coun-
selling encounter. This observation does not negate the importance of trust 
in counselling. However, as I have shown, the two need to be considered sep-
arately as they result in very different actions and social relations. Secondly, 
I argue that counsellors’ mistrust towards clients is structurally generated. 
Therefore, I speak of generalized mistrust in order to highlight the socio-po-
litical dimension of mistrust in this setting. Thirdly, it was demonstrated that 
mistrust usually remains tacit and is rarely outspoken during counselling. In 
this respect, the present chapter focused on screening and monitoring practic-
es that, being bureaucratically and therapeutically legitimized, enable counsel-
lors to conceal their suspicion while allowing them to simultaneously engage in 
information-generating practices. Applying the notion of Doppelbödigkeit, this 
contribution suggested a possibility of conceptualizing mistrust with regards 
to action theory.
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Leonardo Schiocchet
Mistrust, Distrust & susPiCion
Because the term ‘mistrust’ itself has been used to mean both the absence of 
trust and that which hinders trust (Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictio-
nary 1963), even ground-breaking scholarly work, such as Mistrusting Refu-
gees (Daniel and Knudsen 1996), has often conflated ‘mistrust’ and ‘suspicion’ 
under the assumption that they are one and the same. Likewise, the term ‘dis-
trust’ is also used to express ‘lack of confidence’, ‘suspicion’, ‘wariness’, and 
‘lack or absence of trust’ (Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 1963). 
Broadly speaking, the prefix ‘mis-’ can be used to convey the meaning of some-
thing ‘erroneous’ (as in ‘mistake’) or simply the lack or absence of something 
(as suggested in ‘misconduct’). The prefix ‘dis-’, in turn, can be used to express 
reversal (as in disembark), negation/lack (as in ‘disgrace’), removal or release (as 
in ‘disembowel’) or even intensive force (as in ‘dissever’)1 (Dictionary.com n/a). 
Therefore, both ‘distrust’ and ‘mistrust’ have often been used interchangeably 
albeit to mean different things.
Nonetheless, a lack of trust need not necessarily be understood as lead-
ing to the impossibility of entrustment, but rather the opposite. By definition, 
entrustment, or the process of conferring trust to something or someone, is 
motivated by a complex agency that entails the subject’s only partial conscious-
ness and control, and can only exist in the relative absence of trust. While trust 
may already have been mobilized in a given entrustment process, entrustments 
must at least lead to the reinforcement, renegotiation, or restatement of trust. 
However misrepresented and misunderstood, this relative absence of trust, or 
what we may call distrust, is not the same as that which actively hinders trust, 
or what we may call suspicion. Moreover, if there is no necessary intrinsic con-
1 | Dis-; Mis-. n/a. Dictionary.com. See: http://www.dictionary.com/
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nection between suspicion and trust in a given context, suspicion, whenever 
present, greatly affects the dynamics of entrustment. 
Therefore, as a heuristic device, instead of grouping diverse phenomena 
under interchangeable synonyms, I propose using each one of these concepts 
in reference to a specific social phenomenon. As the prefix ‘dis-’ seems to evoke 
absence above all, I propose using distrust to mean simply the absence of trust. 
As ‘mis-’ conveys the idea of misplacement, I propose using ‘mistrust’ to mean 
misplaced trust. Finally, I prefer to reserve the term suspicion to convey active 
resistance towards entrustment. As I will argue in what follows, trust is better 
understood in practice as embedded in complex dynamic processes often but 
not always entailing suspicion. In such a process, distrust and mistrust are dif-
ferent attitudes toward trust. Suspicion, in turn, besides being more than sim-
ply the absence of trust, deeply affects dynamics of trust. In other words, while 
these concepts are indeed all interlinked as the Webster’s dictionary suggest, 
they also reflect different moods and dispositions that characterize and affect 
a given social situation differently, and thus social research must acknowledge 
the nuances between them.
entrustMent anD ritualiz ation
In ‘The Nature of Entrustment’, Parker Shipton reminds us that ‘economic 
entrustment is not neatly distinguishable from ritual, symbolic, or spiritual 
entrustment’ (2007: 215) and that these are ‘dealings and sentiments’ to which 
‘people feel strongly about’ (2007: xi). In this essay, I am inspired by Shipton’s 
insight, and critically locate my perspective somewhat within the symbolic ex-
change tradition inaugurated by Marcel Mauss in The Gift (2000). However, 
I look at a relatively neglected form of exchange, that which I call ‘economies 
of trust’. In other words, this is the management of trust as a resource and en-
trustment as boundary-maintenance mechanisms, framed through particular 
contextual and cultural proclivities, further shaping a given context’s unique 
entrustment practices (Schiocchet 2014a).
In The Gift, Mauss had already hinted that trust is at the base of all forms of 
exchange, even if this does not appear to be the case overtly. This was actually 
a common trope of social theory in the period when Mauss worked, especially 
under the influence of the social contract theory supported by authors such 
as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Friedrich Hegel. 
Supposedly, even the most formal transactions rely on trust. Take the modern 
world financial system, for example. Most of us have a bank account, that is, 
most of us deliberately hand part of our money to an institution that promises 
to store it while allowing us to use it whenever we please. For an external ob-
server not well acquainted with the principles of capitalism, this could sound 
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like a terrible idea, much worse than hiding money under the mattress. How-
ever, while many who willingly engage with the modern world’s international 
financial system do challenge the morality of banks and the goodness of their 
intentions, most still believe our money, or at least part of it, is safe in their 
hands. Ironies aside, what is important here is that most of us believe the bank 
will follow the rules they themselves have stipulated no matter how fair or un-
fair they may seem to us.
Trust and belief are thus tightly interwoven. Yet, as I suggested before, trust 
is a dynamic process with many shades of grey, and most exchanges actually 
take place between ultimate mistrust and ultimate trust. Thus, it is wise to 
avoid talking simply about the absence or presence of trust, and concentrate, 
like anthropologists tend to do, on studying trust as a process. This explains 
my own preference for Shipton’s concept of ‘entrustment’. The concept of en-
trustment suggests exchanges beyond ultimate trust, as it evokes the existence 
of both motivations leading to a given trust exchange and of an action that leads 
to the actualization of trust itself. In other words, an act of entrustment may 
happen in the relative absence of trust, and may itself lead to negotiating trust. 
Moreover, the need for this processual, nuanced understanding of trust is 
reinforced by trust’s inherently dialogic nature. While trust may also be theo-
rized in terms of one’s attitudes toward that which or who must be trusted, a 
given entrustment process is actually always multifaceted, even when power 
asymmetries may conceal trust’s dialogical nature. Returning to the example 
of the financial system, while bank customers must trust the bank and follow 
the terms of a given contract, the bank must also trust that the ‘conditions of 
possibility’ for the system, and hence the contract, will be in effect. That is, 
the bank must trust a given national government not to change the terms of 
engagement without its consent or prior notice. The bank has to trust that the 
judicial system of this given state will act as a deterrent to any breach of contract 
from the side of the customer. After all, there have been numerous occasions 
in world history when bank assets have been frozen and banks nationalized. 
So, while banks may consider investing in countries they deem more ‘stable’, 
what the extreme case reveals is a principle inherent to the form of exchange 
itself, as opposed to the content of a given exchange. Finally, the bank has also 
to trust that its customers themselves will not change the rules of engagement 
in their favour by changing the government through democratic or forceful 
means. However, while this is all true, the balance of power is generally tipped 
so far on the side of the banker that the dialogic nature of entrustment is in this 
case largely concealed. Yet, scholars should acknowledge the dialogical nature 
of entrustments and the power asymmetries inherent to particular contexts. 
As I see it, this understanding of trust dynamics goes hand-in-hand with a 
Foucauldian approach to power. According to this perspective, power emerg-
es from the relational dynamics between the subjects (being them individual, 
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collective or institutional), rather than simply being located within the subjects 
themselves. Furthermore, power is exercised not only through overt expres-
sions of legitimate dominance, but mainly through disciplinary practices mo-
bilized by regimes of knowledge (Foucault 1975).
In light of this, as Edmund Leach put it, we must question the Marxist the-
sis stating that the values behind the secular market are ruled by ‘the strictest 
cannon of rationality’. Instead, like Mauss, we must acknowledge that, in the 
words of Edmund Leach, ‘exchanges grounded on secular, rational, utilitarian 
needs turn out to be compulsory of a ritual kind’ (cited in Hugh-Jones and 
Laidlaw 2000: 167-8). While I prefer to use the term ‘rationality’ to refer to 
any possible way of understanding and engaging the world – much like Louis 
Dumont’s use of the term ‘ideology’ (1992) – it must be noted that in Leach’s 
usage he is referring to Cartesian rationality in particular. Thus, what Leach 
was questioning, backed by Mauss, was the limits of Cartesian logic in separat-
ing practical reason from more complex forms of motivation entailed in ritual 
behaviour. 
To better understand this complexity, I suggest merging the Maussian 
perspective on ritual exchange with Talal Asad’s Foucauldian critical insight 
on the nature of disciplinary practice, well expressed in the work of Charles 
Hirschkind. As Hirschkind (2006) reminds us, discipline is not mainly the 
effect of practical reason, but the result of a process of cultivation (for example, 
of religious values) through practices leading to the embodiment of disposi-
tions, sensibilities and affects. This suggestion is in fact partially corroborated 
by Mauss and is central to his concept of ‘habitus of the body’ (Mauss 1973: 82), 
which in turn was influenced by Aristotle and influenced Pierre Bourdieu’s 
famous usage (2002). It must be noticed, however, that while Bourdieu’s con-
cept deals mainly with unconscious and inescapable social pull, Hirschkind’s 
(2006) and Saba Mahmood’s (2012) usage of the concept highlights instead 
its conscious pedagogical dimension, retrieving a feature already present in 
Mauss’ work and later minimized by Bourdieu’s mimetic, and deterministic 
perspective. For the proposes of this discussion, what must be noted then is 
that entrustments are complex and multifaceted processes often expressed in 
ritualized disciplinary practices that mobilize a complex blend of practical rea-
son and embodied moods, dispositions, affects, and sensibilities. 
susPiCion anD trust aMong refugees
My work on Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, Latin America and Eu-
rope (2013, 2014b, 2015) reveals that the stigmatization of refugee identity is a 
paradox according to which the refugee is precisely that which he cannot be. 
The stigma, being the cause of the flight itself, overwhelms the refugee and 
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becomes an imperative to be dealt with, one that informs much of the refugee’s 
thoughts, reflections, and actions in the world. Being refugee has important 
consequences for their sense of belonging, and for the making of social rela-
tions both at intra-group and extra-group levels. Among the most important 
entailments of refugeeness was an almost ever-present sense of suspicion that I 
call a ‘disposition toward suspicion’, which can be defined as a collective, gener-
alized suspicion that must be surpassed or put on hold in order for social bond-
ing to occur (Schiocchet 2014a). Therefore, the collective and individual expe-
rience of suspicion was of great importance to social organization and identity. 
In this sense, generalized suspicion was in this case one of the stronger forces 
heightening the importance of trust and shaping entrustment processes.
Refugeeness created imperatives that the refugees inescapably had to ad-
dress, not just by reflecting upon them, but also by routinely dealing with them. 
Continuously dealing with suspicion generated embodied moods and disposi-
tions, coming into being often through disciplinary practices learned by the 
mind and the body, often through the ritualized context of daily life. Through 
imitation, iteration, and striving for betterment or simply to belong, refugee 
camp residents learned scripts contained in daily routines since childhood. 
That is, they learned proper behaviour, values, and vernacular expressions to 
deal with the quotidian and the unexpected. This was a learning achieved as 
much through ritualization as by conscious reflection. While some anthro-
pologists like to call this ‘culture’, I prefer to understand it as ‘knowledge’, as 
Fredrik Barth (2002) and Talal Asad (1993) each in their own way suggested. 
As a result, a structural disposition toward suspicion and embodied scripts to 
negotiate trust were thus vital components of the refugees’ life contexts.
Given this context, almost no one was totally above suspicion, and trust 
was not absolute but contextually directed to the same subject or institution 
concomitantly in a tug of war dynamics. Thus, trust became an element of 
strategic choice and investment, at the same time that it was expressed through 
the idiom of sensitivities, feelings and morality. To trust someone or something 
was also to believe him/her/it. Therefore, every social relationship, even if not 
primarily concerned with the issue of trust and social bonding, carried along 
with it an element of trust surreptitiously negotiated. Even being seen in the 
company of someone was as much a statement of where one stood in the com-
munity as it was an investment in that person. 
Accordingly, economies of trust tend to be at once political and moral. In 
the above mentioned cases, they were political because trust was partially ex-
changed consciously according to strategy, and aimed at individual and group 
goal maximization. Yet, economies of trust were also moral, because trust was 
not experienced as something completely open to entrepreneurial transaction, 
but entrustments also depended on embodied dispositions, sensibilities, and 
affects translated into affinity, and were commonly expressed through the id-
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iom of honour. Honour was at the core of identification and self-identification 
processes, indexing subjects and entrustment processes to disputed orders of 
peoples and things. In other words, economies of trust were not completely 
conscious, strategic and unbound transactions; they were also bound to a sub-
ject’s character, social standing, and reputation, with honour tending to em-
body all these features. In spite of the risk, entrustments were often pursued to 
create or strengthen a bond. However, subjects did not pick freely who would 
be entrusted, but, first of all, they classified who could be trusted instead. For 
example, an Israeli soldier would not be as eligible for entrustment as a family 
member. Likewise, someone in the community who was known to honour her/
his word was more likely to be entrusted than someone who was known for 
not being true to her/his word. In other words, entrustments did not depend 
exclusively on individual entrepreneurship, but also heavily depended on how 
the collective measured trust. In this sense, familial, national, religious, ethnic, 
and political ties were the main repositories of trust among Palestinian refu-
gees in the camps I studied. Elsewhere, however, these preferred institutions 
and subjects may vary greatly.
 The special character of trust as currency for social bonding made econo-
mies of trust pervasive in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and was 
recurrently found underlying interpersonal interactions. It is precisely the em-
beddedness of these elements in a broader context – as indicated by Tambiah’s 
example of rioting crowds’ (1996) – that gives meaning to life, creating a sense 
of belonging, evoking salient identities and inspiring collective commitment to 
patterns of social organization.
In the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon I analysed, entrustment pro-
cesses set the boundaries between, on one side, ‘us’ – Palestinian, refugees, 
Muslims, Christians – and on the other side, ‘them’ – the Lebanese, the West-
erners, the non-refugees, the foreigners, and whoever else the ‘other’ may be. 
Although I found a strong disposition toward suspicion in all Palestinian ref-
ugee camps in Lebanon, local economies of trust were unique mechanisms of 
social and individual junction and disjunction. These mechanisms only made 
sense embedded in their respective contexts, and in varying from group to 
group and individual to individual. Furthermore, like other communicational 
elements, they produced meaning, gained strength, and became disciplinary 
practices acting as partially embodied boundary maintenance dynamics 
through the ritualization of the quotidian (Schiocchet 2014a). Thus, on the one 
hand, we cannot lump all the world’s refugees in only one legal, social, and po-
litical category if we wish to understand who they are. On the other hand, it is 
vital to note and discuss general processes related to refugeeness. The idea that 
a disposition toward suspicion might indeed be a very broad tendency among 
refugees in general is one such discussion. The disposition toward suspicion 
must then be understood as a social imperative to be dealt with, which in turn 
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entails a necessity to highlight socio-cultural and context-related rules on en-
trustment that are integral to unique processes of social belonging. 
DiMensions of trust
To Shipton, entrustments are ‘part of ‘multiplex’ social bonds – they accompa-
ny kinship, friendship, church membership, commercial custom, and so on, 
which may coincide’ (2007: 208). Besides, ‘fiduciary thought and practice con-
nect time, space, and social distance in cultural ways not yet widely acknowl-
edged’ (2007: 39). If by ‘fiduciary’, we understand not only ‘financial’, as is 
mainly the case for Shipton, but also any other sort of symbolic entrustment, 
then this proposition covers a crucial part of the processes of social belonging: 
symbolic entrustments shaping all things social, such as friendship, loyalty, 
group membership, alliances, marriages, and others. The etymology of the 
term ‘fiduciary’ supports my usage. Current English usage of the word stems 
from the Latin fiducia, meaning ‘trust’ + arius, meaning ‘-ary’. The Webster’s 
Dictionary lists fiduciary in English as a) ‘holding, held, or founded in trust or 
confidence’; b) ‘of having to do with, or involving a confidence of trust: of the 
nature of a trust <a ~ capacity> <a ~ relation>‘; c) ‘resting upon public confi-
dence for value or currency <~ fiat money>‘ (1986: 845). In other words, even 
if today the meaning of fiduciary is mainly associated with economy, it is only 
so because the question of trust is at the base of economy, as it is at the base of 
virtually all social relations. Furthermore, at the foundation of the word ‘fidu-
ciary’ is the Latin root fidēs, which relates to trust, but also to ‘faith, confidence, 
reliance, credence, belief’ (Lewis 1890) – all associations worth exploring in 
greater depth.
There is something universal about people’s trust dynamics that lies at the 
base of social exchanges and social bonding. At the very least, all social groups 
have socially accepted or contested ways to go about entrustment. Beyond this 
universality, others have suggested that trust as a basic element for social bond-
ing tends to be emphasized by the condition of being a refugee (Daniel and 
Knudsen 1996), as my own work suggests (Schiocchet 2014a). Moreover, be-
yond socio-historical conditions, there are the contextual proclivities that make 
one people’s suspicion and trust dynamics unique in relation to others, in 
which individual engagement flourishes.
Since trust dynamics are by definition relational, there cannot be trust prior 
to a given social relation, and thus there cannot be mistrust (misplaced trust) 
or suspicion (active resistance to trust), as these are different moods, dispo-
sitions and attitudes that can only exist through conceiving particular social 
relations. As such, absolute distrust, or the plain absence of trust, can only be 
understood as an ontological condition to social bonding, a logical point of de-
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parture. However, the process of knowing something or someone necessarily 
entails classification, as the classic Durkheimian critique to Kant, at the base of 
contemporary social sciences, corroborates (1995). Therefore, in practice, there 
is no absolute presence or absence of trust, but only different levels of trust 
(and distrust), mistrust, and suspicion, dynamically effaced, put in place, rein-
forced, and transformed in a given social relation. Furthermore, as Julie Peteet 
states, trust is ‘a fragile and situational concept, easily broken but difficult to 
restore’ (Peteet 1996: 169). This, in turn, reinforces the dynamic character of 
entrustments, as broken trust frequently needs to be repaired, or it leads to the 
repositioning of subjects, which entails redirecting trust elsewhere.
ConClusion
One of this book’s points of departure is its effort to transpose what Godelier 
identifies as part of the enigma of the gift to the question of trust (see Mühl-
fried, introduction to this volume). Mauss, Godelier and Mühlfried highlight 
the connection between economy (or the circulation of objects, peoples, and 
values) and trust, and that trust is a matter of ‘public confidence and currency’ 
(Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1986: 845). Godelier took a step 
forward and understood that for a currency to exist there must be a measure, 
which by definition does not circulate. In this edited volume, Mühlfried devel-
ops this further by reinstating the knowledge sealed into the term’s Latin ori-
gins and overtly re-associating giving/not-giving with entrustment processes.
Godelier’s interest on the inalienability of certain things stems as much 
from his ethnographic material from Melanesia, and particularly from his 
study of the Baruya, as it stems from his dialogue with Marcel Mauss, Karl 
Marx, and Claude Lévi-Strauss. In short, Godelier’s The Enigma of the Gift 
(1999) builds on Annette Wiener’s Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of 
Keeping-while-Giving (1992) in that it reinforces Wiener’s claim that, while so-
cial scientists have emphasized giving and sharing, not giving and not sharing 
are at least just as important. 
As Paul Roscoe puts it (2001: 151), Godelier substitutes Wiener’s formu-
la ‘keeping-while-giving’ for ‘keeping for giving’, which expresses the idea 
that certain things circulate but cannot become anyone else’s property. Yet, 
Godelier’s main interest is in objects that cannot be given or sold, which are 
considered sacred (1999: 08). These inalienable items are thus ‘fixed, still 
points’ and realities ‘anchored in the nature of things’ which ‘are what give 
time its duration’ (1999: 200). From these ‘realities’, the social body creates 
the realm of the imaginary, which in Lacanian fashion takes primacy over the 
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symbolic2. In other words, society creates a fiction in which to live in order 
to mask the reality that society itself is the creator of this very world. In line 
with Marxism, and also developing Durkheim’s conception of society, Godelier 
understands this as a form of fetishism that naturalizes the world, thus giv-
ing it existence ex nihilo (beyond the confines of the social imagination), thus 
protecting the social body from the incertitude of its own subjectivity. At the 
very base of this relationship between the realms of the imaginary and the 
real, there is a relationship between things that circulate (in the imaginary) 
and those that must not circulate (anchored on the real). Paradoxically perhaps, 
according to Godelier, what cannot circulate is considered sacra, serving as a 
nodal point around which to construct the fetish social beings chose to inhabit. 
It is only through inalienable sacra, standing as a measure for everything else, 
that exchange itself is possible and society can exist. Or, as Godelier puts it, ‘in 
order for there to be movement, exchange, there had to be things that were kept 
out the exchange’ (1999: 166-167). 
In summary, by focusing on what circulates, both Mauss and Lévi-Strauss 
overlooked a basic component of social life. In Godelier’s words this is ‘giving 
to the gods’ – a term that stands for that which is inalienable, that which can 
never be reciprocated, which in modern society is conflated with the rule of law 
(1999: 207). It is to this we must turn to understand social dynamics. Likewise, 
Mühlfried suggests looking at what, when or who is not entrusted as a means 
to engender social relations, as opposed to halt them. To him, this demands an 
emphasis on mistrust/distrust (as synonyms) as opposed to the overwhelming 
anthropological emphasis on trust. I present here another perspective in which 
trust and mistrust are only different polarities of the same social operation, 
while distrust stands for the complete absence of trust in one’s phenomenolog-
ical realm, and thus does not belong to the realm of empirical realities. Where 
Mühlfried’s perspective is dyadic, mine is triadic. Yet, underlying both perspec-
tives, is the same urge to differentiate between two sorts of phenomena: the ab-
sence of trust and the refusal to trust. Moreover, my particular choice of words 
here (mistrust and distrust to mean one and another different social phenome-
na) stems only from the meaning they evoke to me, but is almost completely ir-
relevant to the point I wish to make. The goal of this essay is not to create jargon 
per se, but to call attention not only to the need to discuss these different social 
2 | The primacy of the imaginary over the symbolic is one of Godelier’s most serious 
critiques of Lévi-Straussian structuralism. According to Godelier, in Levi-Strauss the 
symbolic eliminates the importance of the sacred, while Mauss exacerbated it though 
the ‘hau’, or the spirit of the gif t, as if the rule of law was not already enough justifica-
tion. To Godelier, instead, modern society conflates the rule of law with the sacred, and 
it is through this imbrication that he suggests one must understand its social dynamics.
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phenomena anthropologically, but also to start by differentiating between them 
heuristically and conceptually in order to accomplish this goal.
Thus, to reiterate, entrustment processes are dialogic even when asym-
metries conceal its dialogic nature. They are processual, since they cannot be 
reduced to a single moment in time, and thus are never static. They are mani-
fested through moods, dispositions, and attitudes; and they are subtly present 
in most social exchanges alongside other moods, dispositions and attitudes, 
composing subjects’ motivations that cannot be defined simply in terms of ei-
ther practical reasoning or morality. Entrustment processes may be embedded 
in ritual exchanges but they are never absolutely present or absent. Finally, they 
frequently serve as currency for social relations, ordering subjects’ proximity 
and distance, and indexing social categories and cleavages. 
Relative to themes such as kinship, ethnicity, or even honour, entrustment 
dynamics (encompassing distrust, mistrust, and suspicion) are understud-
ied in anthropology. This is particularly noticeable when the anthropology on 
trust is compared to the social theory tradition, from social contract theorists 
(like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or David Hume) to 
Charles Tilly and Niklas Luhmann and the contemporary civil society scholars 
(like Robert Putman or Peter Evans), as some of the chapters in this edited 
volume suggest. Yet, due to what I have presented in this chapter, I suggest 
that entrustment is an essential theme underlying general matters of social 
organization and identity, and a comprehensive understanding of entrustment 
processes harbours significant potential not only to more theoretically focused 
approaches to social life, but especially to more ethnographic ones. In turn, due 
to the intrinsically relational character of entrustment dynamics, micro-socio-
logical and ethnographic approaches are now necessary to advance or challenge 
classical approaches on the topic, especially those which still insist on centring 
on the ontological dimension of trust.
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Mis(sing) Trust for Surviving 
Confronting Complexity and the Un/Known in Makeni, 
Nor thern Sierra Leone
Michael Bürge
‘To see a person is not to know him/her’. 
tEmnE funEral SonG1
You know Michael, everything is about money in these days. Some people have to live 
on 2000 Leones [around 0.30€] a day. Those who have money, they cannot get enough. 
People try everything to get money. But it is not that easy. When you have money, it 
disappears very quickly. (…) You know, how our people are. (…) If you want to make 
business, you have to protect yourself. They come to your place and ask for money. 
Others try to destroy you to get money. They have bad hearts (bad at). They use local 
medicine. You must not have a stif f hand. You need an open heart and to share. But 
it is not enough. That’s why I went to Kabala. The [traditional] doctors there are more 
powerful. (…) You need to have sense. You have to know how to play (sabi fᴐ ple) the 
game. (…) You know that I lived in Freetown. I went to Conakry. I’m a drɛg man, a real 
rarray man. I worked in dif ferent places. (…) You have to play tricks. Don’t show people 
everything you have. Don’t show everybody what you do and what you know. Give them 
also a wrong impression. (…) But you also need trust (trᴐs). You need the right connec-
tions, sababu2. (…) You have to diversify. The business, the connections. The way you 
appear. (…) You need to try and to learn. If you only remain in Makeni and do always 
the same things, you will not move ahead. It’s your people, your brothers who want to 
destroy you. Keep your eyes open. I have sense, you know. I made new experiences. 
I saw dif ferent things and I know much. Gold, timber, diamonds, clothes or shoes. I know 
the business. (…) It is dif ficult to have trust these days. (…) Many of our people do not 
1 | The original is ‘Ke-nenk w-uni ke ye ke tara ko’ (see Shaw 2000:42). Ka-Temne is the 
dominant ‘indigenous’ language spoken in Makeni.
2 | In its local usage, sababu is largely synonymous to trust (trᴐs) as I develop in this 
chapter. It denotes the material support, belief and commitment but also the support-
ing person (Bürge 2009; D’Angelo 2015).
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know how to make money. Some have tried many dif ferent things. (…) They trusted so 
many people. They had hope and invested much. (…) But only disappointment.  
(Patrick, Makeni, Conversation with Author, 3 April 20133)
I knew Patrick from 2007, when he was one of the young men whose lives 
circled around commercial motorbike (okada) riding – the overarching topic of 
my research back then (Bürge 2011). At that time Patrick was in his early twen-
ties, earning money not only as an okadaman (commercial motorbike rider) but 
also by engaging in petty trade with clothes, food and agricultural products 
between Makeni, where he was born and resided again in 2007, some sur-
rounding villages and Sierra Leone’s and Guinea’s respective capitals Freetown 
and Conakry. After the civil war (1991-2002), he had lived in Freetown for some 
time, where he had earned a living as a jew man, that is, dealing in second hand 
clothes and other imported, and sometimes stolen, goods (Christensen, Utas, 
and Vium 2011). 
When I returned to Makeni in 2011, it was immediately visible that Patrick 
had been successful during my absence. He had grown bigger, put on quite 
some weight. Some people called him ‘big man’ or ‘bᴐbᴐ bɛlɛ’, literally ‘belly 
boy’ (Shepler 2011:48-49; Ferme 2001:159-86; Utas 2012).4 He had earned mon-
ey: first in Freetown between 2008 and 2009 and afterwards back in Makeni. 
He was not riding somebody else’s motorbike anymore but owned seven mo-
torbikes that he rented out to some of his ‘brothers’. He was not continuously 
roaming the streets looking for a good deal. As a big man, Patrick ‘issue[d] com-
mands, normally from a seated position, while subordinates [did] the running’, 
(Nugent 1995:3; Utas 2012) for benefitting from his socio-economic success. 
Patrick repeatedly sustained that he had capitalized on his ‘sense’ or ‘mind’, 
his cleverness and his ability (sabi fᴐ) to explore unknown places and practices 
and to knit new relations with people. He had appropriated powers that were 
unfamiliar and often invisible for most people in Makeni (Shaw 2002; Ferme 
2001; Bürge 2017). Whereas his knowledge and experiences had been highly 
beneficial for his economic progress, Patrick and his activities were also object 
of rumours in the neighbourhood. He was the target of malicious gossip and 
even more malevolent ‘local practices’ that aimed at harming his social posi-
tion and thereby his existence. People, particularly close ones, members of the 
family and ‘brothers’ that felt insufficiently included in his benefits, doubted 
the morality and sustainability of his practices. Some accused him of working 
with illegal and antisocial occult powers harming the community (D’Angelo 
3 | All names are anonymized.
4 | Having a ‘big belly’ or being called a bᴐbᴐ bɛlɛ points at an individual’s socio-eco-
nomic success, which might also had come about by illegitimately (‘greedily’, ‘corrupt-
ly’) appropriating or ‘eating’ (chop) others’ properties. 
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2014b:278-81). As Patrick states in the quote above, he had little trust for the 
people around him. Many had no trust for him either.
The quote above came from a conversation I had with Patrick in April 2013 
in front of his tiny shop about the various economic activities on which people 
pinned their hopes when attempting to improve their living condition. People 
had to experience that many of these efforts revealed to be disappointingly un-
successful; Patrick’s accounts of the challenges and opportunities for improv-
ing his life under such conditions were typical of the difficulties many other 
people faced when trying to find new trajectories and values to elevate their 
lives beyond mere survival. Opportunities seemed to increase in Makeni, while 
personal success was limited. People had difficulties establishing the right ac-
tivities and relationships for generating money and other capital. Many of my 
interlocutors, particularly young men, were clear that lack of trust (trᴐs) caused 
their social immobility: ‘If there is no trust, there is no progress (yu nᴐ ebul fᴐ 
go bifᴐ)’.5 Success in moving forwards and upwards was often very elusive – as 
generating trust was. 
On the following pages, I elaborate how people in Makeni tried to improve 
their lives and what role trust and its absence played therein. For this purpose 
and faithful to the title of this book, I approximate mistrust mainly ethnograph-
ically. However, I also draw upon some central theoretical elaborations about 
mis/trust. Most importantly, based on empirical insights I problematize and 
offer a different view on the relationship between mis/trust and the un/known. 
Luc Boltanski’s (2014) elaborations about mis/trust, making inquiries and the 
savoir sur/vivre (the art of living and surviving) were of particularly importance. 
What became particularly clear with Patrick’s and other interlocutors’ sto-
ries, was that Boltanski’s – and other authors’ – supposition about the relation-
ship of familiarity or social proximity and trust was not valid for the people in 
northern Sierra Leone. Here, when ‘persons and things in close proximity were 
involved (…) habit and common sense [did not] suffice to engender an accept-
able degree of trust’ (Boltanski 2014: 208) for making things easy. The ‘imme-
diate environment’, ‘friends, colleagues or family members’ (ibid.) were not 
the refuge of trust. People in Makeni knew too well about the ambivalence and 
indeterminacy of the intimate and seemingly known. The house, home and 
5 | The insights I draw upon stem from fieldwork up to 2013. The lack of trᴐs in Sierra 
Leone has become even more crucial with the outbreak of the Ebola epidemic in 2014 
(see Somparé in this volume). Suffice here to say that people who lacked trust in mea-
sures taken by the government and international interventions investigated into their 
own solutions. In line with the argument I put forward here, missing trust, not only as the 
‘belief’ in the government, but also in its more material form and support, urged peo-
ple to look for alternatives (Shepler 2014b; Benton 2014; Yamanis, Nolan and Shepler 
2016; Richards 2016; Bah 2015).
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kin could be ‘comforting yet at the same time inherently dangerous’ (Geschiere 
2013: ix). They were homely (heimelig in German) and uncanny (un/heimlich).
Based on their ‘sensory data’ about their ‘disturbed’ social environment 
(Boltanski 2014), people had thus good reasons not to turn a blind eye to their 
relations with close ones for suspending doubt (Geschiere 2013:32) and pre-
tending ‘as if’ everything was ok (Möllering 2006). As in the case of Dar Es 
Salaam’s shoe vendors of Alexios Malefakis (2014), people in Makeni had diffi-
culties generating trust with their close ones because they knew them so well. 
At the same time, there was something uncanny (un/heimlich), not completely 
known but neither fully hidden, that people could not ignore in their every-
day lives, if and when they had to collaborate with the people in their vicinity. 
Therefore they had to ‘undertake inquiries’ (Boltanski 2014: 209; also Klaits 
2016: 417) and to engage with their doubts when considering various alterna-
tives to improve their lives. 
In other words, trust and social proximity were not pre-given by the context 
or some physical properties. Trust was the imagined but unattainable ‘solution’ 
to uncertainty that drove people’s lives. Trust is not an embodied or existent func-
tion that substitutes incomplete knowledge and suspends uncertainty to keep 
society together (Simmel 2011:191; Giddens 2008). It had to be wrought from 
uncertainty and ambivalence. Mistrust was the active and constant engagement – 
and detachment – with the uncanny, the known and the unknown. Questioning 
and inquiring into them was elementary for survival. Mistrust could rework and 
transcend the local to create social intimacy. Aiming at calming and purifying 
troubled waters, though, people’s acting often had contrary outcomes. 
Mistrust as to Miss trust
This chapter elaborates on empirical findings what mistrust means in north-
ern Sierra Leone, and what people do when they mistrust. Fundamentally, I 
argue that mistrust means to miss trust. This is not just a playful change in 
spelling. What I want to emphasize is that mistrust is not the opposite or nega-
tion of trust. The English prefix mis- does not simply express a negation. It is 
etymologically directly related to to miss and implies a more complex alterity 
or divergence. Putting forward a concept of mistrust signifying to miss trust 
means to take vernacular understandings and conceptualizations seriously. In 
locally spoken Krio, Sierra Leone’s lingua franca, I am not aware of a dichoto-
mous relationship as it is at least assumed to exist in common English usage 
between trust and mistrust. Whereas there is a formal equivalent to English 
trust, trᴐs, Krio does not have a word like ‘mistrᴐs’ (see Fyle and Jones 1980). 
In other words, for elaborating on practices of mistrust in Sierra Leone, as ‘to 
miss trust’ (nᴐ gɛ trᴐs or trᴐs nᴐ dae), I must digress and develop this idea in 
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relation to trust. However, it should become clear that trust does not exist prior 
to missing trust. Trust is not the productive social normalcy and missing trust 
its antisocial deviance. Trust emerges from and in the relation to it. 
Trᴐs is semantically more encompassing than common and conceptual un-
derstandings of trust in English. Trᴐs does not only refer to the general and 
rather elusive, ‘hard to describe’ belief in something to happen in a certain 
way (Simmel 2011:192; Möllering 2006:1; Gambetta 1988). Trᴐs in Krio liter-
ally means credit, an advance of valuables (Fyle and Jones 1980). Hence, the 
notion bears a decidedly material (ist) meaning that still can be found in more 
specialized usage of trust (e.g. investment trust) in English (Oxford English 
Dictionary).6 During the periods of my fieldwork, money was perhaps the most 
valuable credit or investment in Makeni. ‘Everything is about money’. Yet mon-
ey was only meaningful and valuable in social relations and practices that were, 
in turns, indispensable for generating money and wealth (Bledsoe 1990; Shaw 
2000; Guyer 1993). One could not substitute for the other.
Trᴐs is in other words the multifaceted ‘capital’ (Bourdieu 2002) generated 
in and translated and invested into social relations and economic activities. Trᴐs 
thereby always refers and relates to something else, spans and limits multiva-
lent networks. It links people, objects and practices and is produced in their 
relating. It is not stable but always eludes people’s grasp. However, these net-
works cannot expand infinitely and relations are not inherently benign (Stra-
thern 1996, 2014). Trᴐs is and has to be limited. Information and knowledge 
are key to generating and stabilising trᴐs – and not substituted by it. One has 
to know how to arrange the various potential forms and sources of trᴐs, how to 
make valuables meaningful, where to invest what and when properly and for 
getting what. One has to know what to exclude. People in Makeni could often 
not generate and maintain enough of this capital. Saying that they did not have 
trᴐs, people implied that they did not receive as well as could not give enough 
trᴐs. Circulation, reciprocity and stabilization was hampered. Trᴐs was hard to 
realize. People did miss trᴐs. 
As stated, in Krio no term such as ‘mistrᴐs’ exists that might oppose trᴐs. 
Ontologically, trᴐs is not prior to ‘something’ that might negate it. People felt a 
lack of and the thirst for trᴐs. As Patrick commented above, people tried inces-
santly to produce it. They had ideas of what came along with trᴐs. They invested 
in various social relations and economic activities to realize and materialize 
their aspirations. Often their attempts failed. Actors and practices diverted trᴐs. 
It could be withheld and rejected and thus not be realized in a particular activ-
ity and relation. Practices of perceiving and pursuing trᴐs might fumble and 
6 | Georg Simmel elaborates his influential thoughts about trust in a passage where he 
discusses the transition from material money to credit money (Simmel 2011:190-92; 
also Möllering 2001).
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misdirect trᴐs. People were (increasingly) uncertain about how exactly to locate 
and grasp trᴐs. They lacked crucial information. They erred. The result was 
often again a personal feeling of a void and insufficiency. 
On the pages to come, it is important to read mistrust as to miss trust in 
such multiplicity and polysemy. That is, both to miss and trust have multiple 
meanings that allude to elusiveness and the desire to stabilize them. Mistrust 
is not normatively hierarchically related to trust. To miss means to long for, 
trying to locate and to understand how to reach. To miss trust also means to 
fail to realize trust, not locating it properly and thus not hitting or grasping, but 
only brushing it or going in another or the wrong direction altogether. Longing 
for and failing in producing trust never ceases. It is recurrent. To miss trust 
produces (unintended) material and immaterial outcomes that are constitutive 
of emerging socialities. It produces provisional forms of trust. To miss trust is 
to try to constantly produce and transform trust and by implication, the way one 
relates to other people and objects.
Suggesting such a concept of mistrust that is not the opposite and negation 
of trust but the multifaceted and recursive quest for trust, implies that I do 
not conceptualize it as just another way of reducing complexity, a ‘functional 
equivalent’ to trust as Luhmann has it (1979). To put it perhaps better: reducing 
complexity can be seen as one facet of mistrust but definitely not the essential 
function of it. People possibly aim at reduced complexity, a distant ideal out-
come when everything is clear and without challenges. I argue that mistrust 
implies distinct positioning and acting in the world (Endreß 2012; Hörlin and 
Ellrich 2013; Schweer et al. 2009). It is inextricably related to trust – yet not 
in a dichotomous ‘dualism’ but rather in a mutually productive or ‘recursive 
duality’ (Giddens 1984, 2008: 139). Trust and mistrust coexist, as Mühlfried 
lines out in the introduction. Their relation is however tense. To miss trust 
indicates a dissatisfaction with the things as they evolve and the knowledge one 
has about them. It means to problematize the status quo. To miss trust urges 
people to inquire (Boltanski 2014; Klaits 2016: 417; Whyte 1997) into things 
as they are and possible alternatives and, thus, to engage with complexity. It 
suggests opening up in order to challenge yet unknown and invisible practices, 
actors and realms involved in improving one’s life (Bürge 2017). Vulnerability 
and precariousness are fought with increased and diversified engagement with 
more actors (Newell 2012: 68, 88). At the same time, to miss trust also entails 
being alert and seeking to reduce the dangers emerging from the assumedly 
known (Endreß 2012:86; Malefakis 2014) and the increased exposure to the 
(unknown) world (Bürge 2017). Mistrust produces knowledge and connections 
that change the way one engages in the world (Jackson 2011: 42-44). In the 
words of Klaits, it is trust’s ‘uncanny twin’ (2016: 416). 
The quest for betterment in the future could imply a backward or nostalgic 
orientation towards the past or ‘temporary suspension of temporality’ (Herz-
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feld 2005:175). The assignment of responsibilities for failures and disappoint-
ments might be internalized or externalized (Jackson 2008: 70-71). Important-
ly, in Makeni they were mostly personalized and seldom ascribed to structural 
problems.7 In Sierra Leone we can observe feelings, practices or processes that 
might resemble what general ‘lay’ theories call (symptoms of) mistrust or dis-
trust and conceptualize as the (dysfunctional) opposite of trust (Schweer et al. 
2009). Continuously missing trust could manifest in what might be qualified 
as ‘psychosomatic stress’, ‘paranoid cognitions’, ‘witchcraft’, ‘anxiety’, ‘nostal-
gia’, ‘drug consumption’, ‘fear’, ‘deceit’, ‘mobbing’ or ‘violent behaviour’ (Gid-
dens 2008; Boltanski 2014; Geschiere 2013; Molé 2012). 
However, such corporeal, mental and social positions towards the world are 
neither the negations of trust or the opposite and functional equivalent of trust 
in Luhmann’s sense (1979, 1988). They do not just ‘swallow up’ trust. They are 
the outcome and point of departure in processes of missing trust. They produced 
and were products of particular forms of and relations to trust. They triggered 
particular social relations and acting in the world, in which actors oscillated be-
tween detachment from and encompassment of actors, distancing from and en-
gaging in the world (see Mühlfried this volume). Local conceptualizations of the 
mental, bodily, social and spiritual symptoms or manifestations just mentioned, 
second, reflect this productive potential and the ambivalence of how individuals 
miss trust. ‘Anxiety’, ‘jealousy’ or ‘mobbing’ do commonly not exist as such in 
northern Sierra Leone’s local languages and cosmology. Missing trust can lead 
into particular states of mind, soul and body such as what is locally called ‘bad 
hearts’, ‘warm hearts’, ‘spoilt hearts’; symptoms that require and yield various 
bodily and social practices that have their specific socio-economic significance 
and productivity. Missing trust did not result in uniform activities.
What people do when they miss trust has thus to be investigated ethno-
graphically. This chapter is a first tentative contribution to this effort. It inves-
tigates the ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ social forces at work in the practices 
triggered by the missing of trust (Malefakis 2014: 56-57, 110). It sheds light 
on how people sought a better apprehension of trust, how they tried to make 
experiences and to uncover the secrets of how to be more successful. On the 
following pages, I account for the ambivalently dis/entangling properties of 
trust and its missing. People suspended certain practices and social relations 
they deemed to be obstructive and sought people that could help and involve 
them in favourable enterprises (Bürge under review). They tried to work on 
themselves and change personal attitudes and impression. In brief, they tried 
7 | To ‘personalize’ responsibility does not mean to ascribe it to inhering in the indi-
viduated person but to the multiple relationships in which persons emerge (Jiménez 
2011:180). ‘Betterment’ thus needs a more ‘holistic’ apprehension of the multiple – so-
cial, economic, moral – forces that make up for persons (Shaw 2000).
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new practices, endeavoured into unknown venues with the associated dangers 
this involved. They wanted to ‘go bifᴐ’, that is, to progress, without leaving their 
past and the known behind. 
elusive trust anD tHe seCre t of Progress
My fieldwork took place between 2005 and 2013, a period when most people in 
Makeni, the capital of Sierra Leone’s Northern Province, lived in rather precari-
ous conditions and faced ‘chronic crisis’ (Vigh 2008). People struggled for their 
daily survival, producing just enough capital to regularly afford sufficient food 
(Bolten 2008, 2012a, 2012b). Despite high statistical national economic growth 
and visible development after the arrival of new multinational companies in-
vesting in the exploitation of natural resources in the 2010s,8 people literally 
lived ‘on 2000 Leones a day’, around 0.30€ in 2013, not knowing what the next 
day would bring.
Precariousness in Makeni was not only about existential goods and the strug-
gle for survival. People had ideas and aspirations about a better and more ‘en-
joyable’ and ‘comfortable’ life that others lived – often elsewhere, in Freetown, 
Ghana, Europe and the US – and from which they perceived themselves as being 
excluded. Such feelings of exclusion from the benefits of economic development, 
education, and general ‘promises of modernity’ were not new (Bolten 2008; 
Bürge 2009). People learned in school that, during colonial times, Makeni and 
most of the territory that belonged now to Sierra Leone, had been part of the 
British Protectorate where people were differently treated than the Krios in the 
Colony around Freetown (Fanthorpe 2001). The civil war (1991-2002) isolated 
Sierra Leone as a whole from the ‘progress’ happening elsewhere and brought 
only destruction. The little ‘development’ that reached the country during those 
years and particularly during the reconstruction of the country afterwards was 
diverted to the south by the ‘tribalistic’ government of the Sierra Leone People’s 
Party (SLPP). Since independence in 1961 changing governments have given 
emphasis to the development of the south. People narrated that even northern 
Presidents Siaka Stevens (1967-1985) and Joseph Saidu Momoh (1985-1992), who 
allegedly worked for the north, benefitted rather restricted circles and different 
areas around the country. For decades, if not centuries, Makeni people had been 
united in marginalisation and suffering.
8 | Sierra Leone’s annual GDP grew by 15.2% and 20.7% respectively in 2012 and 2013 
before declining in 2014 (4.6%) and particularly 2015 (-21.5%) due to the Ebola epi-
demic and the collapse of the iron ore price. Despite this exponential growth, the GDP 
per capita was still among the lowest in the world – and the GDP per capita does not 
consider how capital is distributed among the people.
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In late 2007, everything changed in Makeni, or, at least, that is what people 
thought. They elected Ernest Bai Koroma of the All People’s Congress (APC) 
as their president. Born in Makeni, he was the president of the north. Multina-
tional companies soon came to northern Sierra Leone, pouring investment into 
infrastructural improvements designed for their purposes, either to further 
the extraction and export of mineral resources or to transform fields used for 
subsistence farming into sugar cane plantations for producing bio fuel. All of 
a sudden, ‘development’ and the good life were highly present. People could 
see it as close as they never could before; they could almost touch it. It was just 
a step from their grasp. And a good number of young men made this step. 
The multinational companies employed them, mostly for menial labour and 
on short-term contracts. For the first time in their lives they earned a monthly 
salary. People from all over the country and from abroad came to Makeni to 
secure an employment. Nobody in Makeni could remember anything like this 
having happened before. People had always been forced to move to Freetown, 
to the ‘diaspora’9 to get ahead in life (Jackson 2008, 2011). 
Still, the majority of the residents and the new arrivals were not able to ben-
efit decisively from these economic developments in the long term. Rising pric-
es for food, necessities and rents came to determine their everyday existence, 
eating into any increased earnings they had enjoyed. Most houses were still 
without electricity and periods of fuel shortage slowed down the local economy. 
After the initial period of labour intensive infrastructure work came to a close, 
the multinational companies increasingly rejected new job applications and did 
not renew expiring contracts. Many people were left with debt and could not 
keep up their newly acquired standards in life. 
Most people in Makeni could not consolidate a place for themselves in the 
‘good life’ that they had expected. Yet, this ‘good life’ was still taking place so-
mewhere else; very close to them they could see that others ‘enjoyed’ themsel-
ves, while they still suffered and could not generate any capital. Instead, things 
increasingly took a turn for the worse. The social relationships and economic 
practices upon which people had relied and pinned their hopes did not deliver 
as expected. Feelings of exclusion were even stronger. Thus, things had to 
change thoroughly. People wanted to bridge the gap between themselves and 
what they wanted to achieve, the position in which life was more ‘comfortable’ 
and ‘enjoyable’. They had to put an end to and avoid unproductive activities 
and relationships and, instead, discover those that would let them progress 
(lɛ dɛn go bifᴐ) instead of pulling or tying them down (pul dɛn doŋ) (Bolten 
2013: 164-65; Bürge 2017: 147, 155). For this purpose, people had to understand 
9 | The word ‘diaspora’ in Makeni did not refer to a group of people but to the places of 
migration. It was synonymous to ‘overseas’, the US, UK. Therefore, diaspora is a place 
one went to rather than something one joined.
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why they failed. They had to understand why others succeeded and how to 
replicate their success. They had to relate to them. It was obvious that success 
came along with new practices, people and goods from outside. The question 
was how to access and comprehend them. Apparently, people in the communi-
ty who were equal or at least similar by birth and upbringing and had engaged 
in rather similar activities for a long period, all of a sudden started performing 
much better. If they had been economically successful under the new conditi-
ons, by logic, they must have uncovered the secret and hid it from the others 
(Shaw 1997; Bürge 2011, under review). Those still suffering wanted such se-
crets to be disclosed. 
As said, not every secret to progress and to economic prosperity was invisi-
ble or ungraspable simply because it was new for the people in Makeni. Certain 
practices and relations did not require much investigation; it was clear for the 
people that they were particularly detrimental to them while making others 
prosper. These were public secrets (Taussig 1999) and extant routines for the 
people. They learned from radio, newspapers and public discussions that the 
government had attracted foreign investors with attractive tax conditions or 
even complete exemption. Land leasing agreements with multinational com-
panies were signed without parliamentary consultation. The president sent 
his most powerful ‘witch doctors’ to catch the dɛbul den, the invisible spirits 
inhabiting the bush that had been uprooted and left haunting the construction 
area of a railroad for exporting iron ore. Instead of looking for a solution to 
pacify the spirits or compensating those forcibly displaced from the area, the 
president prioritized the interests of foreign investors.10 The Anti-Corruption 
Commission investigated against the mayor of Freetown. Al-Jazeera aired a 
documentary in which the vice-president allegedly accepted payments from 
foreign businessmen who wanted to circumvent the export ban on precious 
timber (Samura 2011; Akam 2011). People started to talk about the striking 
coincidence between the mushrooming construction of opulent mansions for 
high-ranking politicians, the improvement of the roads leading there and the 
awarding of profitable contracts to the same ‘Chinese people’ who had built 
the mansions. People felt betrayed by the multinational companies that failed 
to provide the expected employment opportunities but, instead, brought in 
expat workers to exploit the country. And they became increasingly ambigu-
ous and critical toward ‘Pa’ Koroma’s neoliberal politics to which they tried to 
adapt without receiving much back in turn. 
10 | See Lorenzo D’Angelo’s fascinating work on various manifestation of the dɛbul as 
a social and political actor in Sierra Leone (D’Angelo 2014a, 2014b).
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intiMate eneMies anD Miss trust
Nonetheless, people in Makeni could not do much about these elite actors and 
the way the latter marginalized or even excluded them from ‘development’. 
For one, people were used to the ‘rotten system’ of not being included into 
reciprocal networks of trust with national politicians and foreign business peo-
ple (Bolten 2012a; Bürge 2009). People never lost hope they might personally 
benefit from political and socio-economic changes and improve their person-
al position within these networks (Bolten 2013). Disappointment, though, had 
become part of their routine or ‘constant crisis’ (Vigh 2008). In addition, elite 
actors were seen as too powerful and too distant; people could not grasp their 
actions. In other words, people could not apprehend their doings fully and they 
could not make them directly accountable.11 
Instead, people concentrated on or were absorbed in more ‘immediate strug-
gles’ with the ‘immediate enemies’ to their progress (Foucault 1983: 211). Here 
they sought to bring about change and to generate trust. In people’s everyday 
experiences, fellow citizens denied their job applications to the multinational 
companies. The peers with whom they had grown up, did not share their benefits 
with them. Neighbors gossiped about them. Brothers went overseas and lost con-
tact. Others disappeared with motorbikes and other valuables with which they 
had them entrusted. In short, people identified the causes and remedy for their 
personal suffering in more intimate relationships (Shaw 1997: 866-68; Ges-
chiere 2013). Their ‘brothers’ prospered while and because they suffered in this 
zero-sum universe (Austen 1993:92; Newell 2012). They accused their ‘brothers’ 
of having a ‘bad heart’ (bad at), being stingy and jealous, instead of having an 
‘open heart’ (opin at), being generous and sharing their benefits. People missed 
trust in these relationships, as they did not receive what they expected or needed. 
My very close friend Mamadu often lamented the problem of trust in Mak-
eni, particularly among people one knew or thought to know. 
They are my brothers (…) we grew up together. I per fectly know them. But I cannot trust 
them. Without trust you cannot advance in life. Some are just childish and cannot think 
into the future. Others are wicked. (…) They try to destroy you. Because they are jealous. 
(…) For this reason, I go to other places and meet with more developmental people. 
There I can make cool heart. 
(Mamadu, Makeni, Conversation with the Author, October 2007)
11 | However, people silently and precariously acted on the more powerful economic 
and political actors (D’Angelo 2014a: 26). They discussed politics, developed hypoth-
eses and rumours about elite people’s occult practices, circulated stories about the 
invisible presence and the retaliating appearance of dɛbul den, and recurred to hidden 
activities of sabotage. 
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Mamadu’s problem, the trust he missed, was not mainly related to those who 
did better than him and did not share their profits and knowledge. He did not 
apply for jobs. He had been relatively successful as a self-entrepreneurial motor-
bike rider and wanted to progress within the transport business. His problem 
was that those close to him by birth tied him down and depleted his few savings 
(Bolten 2008; Bürge 2009, 2011). As others in Makeni, Mamadu increasingly 
questioned the point of investing time and energy into such relationships in 
the expectation of reciprocity or, perhaps, if it would not be better to give up. 
Giving up on relationships and looking for more promising networks was 
only one possible solution when engaging with situations and feelings in which 
people missed trust. Another way was to increase one’s efforts and to engage 
even stronger with those particular individuals with whom one had failed to 
create the expected levels of trust. Mamadu was a target rather than the ac-
tor of such intensified engagement or tying. People in his surroundings acted 
more intensely on him and tried to enforce links. They aimed to disrupt or 
break the bonds he entertained with other people, localities, and property that 
they viewed as not useful to their common relations and shared network. They 
controlled and levelled him socially (Bolten 2015). In other words, these people 
primarily sought to change the lives of others to generate trust; they did this not 
exclusively for themselves but in correspondence with and for the benefits of 
others – the targets of their engagements. Benign intent, though, often became 
threatening for the one acted upon. He reacted to or anticipated the encroach-
ment of others by avoidance, exclusion or aggression.
Young men, such as Patrick, Mamadu and many more of my friends, were 
a common target of such double-edged practices of increased engagement aim-
ing at disentangling them from other practices and actors.12 In many people’s 
eyes, young men ‘wasted’ their money for momentary enjoyment, instead of 
long-term and more inclusive development. It was seen as all the more deplor-
able that those young men who had been lucky enough to find employment 
with a company preferred to spend their salaries immediately on clothes, elec-
tronics, gambling, drinks and girls. They proved to be bᴐbᴐ den, ‘little children’ 
that did not yet have ‘mind’, enough ‘sense’, to make proper use of money. They 
were immature. They had to be taught to be responsible adults and cautiously 
initiated into society (Hoffman 2003: 299-300; Shepler 2014a; Ferme 2001). 
12 | This ‘primacy’ of young men has various reasons: As I argue here, for some they 
were the hope of the future, while others saw them as again potentially leading to the 
ruin of the country (Honwana and De Boeck 2005). This is because young men had 
played a crucial role in the civil war (Peters 2011; Peters and Richards 1998; Fanthor-
pe and Maconachie 2010). Another reason is demographical, as the majority of Sierra 
Leoneans are under 30 years. Finally, young men figure prominently in discourses and 
practices of missing trust, as they were my primary interlocutors.
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Increased engagement with those who erred was in order to discipline them 
and halt their ‘wasteful’ spending of money and direct them towards, from the 
point of view of the interloper, more ‘meaningful’ practices. 
Coming back to my argument about the relationship between mis/trust and 
the un/known, it is important to highlight that people who criticized the life-
styles of these young men only partly knew and saw where and how the latter 
‘wasted’ and generated their capital (Bürge 2011; Newell 2012). Most of their 
doings were not public or at least not for everybody. Knowledge about young 
men’s doings was often based on assumptions, generalizations and projections. 
True, people inquired into the lives of others and questioned their morality; 
yet their investigations often remained at the surface. As I have argued else-
where (Bürge 2017), people could find convincing evidence of their fellow citi-
zens’ antisocial practices. Yet, I further argue there that people could also yield 
more positive evidence about their social productivity if they asked different 
questions about and emphasized other aspects in how, where and when people 
produced trust. Knowledge and ignorance about the other were selectively, or 
better conjuncturally produced. Reality was highly complicated and to miss the 
truth was easy. Patrick and Mamadu were telling examples. 
Both of them earned and spent their money beyond their most restricted 
social environment. They imported and exported goods from and to Guinea, 
worked for longer periods in Freetown and spent much time roaming around 
Makeni. They worked in the bush and in the night, themselves realms of highly 
ambivalent forces (Shaw 2002; Ferme 2001). They visited hidden places where 
drugs and alcohol was consumed. They not only consumed but produced and 
invested into social networks with ‘more developmental people’, locally highly 
reputable people, who also frequented those places. Both supported members 
of their family outside Makeni, while neglecting others. They rented out their 
motorbikes and invested into the lives of their peers. Obviously, they could not 
meet the demands of every person. Both made ‘real friends’ beyond Makeni, 
for whom they felt ‘real love’ and with whom they wanted to collaborate. Both 
were okadamen, commercial motorbike riders, the contemporary embodiment 
of the ‘rebel’ (Bolten 2012b: 505), that ambivalent figure that had haunted Sierra 
Leone for a decade (Bürge 2017: 160-61). Both had had contact with the ‘rebels’ 
when the latter occupied Makeni. Even then, though, in doing this they strug-
gled for their own and other people’s survival (Bolten 2012a). Mamadu was 
forcefully recruited and did menial work for the rebels while also supplying 
foodstuffs to his mother that they could sell together. With his savings, he first 
bought bicycles for renting out and later on his first motorbike.
Mamadu owed much of his relative success as an okadaman to trust. He was 
only able to purchase his first commercially used motorbike in the early 2000s 
due to the trust of Saidu, a local businessman. Saidu advanced him money, 
believing in his reliability and ability to use it properly. Saidu trusted Mama-
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du because the latter had proven before that he knew how to handle money 
and to make business. Mamadu paid his debts and invested marginal profit in 
other peeople. When he felt that those he invested into did not reciprocate his 
efforts, that people asked for more support and muddied his reputation in the 
community if he refused, Mamadu had to try other venues. He increased his 
journeys outside Makeni – which obviously fuelled criticism – and one day in 
2007 left for good to live in Freetown. There he found a group of likeminded 
young men with whom he founded Trust for Life, an association organized 
around the place they met several times a day to maintain their motorbikes and 
themselves. Life in Freetown was not easy for Mamadu. But he had found trust 
there. Although the young men had little, they helped each other, raised funds 
for new bikes and parts and shared their ideas. 
Mamadu’s story was exemplary in showing how people longing for trust 
often missed their goals with the measures they took. Instead of convincing 
others to include them into their networks and to share trust, often forceful-
ly binding them, they drove them further away. Trying to suspend the con-
tinuously growing gap, people could also resort to more radical practices for 
changing what others do, cutting and reworking relations and ‘trying to destroy 
[people] to get their money’, as Patrick has it, such as publicly destroying their 
reputation in order to isolate them socially (Shaw 2002). People could recur to 
a ‘local doctor’, use special medicine or witch guns (fangay) to harm, (socially) 
kill and tie other people. The motivations for and forms and extent of aggres-
sive measures differed. The outcomes, although also differing in scale, were 
more uniform. It perpetuated the conditions for which people did miss trust 
(Bürge 2017).
People’s more or less aggressive attacks on fellow citizens and on the ex-
istential foundations of their economic, social and moral personhood, which 
they launched due to their longing for trust, affected the general atmosphere in 
Makeni. The individual, as for example Mamadu, targeted by straightforwardly 
destructive measures but also by more well-intentioned critique had to find 
an answer to these challenges. Otherwise, relations with other people could 
disintegrate due to a damaged reputation and other forms of ‘social killing’.13 
Trust in its material and immaterial forms would be lost. Those attacked had 
to protect and defend themselves. They had to calm the agitation. They had to 
avoid an excess of force as well as to become ‘petrified’ (Le Courant 2016: 30). 
As Mamadu explained, they had to ‘make cool heart’, control their temper and 
bodies. They had to escape the attempts of others to ‘tie’ or ‘pull them down’ 
(Bolten 2008; Bürge 2009), practices that aimed at destroying their social 
forces for progressing. They had to defend their personhood and subjectivi-
13 | ‘Social killing’ refers to the various practices that aim and lead to ‘social death’ 
(Vigh 2006). 
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ties, which was not ‘simply aimed at protecting social honour or, in Goffman’s 
terms, “saving face”, but involve[d] matters of life and death’ (Boltanski 2014: 
209). People had to anticipate their own victimization and become active before 
being approached or attacked. 
‘Not having a stiff hand’ but opening one’s heart and appeasing people by 
sharing would obviously have been a good solution. One could comply with 
the immediate critique and change patterns of relating. Patrick knew howev-
er that ‘this was not enough’. Demands and jealousy outweighed by far the 
possibility for appeasement. There was just not enough socio-economic capi-
tal to satisfy everybody’s desires (Bolten 2012b: 499). Furthermore, complying 
with the immediate request and satisfy people’s desires was often seen as not 
beneficial personally on the long run. Beneficiaries would not be able to re-
ciprocate trust but rather continue to ask for ‘charity’. People had to find other 
ways of pre-empting attacks or apprehension by others and of generating trust 
elsewhere. In the quote at the beginning, Patrick lists some of those that he 
and Mamadu applied themselves. People hid their wealth and the ways they 
generated it. They left Makeni, sometimes in order to generate more capital 
and satisfy those back home. Sometimes they turned their backs on those who 
tried influence them, cutting them off from their networks (Bürge 2011). People 
resorted to local doctors for protective but also preventive medicine – or were 
at least suspected and accused of doing so. People slandered others before and 
after being muddied themselves. They tried to stay ahead of potential threats 
to their existence. In brief, people reacted to or rather anticipated attacks from 
their fellow citizens with practices that confirmed and provoked the critique of 
the latter. Thus, this became a self-fulfilling prophecy, which ratcheted up peo-
ple’s urge to inquire and intervene in the doings of their fellow citizens. Actions 
and reactions of mistrust became perpetual and circular (Molé 2012). I would 
now like to outline this in more detail.
life is a war
Trust, for Boltanski is the ‘more economical’ possibility of acting without sus-
pecting or questioning any interaction (2014: 14). ‘Endless inquiries’, he writes 
in the chapter with the same title, ‘beyond what [is] reasonable in the ordinary 
circumstances of life’, is one symptom of paranoid people (ibid: 170-223). How-
ever, excessive inquiry into ‘reality’14 is for Boltanski not exclusively a manifes-
tation of mental disturbance. It is normal and appropriate under ‘stressful’, that 
is, heavily disturbed socio-political conditions. In war zones, intense inquiries 
are part of indispensable survival skills (compétence du savoir-(sur)vivre) as Bol-
14 | See Boltanski (2011, 2014) for his distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘world’.
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tanski’s doctoral student Suarez Bonilla has shown in the case of Colombia 
(Boltanski 2014: 208-9; Suarez Bonilla 2010).15
Even if the civil conflict in Sierra Leone ended in 2002, in the early 2010s 
life was ‘still like a war’ in Makeni, ‘layf na wa-o’, a point with which many 
of my interlocutors agreed. They ‘suffered’ and ‘strained’ (Finn and Oldfield 
2015) just to get enough food for the day. Witch guns (fangay) were substituted 
for the AK-47. People did not have to fear anymore incursions by fighters or of 
being delivered to them by a neighbour who wanted to settle scores (Jackson 
2004). Now neighbours betrayed them for their jobs and other economic aspi-
rations and hampered their reputation with malicious gossip in public places. 
The bush encroached increasingly upon the town. Danger to one’s existence 
lured everywhere. Survival skills (savoir survivre) had long since become part 
of the ordinary skills (savoir vivre) of daily life (Boltanski 2014: 209; also Vigh 
2008). 
Not only excessive inquiries – missing trust – have excessive costs as they 
‘endanger most social relations and gradually consume all the strength one 
needs in order to act’ (Boltanski 2014: 208). Trust also comes at a price, I ar-
gue. Boltanski’s ‘reasonable expectations’ are only enabled by the ‘leap of trust’ 
(Möllering 2001), the suspension or bracketing of the unknown, uncertainty 
and doubts (Geschiere 2013: 32). Such trust means to suspend, blind out what 
and that we do not know. In a ‘stressful’ environment not to inquire into and 
pause the course of action but just to pretend as if one knew that everything 
would be ok, would not simply be inadequate but a dangerous and potentially 
deadly act of self-deception – an example of totally missed trust. 
I argue that the compétence du savoir-(sur)vivre, or ‘survival skills’, is thus 
most centrally the competence to cut or to avoid properly, that is, to cut the right 
thing at the right time. People need to develop the competence to cut dangerous 
relations and processes, which they first have to uncover. At least as much, they 
need the competence to cut the endless ‘extension of an inquiry’ and to open 
up again for interaction. They have to cut loops and routines in order to avoid 
remaining stuck and isolated (Suarez Bonilla 2014: 143).16 
In Sierra Leone, people know many nuanced forms or degrees of and terms 
for their skills to survive – sabi fᴐ – the contemporary ‘war’ and to make ‘mar-
ginal gains’ (Guyer 2004) at the increasingly broad margins of society. Most 
15 | Boltanski writes that the ‘tendency to see, beyond the appearances of phenom-
ena’ is not only distinctive of the ‘paranoids’ and those living in war zones but also of 
the ‘sociologist’ (2014:176), the one that penetrates sur face for explaining people the 
truth underneath. 
16 | See Strathern (1996) on cutting social networks and networks of inquiries. See 
Shaw (2000, 2002) and Jackson (2011) on the dialectic and challenge of balancing of 
opening and closure in social relations in northern Sierra Leone.
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generally, people ‘managed’ (manej). Individual people’s everyday lives and 
well-being differed due to their capacity to manage (sabi fᴐ manej) their social 
and economic relations, that is, their competence in relating and detaching 
adequately and thereby generating – more – trust. Most people in Makeni per-
ceived their lives as mere survival or suffering, devoid of trust, living on 2000 
Leones a day and being exposed to the charity and goodwill of others. They 
were managed instead of managing other actors. They ‘struggled’, ‘suffered’ 
(Bledsoe 1990) and ‘strained’ (Finn and Oldfield 2015). They aimed at more 
‘enjoyment’, increased ‘comforts’ and a ‘better life’ – more trᴐs.17 Some made 
a (slightly) better living on their wits – sabi fᴐ drɛg – as jew men or rarray men 
(Hoffman 2011: 52-53; Abdullah 2002).
Patrick knew how to drɛg; he proudly ascribed his success to the fact that he 
was ‘a drɛg man, a real rarray man’. He had been economically and socially suc-
cessful because he was street-wise, educated by the war and life in Freetown’s 
‘urban jungle’ (Christensen 2007). Patrick claimed to have the savoir-(sur)vivre, 
to be savvy (sabi fᴐ drɛg). He was able to decipher intentions of other persons 
and to anticipate dangers. He got ‘sense’ and had ‘open eyes’. He was attentive 
and had control over the information others could get about him. He knew 
when to share money and secrets and when to keep them. He had been able 
to relate to the right persons and activities, and detach from the unproductive 
ones. He was sensible to the contemporary context and at the same time to 
more general idea(l)s about social action and personhood in northern Sierra 
Leone as Rosalind Shaw has elaborated on (2000: 40-44): He was conscious 
about the necessity of balancing openness – making inquiries and being atten-
tive, but also sharing with others and nurturing relations – and closure – con-
trolling knowledge and other valuables, but also putting an end to inquiries and 
to the suspension of trust. Therefore, he was progressing. He was not suffering 
anymore, running after any opportunity and depending on the (good)will of 
others. He was a big man now. He had his own dependents and opportunities 
running after him (Utas 2012; Nugent 1995). He was the manager of his and 
others’ lives. He knew how to live the good life (sabi fᴐ enjᴐy). Patrick proudly 
underlined the importance of being ‘gallant’ and claimed to ‘know to live Euro-
pean life’. However he also could emphasize (and embody) his suffering, being 
still in need and not able to support others, if needed.
Patrick knew too well about the fragility of his success. Although he praised 
his capacities to read signs, to dissimulate his appearance and to balance be-
tween sharing and keeping, he likewise lamented how difficult and endan-
17 | Suarez Bonilla’s French term savoir-(sur)vivre grasps this tension between mere 
survival and ‘good life’ more elegantly than it is possible in English (survival skills vs. 
ar t of living). Krio sabi, linguistically related to French savoir, Spanish and Portuguese 
saber, but also English savvy, encompasses this multifaceted skilfulness.
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gered success was. In the early 2010s, his situation was more comfortable than 
of those who had to inquire continuously how to generate just enough trust to 
buy a plate of rice a day. He still had to defend actively his slightly privileged po-
sition at some cost to himself, constantly checking for threats and possibilities. 
Under current socio-economic conditions, Patrick had to invest much time, en-
ergy and money to perpetuate his social and economic capital. Not everything 
was under his control. He was not enough of a big man but still had to grow 
more. Other people decided how and if to relate with him. His information 
was also only partial. He did not know about everybody if they reciprocated or 
aimed at destroying his trust. Patrick diversified his activities and relations. He 
tried to access as many sources as possible for generating more trust and for 
substituting for defaults in reciprocity. At the same time, this also exposed him 
to threats and he risked failure.   
no ConClusion – Miss trust ContinueD
On the long run, things did not work as Patrick thought. He did miss trust. He 
had invested his money and energy in the wrong people and activities. He could 
never finish his house as the government confiscated the land and offered only 
minimal compensation. He lost money in an attempt to mine gold. He lost his 
job with the multinational company as the young man who had ‘rented’ his con-
tract revealed the fraud. Patrick struggled to keep sources open to access cheap 
petrol, which he had not only sold on the black market but had also used to 
fuel important relationships with important people in Makeni. For some time, 
he could benefit from some of the relationships in which he had invested his 
money before. Trust was still reciprocated. This was only for a while, however. 
Trust had to be nurtured. When the sources petered out, one had to discover 
new ones.
Some people refused to reciprocate and reproduce trust due to the bad rep-
utation Patrick had acquired by some of his dubious activities and by the dero-
gative ‘gossip’ of those people that he had not included in his networks. They 
opted for investments that were more promising in the future – the same logic 
that Patrick also always followed. Others could not reciprocate, or at least not to 
the extent that Patrick aimed at, as they also struggled to generate trust. Many 
people lost their jobs with the construction companies and downstream sup-
pliers when the infrastructure construction had been finished and the highly 
mechanised iron mining started. Patrick did increasingly miss trust. People 
increasingly avoided him and he avoided them again. 
When I saw him last in Makeni in 2013, he still lived a relatively good life. 
Ebola and the decreasing prices for iron ore, though, were an additional blow 
to his efforts to generate trust. By the end of 2016, Patrick had to readjust his 
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survival skills again. He has again cut off many of his links with Makeni and 
retreated to other less visible places. I do not have contact with Patrick. Some of 
my friends – most not close friends of Patrick (anymore) – claim that they have 
him seen roaming the surrounding villages buying and selling sheep. Perhaps 
this is true. It is also possible that he deals with other things. In the villages, 
one can still find precious goods. Patrick very likely knows where and how. Per-
haps people do not know what he is doing. Perhaps they know. 
Mamadu, the other protagonist of this chapter also continued to miss trust. 
His friends in Trust for Life, the association, could suspend small monetary 
exigencies, advance money for medical treatment or spare parts of a motor-
bike. When Mamadu lost money to a so-called money doubler (Bürge under 
review) and motorbikes in a fire and to a thief and later on could not pay his rent 
anymore, his friends could not replace the losses. Whereas people in Makeni 
who learned about his failures felt themselves confirmed in their opinion about 
Mamadu’s antisocial and unsustainable practices whose price he now had to 
pay, his friends at least offered him a temporary place to stay and rented him 
a bike. Still, Mamadu was back in the subordinate position he thought he had 
left behind. 
In this chapter, I have given an insight what mistrust means in Makeni and 
what people do when they mistrust. I have argued that mistrust is not the oppo-
site or negation of trust. Mistrust means to miss trust. I argued that both to miss 
and trust, as trᴐs, have multiple meanings. Trᴐs, in Krio is not only a ‘belief’ but 
has more material(ist) facets, which, however cannot be realized easily. To miss 
trᴐs expresses these difficulties, people’s longing and failing. It stands for their 
inquiries for grasping it and for understanding the obstacles to it. To miss trᴐs, 
thus, is engagement with and not reduction of complexity and depth. To miss 
trᴐs is costly. In (contemporary) Sierra Leone, though, there is no alternative. 
People could not just pretend as if everything would work fine, if they relied on 
their routines and did not problematize them – a rather common definition of 
the function of trust. They could not know. They could not bracket this blind 
spot. Their conditions triggered them to question and illuminate it. Routines 
with new developments did not exist beforehand. Extant routines were also full 
of contradictions. One had to produce routines and understand how to go about 
it, to become critically knowing or savvy (sabi fᴐ). 
Trust, thus, itself did not exist. It was not a magical social glue, whereas 
mistrust does cause disintegration. Trust does not precede mistrust. Trust, the 
‘bridge’ or ‘leap’ (Giddens 2008; Möllering 2001) in its more or less materi-
al form, had to be constantly produced. There was no pre-given or enduring 
pattern or form of relating, an almost natural ‘desire to protect (local) social 
arrangements’ (Boltanski 2011:54). In the words of Candea and co-authors, ‘nei-
ther relations nor entities come first’ (2015: 3). Relations and entities emerge 
together in the continuous oscillation between cutting and relating (Strathern 
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1996), the interaction of centrifugal and centripetal social forces (Malefakis 
2014; Newell 2012), between new opportunities and extant practices. I have 
shown how to miss trust is not only about cutting of social relations and inter-
actions, but also about intensifying them. 
How exactly this has to be done was the most important and persistent 
question for people in Makeni. People’s relating and cutting, pausing and con-
tinuing, their orientation toward the new or the old continuously went on in or-
der to improve their conditions. I have accounted for some of these attempts in 
this chapter. Some people were more successful than others. Success, though, 
was precarious, as I have shown. We should not forget, trᴐs in Makeni is in-
creasingly monetarized – without fully doing away with its less material facets. 
The uncertainty how to bridge this tension and the constant scarcity and drain 
of economic capital made people miss trust. 
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Mistrust During the Ebola Epidemic in Guinea
Abdoulaye Wotem Somparé, Ester Botta Somparé
After the World Health Organization declared the outbreak of Ebola in Guinea 
in spring 2014, the subsequent campaign announced to combat the epidemic 
aroused many cases of resistance and reluctance. This was often expressed, 
especially at the early stages of the crisis, by acts of violence provoking wounds 
or death. Later, fearing armed repression, communities opted for more silent 
forms of resistance, combining an apparent submission to the new measures 
with passive resistance and sabotage of public health measures. Violent resis-
tance occurred, at first, in the Forest region, before spreading to the Coastal 
region, following the evolution of the epidemics. Among the four natural re-
gions of Guinea, Ebola especially affected the Forest region, where it started, 
and the Coastal Region, where it lasted for a very long time, especially in the 
capital Conakry and in the districts of Dubreka, Forecariah and Coyah. The 
Region of High Guinea, quickly rid itself of the epidemics, as did the only town 
of Mid Guinea that was affected by this illness, Telimélé. Such acts of resistance 
were often directed towards workers of the Coordination of Riposte against Eb-
ola, sponsored by the state with the assistance of NGOs and International In-
stitutions, such as WHO, that played a preeminent role. This Coordination, 
guided by the Direction of Prevention and Public Health, was headed by Dr. 
Sakoba Keita, a senior medical doctor who had much experience in directing 
campaigns against infectious diseases. During the Ebola epidemic, the Coordi-
nation enjoyed a high degree of independence from the Ministry of Health and 
was present, through local branches, in all the regions affected by the epidem-
ics. This Coordination involved many professional groups, such as physicians, 
specialists in public health, social anthropologists and communicators. 
 Even though their purpose was to protect people from this mortal disease, 
representatives from Riposte were met either with open hostility, or with sus-
picion, even in villages where hospitality is a social value and strangers are 
welcomed more warmly than in towns. According to our observations, villagers 
were hardly answering greetings and created a cold, tense atmosphere. For ex-
ample, a seven-year-old child was violently summoned by his parents to come 
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back while he was running joyfully towards Riposte workers, in order to wel-
come them in a village. In another village, people refused to gather and pray, 
after noting that a young female doctor had entered the mosque; they suspected 
her to have sprayed something in order to contaminate the congregation. Peo-
ple also expressed their hostility and mistrust by throwing stones at Riposte 
workers, by abducting them, or by blocking the entrance and the exit from 
villages, as if they were enemies to trap. The most violent episode took place 
in Womey, a very isolated village in the Forest region. Here, ten members of a 
delegation, which had come to inform the local community about Ebola, were 
killed by furious peasants who were convinced that their aim was to spread the 
epidemic to their village. Every person working for Riposte was stigmatized 
within his community and even in his own family, because he was thought 
to be earning ‘Ebola money’ resulting from the ‘Ebola business’, which was 
earned from the misfortune of others. All the symbols of Riposte were reject-
ed, namely white jeeps with Red Cross logos, the protective uniforms of their 
health workers, and the hand-washing kits that are, even to this day, seen as 
tainted by association to the epidemic and, thus, rarely used despite the official 
recommendations. For instance, in the Coastal region, near the little town of 
Tanene, an ambulance, transferring Ebola patients to the local hospital, was 
pursued, blocked and burnt, while the sick people were ‘released’ and brought 
back to their home village, thus provoking a widespread infection.
How is it possible to explain, from a sociological and anthropological point 
of view, the widespread, unprecedented mistrust that aroused the astonish-
ment and the incomprehension of many Riposte workers? The media coverage 
of the epidemic mainly conveyed the idea that attitudes of resistance and re-
luctance were the result of illiteracy, isolation, backwardness of Guinean ru-
ral populations, unable to understand the necessity of implementing public 
health measures. However, anthropological analysis based on fieldwork points 
to more complex reasons for resistance and reluctance. These are rooted in the 
particular socio-cultural features of Guinean society and in historical, politi-
cal and economic factors. Our main hypothesis is that the epidemic of Ebola 
triggered off many latent conflicts where mistrust played an important role. 
Such tensions oppose individuals against one another according to their politi-
cal, ethnical, socio/professional affiliations or, more generally, their respective 
inscriptions in the social world. In this chapter, we would like to analyse such 
conflicts and to show how they have shaped reactions to the Ebola epidemic.
Even though hostile attitudes have been targeted as ‘reluctance’ during the 
epidemics, we think that it would be more useful to introduce a distinction 
between reluctance and resistance. Actually, we maintain that the generic word 
of reluctance has led to an understatement of very hostile and violent reactions 
to Riposte. We propose, in this chapter, to consider reluctance as the hesitation, 
tinged with mistrust, to adhere to the measures of public health. We use the 
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concept of resistance to define defensive actions undertaken to counter Riposte 
activities. Generally, such actions are collective, concerted within a village or 
an urban area and range from silent forms of refusal to overt, violent conflict. 
Such actions were motivated by the fear that Riposte workers may introduce the 
deadly disease into their village or urban areas, or by the terror that a member 
of the community could fall under suspicion of infection and be sent to the 
Centre of Treatment of Ebola (CTE), where death would be the certain result. 
Inhabitants also feared that their site would be stigmatized and avoided as a 
place affected by Ebola, where nobody comes to visit relatives, or to buy and sell 
items: during the epidemics, for instance, bread sellers systematically avoided 
villages where there had been cases of infection.
It is interesting to note that, throughout the epidemics, ways of resisting 
varied according to gender and generation. Typically, when Riposte workers 
arrived in a village or in an urban area, women would scream, expressing 
their anger, indignation and suspicion at the sight of ‘Ebola people’, who were 
thought to have come with the intention of introducing the illness into their 
village or urban area, or to enforce unwelcome measures of public health. The 
women’s screams alerted young men, who would surround the strangers to 
block their exit, or start throwing stones. Elderly men, on the contrary, pre-
ferred silent resistance, as they used rhetoric grounded on Islamic religion or 
oral tradition to show apparent obedience, behind which was a hidden refusal 
to comply. A common strategy was to obtain all the advantages of the Riposte 
interventions (for instance financial assistance and food supplies for affected 
villages), without actually respecting public health measures. 
From a methodological point of view, this reflexion is based on research led 
by Abdoulaye Wotem Sompare over a year and a half in different areas of Guin-
ea, as a social anthropological consultant of the World Health Organization. 
Mistrust in tHe MagiCal interPre tation 
of tHe Causes of eBol a anD otHer Dise ases
As noted by Andreas Zempleni (1982), in African cultures the aetiology of ill-
ness is generally explained by the evil desires and intentions of an ‘Other’, that 
can be a human being or a supernatural entity, pushed by resentment and ea-
ger to take revenge. The discovery of the identity of this angry, unpleased crea-
ture, and the identification of the reason of its dissatisfaction, leads to a ritual 
treatment performed by an individual, a family or an entire community. In the 
village of Melandou, where the epidemic started, Ebola was firstly considered 
as a curse of God, triggered by the ancestors’ displeasure and anger with the 
behaviour of their offspring. During an interview, a young teacher working in 
the school of Melandou said: ‘As we had never seen such an illness, we thought 
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that we had done something wrong and that our ancestors were angry with us. 
That’s why we made a lot of sacrifices, but the disease didn’t stop killing people’ 
(Interview with A.W. Somparé, in Melandou. February 2015)
As explained by Favret-Saada (2000), recent Africanist anthropological lit-
erature usually considers witchcraft within the framework of social conflict, fol-
lowing the pattern of accusations, which are of interest because of their capacity 
to reveal social tensions. Evil intentions, provoking illness or death through 
witchcraft, are generally ascribed to people whose position in the family struc-
ture can easily lead to overt or latent conflicts: consequently, a woman can be 
accused of having bewitched her co-wife, a paternal uncle or a step-mother may 
be suspected of having put a spell on a young man, causing the failure of his 
projects, illness or death. As noted by Alain Marie (1998) such accusations may 
increase in times of economic and social crisis. Nonconformist, marginal indi-
viduals, such as independent women acting in a ‘virile’ way and lacking their 
family’s protection, are the classic culprits of such accusations, as the scape-
goats that can be indicted and punished without disrupting social cohesion. 
Accusations of witchcraft are intimately related to mistrust inside a family. Ac-
cording to local beliefs, in Guinea a witch or a sorcerer can only kill people in 
his own family, or exchange his victims for those of other colleagues. Previous 
conflicts are a breeding ground for mistrust within the joint family, leading to 
accusations of witchcraft, especially in lineages at the top of the traditional so-
cial hierarchy, where successions and power issues arise durable rivalries. Fur-
thermore, such accusations also find a breeding ground in pre-existent latent 
ethnic conflicts. In May 2011, in the rural district of Galakpaye, for example, 
two communities that used to coexist peacefully, the indigenous Kpèlé and the 
Malinké, coming from another region, decided together to consult a traditional 
healer to discover the cause of a mysterious series of deaths. As a malinké old 
man was accused to be the sorcerer at the origin of these deaths, which were 
interpreted as magic murderers, he was immediately killed by relatives of one 
of the victims, who was a Kpélé. The two communities turned one against the 
other, starting an extremely violent conflict, in which twenty-five people were 
killed. 
Allegations of sorcery also reflect generational conflicts or social cleavages 
among family members who have become successful urban dwellers and rel-
atives who have remained at the village. Paradoxically, even though villagers 
count on the financial assistance of their urban relatives and hope that they will 
obtain good jobs, enabling them to help the whole village, they are also suspect-
ed of being jealous and of trying to bewitch successful members of their family. 
That is why, in Guinea, many town dwellers are reluctant to get back to their 
village if they succeed, even if they provide financial assistance. According to 
Alain Marie (1998:108), the fear of witchcraft is functional to the maintaining 
of family solidarity, as it prevents successful individuals from detaching from 
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their lineage and exhorts them to share their resources. Promising young peo-
ple who have left the village in order to study and work in big towns are thought 
to be the favourite victims of jealous, unsympathetic old people within their 
lineage.
A tragic example of this attitude can be found in the spread of Ebola to a 
small village at the very South of Guinea, in the prefecture of Lola, at the border 
with Ivory Coast. In January 2015, a young student based in Conakry decided 
to spend the Christmas holidays in his native village. During his journey from 
the capital, he stopped at his girlfriend’s house, in Guéckedou, a big town of the 
Forest Region, where he was probably contaminated. He showed the first symp-
toms of Ebola in his village and, after his sudden, inexplicable death, some old 
women of his family were accused of witchcraft and summoned to drink the 
water used to wash the corpse, in compliance with the rituals of enquiry and 
repression of sorcery. In so doing, they were infected with the virus and died, 
but their fellow-villagers regarded their death as a proof of their guilt: according 
to local beliefs, if they had been innocent, they would have survived. 
In other villages, namely in the Coastal region, people rejected the idea 
that this mysterious illness was actually Ebola, as they interpreted it as fossi, a 
soussou1 word to indicate the supernatural punishment of an evil action. The 
victim of a wrongdoing may ask someone endowed with magic powers to take 
revenge, thus causing the death of the guilty individual and his household: a 
series of deaths within the same family, during the epidemic, would often be 
interpreted as fossi. However, according to popular beliefs, fossi is dangerous 
because, if the accusation is false, it can turn against those who ordered it, ex-
terminating their family. For instance, in Tamaransi, in the prefecture of Boké 
(Coastal region), some people still deny the existence of Ebola in their village; 
on the contrary, they explain that people were killed by fossi. A family, where 
a child died in a strange road accident, was suspected to have called curses 
upon a fellow-villager. However, as these accusations proved to be groundless, 
the supernatural punishment turned against those who had commanded it. In 
Tercé, another village of the coastal region, a young health worker said: ‘I don’t 
know what my relatives have in mind, they don’t understand anything. We are 
poor, we suffer from this terrible epidemic, but they are convinced that it’s 
fossi. While people are dying, they don’t stop making sacrifices and killing big 
cows, in order to fight against witchcraft’ (Interview with A.W. Somparé, Tercé, 
October 2015). This comment shows the existence of concurrent, contemporary 
logics of public health, as noted by Fassin and Dozon (2001). While complying 
with health measures grounded on scientific rationality, enforced by the Ri-
1 | Soussou is the main language spoken in the capital, Conakry, and in the entire 
Coastal region.
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poste, people also adopted their own preventive measures, based on traditional 
representations of illness.
These beliefs are based on a magical and religious interpretation of disease, 
that is grounded on a persecutory model, strictly related to mistrust, in which 
latent conflicts within and among lineages appear as the causes of epidem-
ic. Mistrust leads villagers to suspect other people of evil intentions dictating 
witchcraft attacks: that explains why they use fossi to take revenge and to punish 
the guilty. These convictions represented a serious obstacle to the eradication 
of Ebola, as they sometimes led people to reject public health measures and 
to seek traditional treatment through healing rituals. These ceremonies often 
prove extremely expensive, within a context of generalized poverty, and often 
get families into debts. Furthermore, the hunt for scapegoats also harmed or 
killed people in some Guinean villages. 
tHe greeD for gain anD tHe ‘eBol a Business’ 
During the Ebola epidemic, in every coffee bar, market or meeting point, peo-
ple would invariably talk about the ‘Ebola business’, branding the workers of 
the Riposte as opportunists taking advantage of the crisis and wishing that 
it would last as long as possible, as it coincided with a huge improvement of 
their economic situation. They were even suspected of inventing false statis-
tical data, in order to present a critical situation, worse than reality. However, 
even in other contexts and situations, there is a widespread fear that individuals 
seek enrichment, regardless of any ethical or moral considerations. This is par-
ticularly evident in economic transactions and in the relationship between the 
population and civil servants. 
In economic transactions, customers are extremely suspicious towards trad-
ers and sellers. Within a context of extreme liberalization, the Guinean markets 
are inundated by a wide range of products with doubtful origins, whose prices 
are not fixed, but flexible and subject to negotiation. In a normal transaction, 
sellers tend to fix a very high price, whereas customers propose a very low one, 
until they reach an agreement somewhere in the middle. Even though everyone 
accepts this way of negotiating prices, traders are suspected of trying to sell 
items of bad quality, or out-of-date food, dangerous for the customer’s health. 
They are also accused of fixing prices according to the customer’s appearance, 
which reveals social status or an ethnic identity. For instance if, during the 
transaction, the buyer speaks French, this immediately reveals that he is an 
educated person, likely to afford a higher price. People also condemn the fact 
that prices increase during the Ramadan period, when customers, particular-
ly careful about having a rich dinner after a whole day of fast, tend to spend 
more money on food. Even if the rise of prices correspond to the market laws 
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of offer and demand, this escalation is considered to be an expression of the 
greed of Guinean traders. That explains why they allegedly take advantage of 
their customers even in moments when people are supposed to behave in a 
religious manner, showing charity and altruism. At the end of the day, dealers 
are accused of seeking gain regardless of any other consideration. The only way 
to avoid abuse, according to most people, is to get close to them, to establish 
warm relationships, so that a trader will be reluctant to cheat them. A woman 
buyer and a woman seller may, for instance, become ‘aimées’ (loved ones), a 
term that indicates a special consideration for one another, close to affection. 
When a person says: ‘Je suis ton client’, (I am your customer), he means that he 
is a regular buyer, whose trust must be preserved: good prices should be fixed 
and bad-quality items should not be sold to him. As in public services, person-
alization of the relationship appears to be the best way to diminish mistrust 
and to avoid cheating. 
It is important to note that this negative representation of traders, who 
‘would even sell their mothers for money’ is rooted in the demonization of 
this professional group enhanced by the first socialist regime, headed by the 
President Sékou Touré, who governed Guinea from the Independence in 1958 
to 1984. During this period of state controlled trade, those undertaking private, 
clandestine business were branded as enemies of the people who sought indi-
vidual profit instead of supporting the collective effort towards the development 
of the economy. In the second, liberal regime, marked by a coalition between 
big traders, dealing with import-export, and high public officials, traders were 
considered as members of a corrupt elite that was dipping into the state coffers 
in order to become rich in a context of general, dramatic impoverishment. The 
frauds occurring during the earthquake that struck the mountain region of 
Moyenne Guinée in 1984, or the Kankan inundation in 1990, confirmed such 
representations, as aid sent to help the victims of these regions was misappro-
priated and, thanks to the complicity of public officials and traders, goods were 
put up for sale on local markets. In the same way, during the Ebola epidemic, 
workers of the Riposte, charged of the distribution of free hand-cleaning chlo-
rinated products, were suspected to have sold them to traders. 
 Furthermore, as in the capital Conakry most traders belong to the Fulani 
ethnic group, the largest in the country, prejudice towards traders is also due 
to an ethnic bias against this group, which is feared for its economic power. 
During the liberal regime of Lansana Conté, many Fulani cattle-breeders, who 
had economic capital and a culture of money saving, took advantage of the lib-
eralization of trade to move to the capital, where they became important shop 
owners and import-export traders. Some of them, who did not possess econom-
ic capital, accepted to work as domestic workers, in order to accumulate savings 
and start small commercial initiatives. Within the framework of the bipolariza-
tion of political life, many Fulani support the main Opposition party, UFDG, 
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headed by a Fulani leader, Cellou Dalein Diallo. Fulani dealers are particularly 
manifold among his supporters and finance political campaigns and party ac-
tivities. They usually take part in popular demonstrations of the opposition par-
ty against the government, closing their shops in protest and in solidarity with 
the cause, and also to protect themselves from robbery or vandalism, frequent 
in such events. However, other inhabitants of Conakry interpret this behaviour 
as an arrogant exhibition of their economic power. According to some com-
ments, these shop owners show that they have the power to starve the inhabi-
tants of the capital if they want to, so that the closure of a shop is perceived as 
a veiled threat. Besides, in periods of political tensions, when different ethnic 
groups compete for power by supporting different political parties, Fulani trad-
ers are reproached for fixing high prices for Malinké customers, who generally 
support the standing president, Alpha Condé. On the contrary, they are said to 
be more flexible with customers with whom they share the same ethnic identity 
or, at least, with those who speak their language, pulaar.
PoPul ar Mistrust towarDs PuBliC offiCials
Within a context of corruption and clientelism, users show a deep mistrust 
towards public officials. Here, the state is not to be considered as an abstract 
moral person that would guarantee everybody’s welfare. On the contrary, it ap-
pears as a concrete reality, charged with the interests of individuals, families 
and communities. For many Guineans, the state is endowed with plentiful, 
almost limitless resources, accessible by obtaining, for oneself, for a family or 
a community member, a strategic job in the public service. In such a context, 
public officials, even if their post does not allow them to dip into the state cof-
fers, are suspected of being corrupt, of acting according to clientilist and nep-
otistic logics. Some teachers, for instance, are alleged of taking advantage of 
their position to elicit something close to bribes from pupils or families: for 
instance, when parents are asked to buy school materials, this is interpreted as 
a kind of extortion. 
During the Ebola epidemic, it is particularly important to consider how 
such representations act on the relationship between population and medical 
staff, who are generally perceived as a group of acquisitive individuals, more 
interested in their own gain than in the health of patients. Such behaviour is 
suspected particularly in interactions between strangers, those who do not ben-
efit from a personalized relationship based on friendship or kinship. (Jaffré and 
Olivier de Sardan 2003). In private clinics and public hospitals, patients are sys-
tematically asked to pay for medical care. For instance, a patient suffering from 
an asthma attack will not be treated unless he can afford to buy a bottle of oxy-
gen or other products. ‘Tips’ are often required to ease procedures, for instance 
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to shorten a waiting queue for a radiography. As Jaffré (2003) observes, such 
practices are often considered normal by the medical staff. Sometimes, they 
do not really reflect any intention to earn money through corruption, but are 
simply part of the habits of a professional group in a given health centre. Fur-
thermore, members of medical staff have a different status: in public hospitals 
or health centres, besides public servants, there is a profusion of ‘trainees’, who 
do not earn a regular salary, but only ‘bonuses’ or ‘transport fees’. Thus, their 
precarious economic conditions make them particularly prone to corruption. 
Cases of death occurring in families who cannot afford treatment receive 
a lot of media attention, thus encouraging mistrust towards medical doctors 
and putting a question mark over their morality and deontology. Following the 
logic of collective action, the errors of some individuals are attributed to a whole 
professional category. However, the supposed ‘greed’ doctors have for money is 
one of the reasons behind mistrust during the Ebola epidemic, a situation that 
obliged institutions to pay attention to the health conditions of every single per-
son. People were constantly exhorted to go to the surgery, were monitored and 
submitted to a form of control of their daily life that, as observed by Gasquet-
Blanchard (2014), was perceived as domination. The will to control the body of 
individuals, considered as an object of public health, what Foucault described 
as ‘biopower’, appeared almost inexplicable for people who were used to falling 
sick and dying to the total indifference of the state. The same patients were now 
obliged to attend the hospitals and clinics that had always rejected them before 
because they could not afford to pay for treatment. During a campaign of ‘active 
research’ of Ebola patients in Forecariah (Coastal Region), where doctors would 
come to each concession to ask the family head about the presence of sick peo-
ple in the household, a man commented: 
It is strange. Since the creation of Guinea, when someone is sick, he goes to the hospi-
tal. We have never seen doctors coming to our home to check if we feel fine. This is really 
astonishing, because in the past we were not welcome in hospitals, as we are poor. Now, 
they insist in taking us, or our relatives, to the hospital. What do they want to do to us? 
(Interview with A.W. Somparé, Forecariah, August 2015)
As a matter of fact, on these occasions, family heads tended to deny systemati-
cally that someone was ill in the household, saying that everybody felt perfectly 
fine. The camp hospitals that had been quickly implanted in many villages, 
where doctors were disposed to treat any kind of illness for free, were absolutely 
deserted.
Furthermore, health measures were perceived as an injunction of the state 
in compliance with foreign partners, suspected of imposing a form of neo-co-
lonial domination, hidden behind the idea of defending global health. Some 
of the most terrifying rumours collected during the epidemic conveyed the 
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idea that physicians, who were supposed to treat patients, were actually killing 
them, in order to sell their organs and blood to rich citizens of western coun-
tries. The fact that, in the first phases, people were not allowed to see the body 
of their relatives, fed the idea that an international traffic of human organs was 
taking place. Such reports, especially concerning doctors working for foreign 
institutions such as the Red Cross, are related to the history of Guinean expe-
riences with western countries. The slave trade, colonization, predation, dom-
ination, and the exploitation of human and material resources were some of 
the main features of these interactions. (Somparé and Botta Somparé 2015) As 
noted by Michel Agier (2010: 989) ‘humanitarian workers have taken over from 
colonial administrations and workers of international cooperation, to represent 
the new form of white presence and domination’.
Patients also doubt the competence of medical staff. In the capital Cona-
kry, everyone can tell some story about medical errors, such as doctors nearly 
killing a child or prescribing medication with glucose to a diabetic patient. The 
young age of the medical staff is seen to be one of the reasons for these errors, 
as more experienced and competent practitioners are often busy with Universi-
ty classes and more rewarding jobs in expensive private clinics. Furthermore, 
the fact that many patients, for economic or cultural reasons, choose to go to 
the hospital only when their illness becomes very serious, strengthens the idea 
that Guinean hospitals are a place for people to die, rather than to be treated. 
(Somparé 2017)
However, if these practices and representations represent a fertile back-
ground for mistrust towards health workers, it is also important to note that, 
during these epidemics, medical doctors, as all the other Riposte workers, were 
perceived as representatives of the State, or the menguésanyi (the legs of the 
chief) in Soussou language. They were seen to be cogs in a wide organization 
that, for the first time, tried to impose control on bodies and individual health. 
For this reason, pre-existent mistrust towards medical staff combined, for the 
first time, with hostility towards the State and the political and intellectual 
élites to which they were associated.
Mistrust towarDs PolitiCal anD intelleCtual elites
During the Ebola epidemic, the deep mistrust shown by Guineans towards the 
workers of the Riposte, cannot be understood without reference to widespread 
negative representations towards political and intellectual élites. First of all, 
the different professionals involved in Riposte (medical doctors, specialists of 
public health, communicators, sociologists and anthropologists) were all seen 
to be members of intellectual élites and marked out as ‘Ebola people’. This 
designation underlines a relationship grounded on otherness; as noted by Ol-
Mistrust During the Ebola Epidemic in Guinea 139
ivier de Sardan (1995) in discussing development projects, there is a wide gap 
between local and foreign experts, with, on one side, those possessing cultural 
and economic capital, the bearers of an urban, cosmopolite culture, and, on the 
other, people who benefit from development projects, who are mainly rural, 
poor and illiterate. On the other hand, workers of the Riposte tended to define 
local populations in terms of ‘Communities’, depicted in terms of homogenous 
groups, stuck in tradition, unable to accept innovations, composed by backward 
and stubborn peasants. Ethnic bias may strengthen such representations. Even 
if there was a general tendency to send the Riposte workers to zones where 
they shared people’s ethnic and linguistic identity, this was not always possible. 
In the Coastal region, we heard the workers, strangers to this region, express 
many prejudices about the Soussou people, who asked for more economic aid. 
They were accused of being lazy, of preferring hand-outs to work, of being un-
reliable due to their failure to comply with public health measures, despite their 
apparent agreement to do so. By doing so, the Guinean workers of the Riposte 
adopted well-known stereotypes that exist about every ethnic group in Guinea 
and that vary according to the context of enunciation. For instance, the Fulani’s 
alleged capacity to save money, that can be praised in a positive discourse, con-
verts into meanness in a negative one (Somparé 2009).
During the epidemics, the instructed ‘Ebola people’ were suspected of us-
ing their cultural capital to take advantage of the situation, by enforcing mea-
sures on illiterate people that were based on scientific knowledge that only they 
had mastered. In this sense, they awoke a latent mistrust towards educated peo-
ple that has been present in many African countries since colonization. Since 
the end of nineteenth century, Guineans attending the first French schools 
had become employees in the newly established colonial administration. Con-
sequently, the colonial system used the first educated people as intermediaries 
between local inhabitants and administration, therefore attributing to them 
some power that could be used to defend the interests of natives, but also at 
the same time to dominate them. Furthermore, as noted by Claude Rivière 
(1971), the colonial system systematically recruited civil servants far from their 
regions, so that they could behave more impartially, without being conditioned 
by kinship or friendship. 
These historical circumstances have led Guinean people, especially in the 
rural context, to view educated individuals as dangerous and willing to betray 
their family and community, even though they may also act as counsellors and 
protectors to some of their fellow-villagers. As Gérard (1997) has noted for the 
Malian case, educated people are often perceived in an ambivalent way: on one 
hand, the sacred character of knowledge is transposed over school learning, 
so that intellectuals are assimilated to wise traditional masters, endowed with 
esoteric knowledge and even supernatural powers. On the other hand, this 
very knowledge may be used to dominate other people, as reported by Botta 
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Somparé (2015: 390), who refers to a mother’s comment on her only educated 
daughter, in a Guinean village inhabited by Fulani: ‘She is the smartest of all 
my girls … She is so sharp that she could put her sisters and me in a bag and 
sell us at the market, if we don’t pay attention!’
Furthermore, mistrust towards intellectuals has continued on from the 
colonial period, to become a recurrent theme in accusations asserted by sub-
sequent Guinean presidents towards the intellectual and political élites. Such 
accusations, first expressed by President Sekou Touré, were resumed and ex-
ploited by the two military governments of Lansana Conté and Moussa Da-
dis Camara. The first Guinean president Sekou Touré, leading the PDG (Parti 
Démocratique de Guinée), was supported by lower social strata and preferred 
immediate independence rather than autonomy within the framework of the 
French Union, which was a sort of French Commonwealth advocated by Gen-
eral de Gaulle in order to keep close ties with the former colonies. Nevertheless, 
not all Guineans agreed with Sekou Touré’s point of view: the main Opposition 
party, BAG, (Bloc Africain de Guinée) directed by Yaoundo Barry and mainly 
supported by political elites close to colonial administration, resisted a quick 
and brutal independence, which would entail rupturing diplomatic relations 
with France. From this point on, Sekou Touré suspected France of relying on 
intellectual elites to destabilize his leadership. Another factor in his thinking 
was that most members of this upper class had chosen to live abroad, in Sen-
egal or Ivory Coast, retaining close relations with France in the process. They 
wished to escape from a totalitarian socialist regime that would strongly re-
strain their freedom and even put their lives in danger, as hundreds of political 
opponents died in the prison of Camp Boiro. Nationalist rhetoric aimed at pre-
senting the members of the elites as traitors, who had fled Guinea in order to 
lead comfortable lives abroad instead of taking part in the development of the 
country. A semantic swing slowly took place, as political opponents started to 
be called anti-Guineans. 
Furthermore, Fulani were manifold in the Opposition, as Sekou Touré’s 
egalitarian ideals and his endeavours to disrupt the authority of traditional 
elites clashed with their political conservatism. Fulani, founders of the theo-
cratic state of Djallon, were used to a very stratified and hierarchical tradi-
tional political organization. That is why Sekou Touré introduced an ethnic 
bias against this group, accused them of plotting against the government and 
behaving as traitors and ‘enemies of the people’. They were presented as an-
ti-Guineans wishing to take power of the country. Subsequent real or supposed 
thwarted putsches highlighted the role of intellectuals living abroad, who often 
belonged to the Fulani ethnic group, in the opposition to the regime.
After Sekou Touré’s death, in 1984, the new liberal regime headed by the 
General Lansana Conté tried to improve Guinean diplomatic relations with 
Western countries and asked intellectual elites of the Guinean diaspora to 
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come back to their homeland, in order to use their qualifications and expe-
rience for the development of the country. This created a sort of competition 
between the returning elites and the local high public officials who, sensing 
that their posts were threatened, insisted that they had been the ones who had 
endured sufferings and privations during Sekou Touré’s regime and deserved, 
now, to be rewarded. However, even president Lansana Conte, at the introduc-
tion of a multiparty system, resumed nationalistic rhetoric when he had to face 
an opposition mostly made of former opponents and members of the diaspora. 
In the 1990s, in a period of violent armed conflicts in West Africa, Conté 
presented himself as the defender of peace and order in Guinea, thus associat-
ing any kind of opposition to disorder. Within this context, Guinean intellectu-
als returning from diaspora were depicted, once again, as enemies willing to 
stir up political turmoil and plunge the country into the chaos of war. Further-
more, Lansana Conté, who hardly knew to read and write, portrayed himself 
as a peasant, a soldier, an almost illiterate man who had charged intellectuals 
and technocrats with leading the country. Consequently, they shouldered the 
responsibility for any mistake; when criticized the President would claim ig-
norance, suggesting that it was only his educated entourage that took the key 
decisions. Finally, in order to preserve the sacred halo of respect due to the chief 
in many African cultures, the negative assessments of Lansana Conte’s regime 
were blamed on the intellectual elites that had surrounded him and betrayed 
him, ruining the country he cherished (Somparé 2013).
 After his death, his successor, Moussa Dadis Camara, who headed a mili-
tary regime, completely adhered to this interpretation and decided that many 
politicians of the Second Republic would be submitted to a kind of ‘trial by me-
dia’. This was the beginning of Dadis’s show that coincided with the climax of 
popular mistrust towards the elites. Every evening, the President would appear 
on TV screens and set himself as a master judge while members of the ruling 
class would file past him. During a detailed interrogation, Guineans would 
learn how politicians had destroyed their country for their own advantage by 
engaging in drug traffic or by selling mining firms for low prices. In this show, 
Dadis appeared as the dispenser of justice, who had come to save the coun-
try from its corrupted elites and to restore the vision of Lansana Conte, who 
was betrayed by his own entourage. Even the actual President, Alpha Condé, a 
member of the intellectual elite who spent in France most of his life, does not 
hesitate to demonize the former ruling class in order to criticize his opponents, 
who had a leading position during the Second Republic. However, he avoids 
criticizing Lansana Conte, who was a Soussou from the Coastal region, so as 
not to offend the susceptibilities of Soussous, a group which represents an im-
portant part of his electorate. 
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eBol a in tHe guine an PolitiCal Conte x t
Besides these historical reasons, some anthropological considerations about 
power can help to throw light on the political context in which Ebola appeared 
in Guinea. As noted by Bayart (1989), access to power in Africa is considered in 
terms of appropriation of the state resources that will be shared within family, 
ethnic community or entourage, regardless of public welfare and development 
of the country. Thus, both in rural and urban areas, a lot of Guineans feel aban-
doned by the authorities, as they face daily problems related to poverty, lack of 
water, electricity, difficulties in accessing health and education. Many people 
are convinced that their poverty results from the bad governance of political 
and intellectual elites who seek their own profit and only favour the members 
of their own family or village community. Therefore, during the epidemic, epi-
sodes of resistance represented, for many unheeded communities, an occasion 
to obtain the attention of the authorities and to finally express their discontent 
at these problems. For instance, peripheral urban areas lacking schools and 
public hospitals, as a result of the quick and uncontrolled expansion of the cap-
ital Conakry, showed particularly virulent forms of resistance. 
Furthermore, mistrust towards the Government was encouraged by the 
opposition, in a context of the strong bipolarization of political life reflecting 
ethnic divisions. Two political parties and their allies struggle for power: the 
government party, RPG, headed by the President Alpha Condé, and the opposi-
tion party, UFDG, led by Cellou Dalein Diallo. These two parties have, more or 
less, the same numbers of supporters, mostly motivated by ethnic and regional 
considerations. RPG is originally supported by Malinké and is rooted in High 
Guinea, whereas UFDG is mainly a Fulani party, whose followers come from 
Mid-Guinea (Fouta Djallon), and from the capital Conakry. These parties en-
courage a constant popular mobilization, leading the activists of each field to 
criticize the others and unconditionally support every action of their leader, for 
instance in public demonstrations and virulent debates, especially on radios. 
Within such a context of bipolarization, the opposition supporters suspected 
the President, Alpha Conde, of inventing or maintaining the epidemic, in order 
to delay the impending presidential elections. Rumours also suggested that he 
was taking advantage of Ebola by pocketing international aid. He was also crit-
icized because of the slowness of his first reactions to the epidemic, probably in 
order to avoid panic among foreign investors, especially interested in the Forest 
Region, rich in vast, unexploited iron deposits and other resources. 
On the other hand, the president tried to convert Ebola into a political re-
source. After initial hesitation, he wanted to show that he was managing the 
situation well, allowing Guinea to rid herself of the epidemic. While doing so, 
he made some misleading announcements, for instance declaring that Ebola 
would be over in sixty days. Thus, he conveyed the idea that he could control the 
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development of the epidemic; this only seemed to confirm rumours implicating 
him in the outbreak and spread of Ebola in Guinea. Rumours about Ebola as a 
conspiracy of the government and his international partners were supported by 
oppositional criticism, that only subsided when the dramatic situation finally 
pushed all political actors to try to cooperate in a struggle for national unity, a 
process also encouraged by the visit of the French President François Hollande. 
However, even if misleading announcements surely aggravated reluctance and 
amplified rumours, they were not the main cause of negative reactions, that 
started from the very beginning of the campaign against Ebola. 
At the local level, the Coordination of Riposte adopted a vertical commu-
nication strategy, following the administrative structure. Specialists believed 
that local political and moral authorities, once informed, could sensitize people 
and obtain their compliance with public health measures. However, they did 
not understand that local authorities were often delegitimized, in many cases 
because they had governed for a long time and, consequently, were perceived 
as the allies of subsequent corrupt Guinean governments. On the other hand, 
these attitudes towards local authorities also led those actors traditionally ex-
cluded from politics, like women or young people, to contest the gerontocracy. 
These behaviours arose thanks to the existence of new spaces of communica-
tion, which could be real (such as meeting points in villages or urban areas) or 
virtual (such as social networks). Therefore, the Ebola epidemic highlighted 
latent conflicts, related to generation and gender. 
ConClusion
In this chapter, we have tried to show that Guinean society is marked by latent 
conflicts opposing individuals according to their ethnic, social, professionals 
and political affiliations. Their position in the family structure also matters, as 
it may determine peaceful or tense relationships with other family members. 
Mistrust is an important constituent of such conflicts and a heuristic concept 
in explaining resistance and reluctance during the Ebola epidemic. Our hy-
pothesis is that these attitudes did not only depend on the sanitary crisis and 
on the health measures enforced by the Riposte. Without denying the impor-
tance of these factors, we have tried to underline how such reactions originate 
from backgrounds of mistrust existing before the epidemic, rooted in culture, 
political life, interethnic relations, interactions between different socio-profes-
sional categories. Like every crisis, the Ebola epidemic has made latent conflicts 
become manifest. Even if the media have particularly emphasized the cultural 
factors behind resistance, we think that political factors related to the mistrust 
between elites and people, between public officials and users of public services 
also deserve special attention.
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Mistrusting as a Mode of Engagement   
in Mediation 
Insights from Socio-Legal Practice in Rwanda
Stefanie Bognitz
The institution of mediators (abunzi) existed long before colonisation. When something 
happened, there was the family elder (umukuru w’umuryango), who had the responsi-
bility to solve disputes between family members. He would call upon all family mem-
bers to share into solving the problem. When someone was found guilty, there were 
no governmental or judicial entities as in our days, the family elder only charged the 
responsible with a fine of providing beer that was then prepared for everyone to share. 
The case ended in that way by reconciliation. In order for people to continue to live in 
harmony today, the government decided to bring back our culture of solving problems 
by the people themselves in their communities, because you may find people fighting 
for a chicken and their case can reach the Supreme Court. The government decided to 
decentralize justice and provided for it in the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 
it was in 2003 in its Ar ticle 159, which talks about mediation committees (komite z’ab-
unzi). There are other laws relating to abunzi which means that it is an institutionalized 
organ, so they tried to bring back that traditional culture in order to prevent people to 
spend their time in courts just to preside over small cases.    
(Interview with Dominique Nkurikiyinka, Mediator, Southern Rwanda, November 2012)
introDuCtion
In this chapter, I outline some of the lived consequences of a society that was 
reformed after acts of mass violence and genocide. I intend to examine modes 
of pacifying relationships between actors in mediation of disputes by shedding 
light on the persistence of mistrust, which can be seen in the practices actors 
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use to navigate and anticipate their futures.1 The analysis is confined to the 
mandatory socio-legal practice of mediation or kunga abantu2 guided by those 
who ‘bring people together’ abunzi (mediators)3. Mediation is situated on the 
threshold of the legal system of the post-genocide Rwandan state and is firmly 
under control of local administrative structures. Rwanda has witnessed a shift 
in procedural responsibilities from a conventional judicial system to one that 
formally incorporates abunzi on its threshold. Mediation is re-introduced as an 
institutionalized and regulated space of dispute settlement governed by law. 
However, what is intriguing about this promise of mediation is how it is becom-
ing a space for participatory engagement between citizens and disputing part-
ners who, in terms of strategies and practices, are by no means equal partners 
in mediation. Very similar to what Lipsky has termed street-level bureaucrats 
(Lipsky 1980), street-smart or savvy actors in dispute employ wide-ranging, cre-
ative and flexible registers when pursuing their claims and articulating their 
accusations. The unintended aspects of engaging citizens in mediation forums 
are indicative of life worlds in the aftermath of mass atrocities and genocide. 
In this vein, mistrust has become a forceful strategy in the everyday life of 
citizens. Their everyday pursuit to secure modes of existence and forms of sub-
sistence translates into social forms of engagement in mediation. Mistrust, si-
lences, passivity and subversive actions are meaningful strategies. Resistance, 
doubt and critique are ways of making views public and distinguish the indi-
vidual who employs these critical creative capacities.
The practice of bringing people together in mediation (kunga abantu) is 
embedded in an outgrowth of the Rwandan legal system. It is an organiza-
tional extension (Rottenburg 2009: 105, 140) that, since 2004, has been on the 
threshold of the legal system, bringing people together in mediation forums 
and introduces their disputes4 to a public space (Organic Law N ° 17/2004 of 
1 | My use of the term mistrust draws on the Kinyarwanda verb gukenga which means 
to mistrust, the respective noun amakenga (suspicion) as well as urwikekwe meaning to 
have suspicion from the verb kwikeka which is to suspect something.
2 | The verb kunga finds equivalence in (1) medicine where it denotes rejoining of a bro-
ken bone. It is employed when describing the (2) handiwork of tying two cords into one 
long cord. In relation to people (abantu) it is now used to denote (3) mediation covering 
the re-establishment of relationships between people and reconciling them (Organic 
Law N° 17/2004; N° 31/2006; N° 02/2010; Ministry of Justice 2010: 4).
3 | In the course of the text I make use of the terms mediators abunzi and mediation 
kunga abantu interchangeably. 
4 | As acceleration of an unanswered claim or an unresolved disagreement between 
people, a dispute is addressed to some kind of public forum possibly staffed with a 
third party: ‘The duration of disputes depends on the intensity of such bonds that unite 
victims with those against whom they clamour for justice’ (Gulliver 1969/1997: 14). 
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20/06/2004). This space holds various modes of practices and forms of artic-
ulation for actors in dispute. They bring critique to light, employ strategies of 
mistrust and consciously distance themselves or resist figurations of authority. 
However, mediation is not an alternative to negotiation of disputes in courts. 
It rather precedes courts and gives access to disputes easily entering into the 
judicial system at its lowest level. Thus, mediation is a significant institutional 
arrangement for coming to terms with disputes considering the number of 
cases introduced to abunzi who set the itinerary for mediation. Mediation aims 
towards dispute settlement supported by active involvement of abunzi as a third 
party. I thus situate mediation, as organizational extension, within vigorous 
and fast-paced conditions of citizen surveillance brought about by post-geno-
cide legislative reform in a context of ‘autocratic’ modes of state-administra-
tion and governance as well as their gradual consolidation (see Ingelaere 2009, 
2014; Reyntjens 1990, 2010; Schabas & Imbleau 1997; Waldorf 2006).
Mistrust is not only an analytical moment in lack of trust. I would agree that 
‘distrust ought not to be understood as derivate from an original state of trust’ 
(Pedersen and Meinert 2015: 103). Neither do I expect to find logical consequen-
tialisms in the presence and absence of trust as against mistrust. Mistrusting 
is a strategy, the cautious practice of actors who find themselves in relation-
ships with others, ‘mistrust (…) enables people to engage in strategic action and 
tactical manoeuvring’ (de Certeau 1984: 50-52, 59-60; cited in MacLean 2013: 
5). In this contribution, I follow an understanding of mistrusting which is to 
doubt, critique, provoke or steer questions and point to inequalities and injus-
tices. Mistrust is to maintain a critical and self-determined distance to everyday 
events, institutions and its actors. Here mistrusting is a mode of engagement 
that can evaluate and calculate situations to create and maintain a vantage point 
from which actors can strategize about their practices. In my analysis, I focus 
on creative action and practices that can be achieved in situations of mistrust-
ing, but that can also go wrong. ‘Mistrust (…) creates opportunities for people to 
pursue their own interests, especially where others try to limit their ability to 
defend and/or advance them’ (MacLean 2013: 5, emphasis retained).
Studying dispute management and resolution mechanisms include a perspective on 
cases or litigations enacted in a socio-legal sphere under consideration of respective 
assemblages, rules, institutions and stabilizing objects (Boltanksi and Thévenot 1999: 
360).
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wHen Mistrust surfaCes
Mistrust is not a set of actions or a range of practices including speech acts 
that offers itself directly for ethnographic inquiry. Mistrust marks a range of 
practices asking the participating, observing analyst to come forth attempting 
to percolate its opaqueness. I did not consider mistrust as a strategic practice of 
actors when I conceptualized the ethnography. This only surfaced much later 
in forms of organizing and institutionalizing access to the legal system and 
justice for ‘ordinary Rwandans.’
What if we question the silences that we mistake for quiet endorsement? 
Speaking with street-savvy Rwandans at the margins of the state in their own 
language (Kinyarwanda) allowed me to inhabit a fugitive identity that made the 
familiar unknown and vice versa. I remained at a distance to take people out of 
their everyday and allow them to see their situation otherwise, while I created 
proximity to be entrusted with secret stories, insights and concerns. Given that 
we shared a common language, I could continuously deconstruct the unknown 
and make it familiar to me. It seems to me that this was the foundation for 
earning trust and being granted access to restricted realms that many research-
ers working in post-genocide Rwanda have called a ‘withdrawn society’ (see 
Fujii 2009, Thomson 2013).
Starting after the 1994 genocide and lasting until today, villages and 
communities on Rwanda’s hills continue to be remade. Exiled refugees have 
returned, former FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) 
members are reintegrated, prisoners are being sent home after serving their 
sentences, inhabitants from scattered settlements without access to public ser-
vices and infrastructures have had to relocate to live in newly built villages. 
Whenever Rwandans interact with public institutions they are asked to identify 
not only who they are, but also where they come from. In this way, they strict-
ly follow the rules of the administrative units into which the whole country 
has been reorganized. The loose translation of village that I employ here, is 
far from an organically grown community, but more of a collection of homes 
closely built together, usually within reach of a road or path and implemented 
as the smallest administrative unit, commonly referred to as umudugudu (pl. 
imidugudu).
Against this background of inhabitation, the formation of villages framed 
configurations of peasants, who are expected to acquiesce when they interact 
with authorities and public institutions. The reconfiguration of rural dwellings 
and the comprehensive relocation of the local population certainly resonates 
in disagreements and disputes. ‘Distance from their fields also contributed to 
uncertainty and concern among rural dwellers about losing their rights to land 
or their harvests’ (Newbury 2011: 225). Given the remaking of post-genocide 
politics and governance, rural Rwandans not only find themselves living in 
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communities of strangers, but they are no longer in close proximity to where 
they cultivate crops and till their land to secure subsistence livelihoods. Farmed 
fields no longer border plots of land, which belonged to organically grown com-
munities of trust who rely on mutual practices of reliance and exchange. In the 
longue durée historical approach to social organization, genealogies and polit-
ical economy, among many other aspects of the ‘interlacustrine’ region, Chré-
tien evokes a certain dynamic in responsibilities and dependencies between 
people. ‘Indeed, influence resided in trust born out of personal relationships, 
in oaths, and in resource availability, which allowed one to forge relations that 
went far beyond the hill or banana garden where one lived’ (Chrétien 2003: 
349). Moments of identification strictly pursuing reconfigured spaces rather 
speak of significant reorganization and reform of governance of Rwandans, 
than the forging of identities in terms of origin and place of residence. James 
Scott has scrutinized high modernist social engineering projects that subject 
organically grown and culturally embedded patterns of human organization 
to villagization enforced on ordinary inhabitants. The ‘administrative order-
ing of nature and society’ (Scott 1998: 4) stands out as an attempt to create 
order where, in the eyes of the state, otherwise restless populations roam. In 
its attempt to make the ‘social landscape legible, a bureaucratic state concerns 
itself with the administrative ordering of state and society’ (Newbury 2011: 225). 
In the state’s effort towards efficiency and good governance, citizens become 
subjects again. This legibility of the social descends into ordinary life worlds 
and concerns real people inhabiting these worlds. This short introduction to 
observations on current forms of living in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide 
demonstrates how detachment and isolation from mutual practices are con-
scious actions. They persist in spaces of making community or forums within 
which mediation is underway (see Doughty 2016). It is in these spaces of the 
everyday life world that I intend to access, to pursue, observe and, thus, analyse 
the surfacing of mistrust.
tHeories of trust
In the preface to his book on trust, Niklas Luhmann (1967: v) expressed doubt 
over whether sociology should utilize words of ‘everyday language use’ that 
originate in a ‘world of imagination’ (Vorstellungswelt). His doubt was probably 
confirmed by the insight that trust had not been systematically conceptual-
ized in sociological analysis and his work should remain the only systematic 
approach to a sociology of trust for some time to come (Hartmann 2001: 7, 
Luhmann 2000: 1). Luhmann situates trust in a moral world. Thus, trust runs 
the risk of being misused as concept for the analysis of the social world. None-
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theless, he sets out to introduce trust to the endeavour of building a theory in 
correspondence to the everyday of the social world (Luhmann 2000: v).
His overall approach to trust makes it a necessity of the everyday to reduce 
social complexity as a precondition to act. Everyday life, practices and decisions 
become possible because of trust and trusting, when individuals are in situa-
tions and take on certain risks. Following this understanding, individuals who 
refuse to trust, cannot establish trustworthy relations with others so that mis-
trusting produces perhaps even too many possibilities for action. This implies 
that because of mistrusting, the level of complexity of situations encountered 
by individuals accelerates, so that courses of actions are manifold and actors 
are overwhelmed by the sheer possibilities in any given situation (Luhmann 
2000: 93). Strategies of mistrust accelerate complexity, since more information 
is required to stabilize one’s actions. People tend to scrutinize information to 
weigh its validity and worth when proceeding with equivalent actions. Given 
the dynamics of trust and mistrust brought about by thresholds that make ac-
tors weigh their risks, Luhmann concludes that ‘a social system that requires or 
cannot avoid attitudes of mistrust (for certain functions) of its members, at the 
same time requires mechanisms that reduce the possibility of mistrust, out-
balances other possibilities or worse runs the risks to reproduce modes of mis-
trust that slowly result in destruction (of the social system)’ (ibid. 100). In this 
regard institutional arrangements hold actions based on mistrust accountable. 
In other words, mistrust in each other could provoke actions that are based 
on faith in institutions, not least so as to mitigate the risks and uncertainties 
of actors invested in mistrusting practices. Lack of trust would be a result of 
diverse institutions and unstandardized measures (Porter 1995: 46). Porter fur-
ther asserts, ‘trust can never be separated from hierarchies and institutions’ 
(ibid: 214). Following along these lines, trust in new institutions will decrease, 
if experience of personal encounters and engagements with such institutions 
vary and lead to contradicting results.
Tilly broadly defines trust ‘as an attitude or a relationship that comes along 
with a set of practices’ (2005: 12). He excludes the ‘sorts of attitudes that might 
motivate, complement or result in relationships of trust’ (2004: 4). It seems 
to me that the practice approach may circumvent the ‘elusive notion of trust’ 
(Gambetta 1988: ix). Tilly rather foregrounds the fabrics of relationships be-
tween people that emerge with their practices. ‘Trust networks, then, consist 
of ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within 
which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at 
risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others’ (Tilly 2005: 12). Trust 
relationships cannot sustain themselves without the premise of people taking 
risks and investing in unpredictable outcomes (Tilly 2004: 4).
Trust is confidence in the reliability of a person or system (Giddens 1990), it 
is indispensable for a stable and collectively shared life. In a similar movement, 
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Broch-Due and Ystanes (2016) expose trust to ethnographic inquiry. These au-
thors acknowledge the elusiveness of trust, in a similar way to Gambetta (1988). 
According to Broch-Due and Ystanes (2016: 1), trusting is ‘a disposition, a pow-
erful affect, a stance towards the world expressed in a confident reaching out to 
others’. Indeed, this presupposes trust almost as a confidence in and of the ex-
perienced world, as a consequence of modernity (Giddens 1990). These authors 
also emphasize the future-orientation in a trusting disposition accumulated 
through collections of positive experiences as actors get along with one anoth-
er (ibid.). When ‘trust weaves together intersubjective worlds’ (Broch-Due and 
Ystanes 2016: 1), it is also in danger of being undermined by mistrust, a cor-
rupting force with the power to encroach social worlds and their associated 
actors.
According to Hardin, we have entered an age of distrust, as we interact 
more with unrelated people we cannot trust, rather than with those in whom 
we trust due to memory of previous encounters (Hardin 2006: 13). ‘Distrust 
is sometimes not merely a rational assessment but it is also benign, in that 
it protects against harms rather that causing them’ (Hardin 2006: 89). 
Showing how distrust can fulfil the incentive of keeping oneself from risks 
and harmful actions of others, this approach foregrounds questions of how 
distrust plays out and which motivations it fulfils, rather than falling into the 
trap of pathologizing communities of mistrust and generalizing what seems 
impossible to corroborate empirically. The impossibility of reading trust as 
opposed to and different from mistrust also brings to the fore the question of 
how trust relates to trustworthiness.
Hardin opens an alternative trajectory when he sets out from trust and 
rather considers its attached merits when he turns to trustworthiness. ‘Your 
trustworthiness is your commitment to fulfil another’s trust in you’ (Hardin 
2002: 28). In the following pages on the worthiness of abunzi, going along with 
Hardin, I discuss how ‘trustworthiness is a motivation or a set of motivations 
for acting’ in the socio-legal world (ibid. 31). But I belief some critical distance to 
Hardin’s assessment of trust needs to be kept when he reasons that ‘the mean-
ingful result of trust, when it is justified, is to enable cooperation; the result 
of distrust is to block even the attempt at cooperation’ (ibid. 96). Moreover, he 
seems short sighted in painting the two worlds of trust and distrust as distinct 
and taken for granted opposites: ‘Trust is functional in a world in which trust 
pays off; distrust is functional in a world in which trust does not pay off’ (ibid. 
96). What is more, in practices and situations there is a leverage for actors to 
engage their competences ranging from mistrusting, testing commitment to 
being trustworthy as well as establishing trusting relationships; all of whose 
thresholds can be overcome effortlessly.
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CustoDians of trust wortHiness
‘You never know the name of the one who will make the 
spade that will avenge you.’
AgAcumu kAzAguhorerA ntumenyA uwAgAcuze.
rwandan ProvErb
The abunzi mediators I worked and conversed with, would refer to having been 
elected by residents of their village or cell as their representatives in mediation 
committees as evidence of their public commitment and merit. Referring back 
to the much formalized procedures of nationwide abunzi elections as underly-
ing reason for them becoming abunzi was often regarded as ample explanation. 
But it is worthwhile looking into how people would go about choosing their 
representatives as everyone could be in need of abunzi one day and rely on 
their good conduct to reconcile with or resolve a disagreement with a party in 
dispute. Accepting one’s own potential need of abunzi sometime in the future 
is an inducement for actors to accept abunzi as an institution of worth and 
significance. Seen from a perspective of the making of institutions as linked to 
actors’ practices and human actions5, there is a need to rely on abunzi and trust 
their worthiness on behalf of people entering mediation. The trustworthiness 
of mediators and trust in mediation could therefore be read as a defining mo-
ment delineating the practice of mediation kunga abantu from mediation in 
becoming an institution (komité y’abunzi).
I base the term trustworthiness on concepts in Kinyarwanda that are among 
the everyday register of street-savvy and ordinary people. Kwizera (verb) and 
ikizera (noun) in a general sense means to hope, believe or have faith in. Icyiz-
ere (noun; plural iby-) implies hope, trust, and confidence and is derived from 
kwizera. Kwiringira (verb) and icyiringiro (noun; plural iby-) denotes to trust, 
rely on, hope, expect. All the connotations that are related to trust inherit the 
value of a future-oriented perspective.
So why would an ordinary, street-savvy person be elected to become um-
wunzi? Emmanuel, vice-president of a Mediation Committee at the appeal level 
of the administrative unit of the sector elected for a five-year mandate, explains 
how he was trusted by people to represent them. A person can only reach trust-
worthiness – ubunyangamugayo (literally the strength to publicly stand against 
disgrace and shame) – and be a trusted person – inyangamugayo (literally some-
one who refuses blame and is therefore a reliable person) – when his actions 
and behaviour, especially in his family, are seen as exemplary, good and for that 
matter trustworthy. Emmanuel captures the formula for qualifying as inyan-
gamugayo in the following terms:
5 | Hans Joas calls this aspect of institution-making a creative process (Joas 1989).
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You cannot go to help people in cer tain matters whereas you have not even understood 
yourself or know what you are going to help them with. So what does it mean to be trust-
worthy? It is to see, that the person who will represent you, has the value of ubunyanga-
mugayo. It is a quality of knowing what is good and what is bad. It is in his behaviours. 
I give you an example, if in my house I always fight with my children and my wife, do 
you think that I can be inyangamugayo? Can I bring together a husband and a wife in a 
mediation, while they know that even in my own home there is no peace. First, they have 
to see my behaviours before they trust me. To stand before them and represent them 
in mediation, if I do not have ubunyangamugayo there is no need to trust me for solving 
their problems because even in my home I need to earn trust first.   
(Interview with Emmanuel Désiré Uwimana, Mediation Committee’s vice-president, 
Southern Rwanda, October 2012)
Knowing about a perceptive person’s trustworthiness seems to play out in the 
everyday and in situations of people going about their daily lives with all its 
flaws. During an unpremeditated conversation between mediators situated at 
the level of appeal in Gishamvu Sector, a mediator shared the roles he plays in 
the vicinity of his hill.
I forgot to tell you that all young men who want to date a woman, come to consult me 
and ask me what to do. So I teach them loving words to say, good songs to sing or poems 
to recite and even about a cer tain flower to give to women. Sometimes I accompany 
men to meetings with their beloved. It has happened that the women fall in love with me 
instead, but I am a good person I cannot do this kind of things
(Interview with Pascal, Mediator, Southern Rwanda, February 2013).
His account of everyday practices of earning one’s trustworthiness through be-
ing good with others goes along with an understanding, that surfaces in media-
tors’ narratives of their motivation. Being less concerned with oneself and one’s 
own issues, or in other words selflessness, is a vital ethical responsibility for sav-
vy community members to fulfil. The value agaciro of selflessness, compassion 
and being kind with others resonates with fellow mediators present in the above 
conversation, who recall memories of cordiality. ‘People trust me and they know 
that there is no one to help them except the one they can trust. We accept to serve 
our country in this voluntarism [of mediation committees] because we have to 
help people, our neighbours and to serve the country we belong to.’ This inter-
connects with the voluntariness of a trustworthy person to take the responsibility 
of being a mediator umwunzi and representing, as Emmanuel as called it above, 
parties in mediation who invest their trust in the responsible inyangamugayo.
In this regard mediators are vanguards of a new spirit of trustworthiness 
and truthfulness in Rwanda that goes along with building new communities 
after genocide. This is accompanied by socio-political agendas that can be read 
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as manuals for a new, united and homogenous Rwanda, such as the Ndi Umun-
yarwanda (lit. ‘I am Rwandan’) programme. Even though it addresses every 
ordinary Rwandan, it also sets the stage for abunzi to act as moral signposts 
and mobilize Rwandans to set out and search for values that are hoped to bring 
reconciliation among a population divided by genocide and its lasting ideology. 
The programme instructs:
To be a person of integrity is characterized by saying the truth, being humble, listening 
attentively to others, being in harmony, assist others. All this leads to trust between 
people. To develop a culture of having conversations and to give strong incentives to re-
solve problems. Ndi Umunyarwanda prompts us to always seek the truth, live in harmo-
ny without any kind of violation, to accept when we fail and to ask pardon to go forward 
Decisions on the Programme of Ndi Umunyarwanda (lit. ‘I am Rwandan’).
In her observation, Dasgupta finds that trust is earned and established through 
practices and their everyday repetitions. ‘[T]rust is based on reputation and that 
reputation is ultimately to be required through behaviour over time in well-un-
derstood circumstances’ (Dasgupta 1988: 53). Again, trusting relationships are 
located, embedded and rely on contexts delineated by actors embroiled in rela-
tionships and collaborations.
keePers of trutHfulness
‘Abunzi bring people together in truth’.
Description of a good mediation often eluded to by 
mediators.
intErviEw with Sil aS ndakizi, mEdiator, SouthErn rwanda, 
January 2013.
The quest to bring trust to light and establish trusting relationships as founda-
tional principle in mediation is closely linked to trustworthiness that qualifies 
a person inyangamugayo to be elected as mediator umwunzi. It seems worth-
while to look closer into how relations evoking trust and truth play out in the 
everyday. A mediator shares the circumstances surrounding his selection to 
become umwunzi based on his conduct as inyangamugayo.
To elect inyangamugayo, people only select those who were not involved in genocide. 
Those who do not steal, not even touch the cash crops of others. Those who do not have 
quarrels or cause disturbances in the community where they live. That is how people 
came to conclude that I am inyangamugayo. They hope that you can do good things 
for others, because inyangamugayo is someone who cannot discriminate people based 
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on ethnicity, but will base his decisions on what the law says. That is inyangamugayo, 
someone who is impartial in all decisions made.
(Interview with Silas Ndakizi, Mediator, Southern Rwanda, November 2012)
I consider this wording of how trustworthiness relates to truthfulness as a pro-
found insight into how cooperation between people can be maintained based 
on how actions are valued, measured and put in the context of what everyone’s 
expectations of people live up to. It is ordinary but savvy people seeing, estimat-
ing and calculating the actions of others. Value is ascribed to good actions and 
behaviours that become visible in everyday situations and ordinary encoun-
ters. Investing one’s trust in a person and seeing truthfulness in the doings of 
abunzi is open for everyone to share into – even strangers, as I described above 
for me approaching interlocutors in their language and gradually earning my 
trust. The ways of finding out about trust and truth goes along with Hardin’s 
candid street-level epistemology that ‘knowledge of another’s trustworthiness 
can come from many sources other than thick relationships’ (Hardin 1992: 157-
58). Again, it is a practice-level approach that opens the perspective and possi-
bilities of trusting and trustworthiness. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall 
turn to the socio-legal practice of mediation with the help of an ethnographic 
situation and will elaborate on how mistrust surfaces as mode of engagement.
‘we are going to MeDiate you’
‘A distant brother is less valuable than a neighbour’.
Umuvandimwe wa kure arutwa n’umuturanyi.
rwandan ProvErb
Entering into a mediation calls upon the disputing parties into being-with-oth-
ers. This and the coming together, being in and making of community – even 
if this coming together is called upon by authority and a dispute settlement in-
stitution that summons reluctant and unwilling actors, sets the pace for parties 
undergoing mediation and remediating their positionalities (Doughty 2015).
What follows is an ethnographic insight into the introduction of a media-
tion, usually opened by the lead mediator, held in the Sector of Gasaka in the 
Southern province of Rwanda, one of the major research sites of my fieldwork 
conducted for 15 months between 2011 and 2014.
Emmanuel: Nyirimbaraga Gregoire, we are going to mediate you and your mother, Mu-
karubuga Beatrice today and I want everyone who is here to help us in this. Do you want 
to enter this mediation?
Gregoire: Yes, I want it.
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After Gregoire gave his consent, the mediation opened with the creation of a 
‘summarizing protocol’, a written device or practice of documentation of the 
main strategies in actors’ argumentation during the mediation. In many in-
stances, I observed how mediators resort to their written documentation to ab-
stract, simplify and ‘boil down’ initial claims and accusations, and, thus, sort 
through the various lines of argumentation. Reading the summarizing proto-
col to the actors in dispute and others present helps to bring about closure and 
at the same time reduces the heat of the moment, when actors bring forth their 
experiences of injustice, unsatisfied demands and claims that have added up 
over several years of unresolved antagonistic relationships. At the end of medi-
ation, stability is brought back into the relationships between actors, which is 
sustained by a written device that also functions as a structuring device; medi-
ation may either result in mutual agreement -kumvikanisha (literally, crafting 
a mutual understanding) – or a decision taken by the mediators – umwanzuro.
At the beginning of mediation, Gregoire’s affirmative statement to seize 
the possibilities of dispute resolution, despite the filial relationship, reveals 
that family relationships of proximity have been altered en route to mediation. 
When the lead mediator proceeds to ask ‘who is the plaintiff?’ and ‘so Mu-
karubuga Beatrice is the defendant against whom Gregoire lodged a claim?’, 
the actors in dispute are being positioned. That implies several things, such 
as being differentiated along the lines of who lodged a claim to the mediation 
committee – the plaintiff, on the one hand, and the defendant, who will take 
the position of the party that is blamed or accused of wrongdoing, on the other. 
The initial distribution of who claims what from whom is always undertaken. 
My understanding of the two opposing positions leads to the assumption that 
actors are not equal parties in mediation, because of the way they are positioned 
as claimant and defendant. Thus, the initial positioning of actors in dispute 
has implications on their truthfulness during mediation. For mediators to find 
out about the truth of ‘how things really are’, they need to establish that actors 
can be trusted. A plaintiff who claims ‘too much’ or whose claim dates back 
to a ‘long time ago’, usually before the 1994 genocide, cannot be considered a 
‘serious person’ in mediation.
This goes along with a broader cultural-political discourse in the country 
about the ‘seriousness of Rwandans’. It is specifically linked to a disorderly state 
of the nation in the years leading to genocide in 1994, shattered social fabrics 
and disquieting acts of genocide committed by people living together in close 
proximity and familiarity. The attempt to reconcile, rebuild and develop a na-
tion insinuates ‘bad history’, as Rwandans refer to it. Thus, a forward-looking 
course of achievements and improvement comes into play, ‘when you are not 
serious’ and striving to achieve what is good, ‘you cannot be correct’ (Tito Ru-
taremara, Ombudsperson, quoted in Kinzer 2008: 233). The seriousness of a 
person has been and is in the becoming of a value in Rwandan society.
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The above mentioned seriousness has also come to be integrated as a 
premise in the socio-political programme Ndi Umuyarwanda – ‘I am Rwan-
dan’, which seeks to mobilize citizens to achieve a common goal, foster the 
self-consciousness of Rwandans and value peoples’ worth (indangagaciro 
z’ubunyarwanda – literally, ‘to give value to Rwandaness’).6 Certainly, there is 
a significant motive of discipline in this seriousness, something that is always 
emphasized by authorities, leaders and members of the ruling party Rwanda 
Patriotic Front, as for instance the Ombudsperson quoted above. It is a consid-
erable transgression to tell people that they are not serious or not correct (see 
also Kinzer 2008: 233). The Ndi Umunyarwanda programme also resonates in 
the conversation with umwunzi Silas on how to invest in trustworthiness and 
truthfulness. He emphasizes that a truthful inyangamugayo cannot see eth-
nicity as a point of reference for discrimination. The programme mentioned 
here, reinforces citizens’ identification as Rwandans instead of resigning to 
ethnic categories that led to the nation’s descent into genocide. This, I think, is 
a moment in the everyday practices and roles of savvy citizens like abunzi, who 
inherit their identities from their worth of inyangamugayo. Good values and 
personal integrity that go along with this worth are identified by Rwandans to 
be rooted in the intricate relationship between having a common culture and 
shared history, on the one hand, and experiencing the post-genocide predica-
ment, on the other. In this regard, abunzi have a significant role to play and are 
entrusted with ethical leadership on the level of their communities. Not only do 
they mediate between parties in dispute but, more significantly perhaps, they 
mediate practices, values and registers of worth between ordinary citizens in 
local forums on the threshold of the legal system.
Returning to the opening sequences of mediation at Gasaka Sector in Feb-
ruary 2013. The lead mediator turns to Gregoire with a provocative assertion:
Emmanuel: You should be ashamed to be in dispute with your mother!
The mediator risks to bring forth probably hasty and premature charges of 
wrong-doing against one of the parties in dispute. But this is intentional; the 
mediator wishes to stir a sense of participation among others attending the 
public mediation forum. Thus, the audience is called upon to get involved, 
share ideas of justice or relate to the dispute submitted to mediation with their 
witness accounts or evidentiary practices. The mediator makes a deliberate at-
6 | ‘Ndi Umunyarwanda is a program that aims towards the instruction of Rwandans 
to feel that they are Rwandans first of all things, to live without distrust – kubana nta 
rwikekwe and to put the common good for the country first, all arising matters concern-
ing society should undergo open discussion and be agreed upon through conversation’ 
(Government of Rwanda 2013: 3, author’s emphasis).
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tempt to reduce the weight of the disputed entity at risk of being lost for either 
side and calls upon the relationship of the involved actors. Gregoire, the son, 
is in dispute with his mother Beatrice. The son takes on the identity of plain-
tiff against his mother. This, according to the mediators, cannot be accepted 
without the disputants’ family relationship being submitted to the mediators’ 
scrutiny. Their estimation draws on the proximity and trust between a son and 
his mother. Let us consider how the lead mediator proceeds:
Emmanuel: You know that my name is Uwimana Emmanuel Désiré, I am umwunzi and 
vice-president of this committee of mediators at Gasaka Sector. I am still waiting for 
other abunzi to come. But it is good for you, Gregoire and Beatrice, because you have 
both come here today and we can talk before all others arrive in order to find a solution 
to your problem.
Gregoire admits that he of course was not in favour of getting involved in dis-
putes in general and that even he cannot recall where this dispute comes from. 
The lead mediator continues to address Beatrice:
Emmanuel: We want to mediate you and your son and the other people present here 
today will help in order for your family to leave this dispute behind and return to your 
previous state of relationship.
Beatrice, however, remains little convinced about the possibility of mediation. 
Her relationship with her son has long been weakened by interests of individu-
al family members calling for property relationships that trespass family values 
and emphasize personal gains. She therefore reinstates her critical distance to 
the course of action laid out by abunzi.
Beatrice: How can you mediate us?
The lead mediator explains the form the mediation could take for the disputing 
parties as he judges their bonds:
Emmanuel: We will show you that your (family) relation is stronger than the dispute (sin-
gle incidence) you have.7
He insists on the significance of relatedness and shared values as one family 
and therefore sets the conditions for the mediation ‘without going into too much 
7 | Here the lead mediator relies on the proverb ‘Icyo mupfana kiruta icyo mupfa’ which 
translates into ‘our relationship (brotherhood) is more important than our dif ferences 
(disputes, wealth)’.
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detail of the case.’ The lead mediator sets the tone for the parties in dispute and 
already lays out directives on what should be remembered and attained in the 
process of mediation. The relation between mother and son should outweigh 
the dispute between plaintiff and defendant. This is also why the mediators 
depart from the assumption that it will be an easy dispute to resolve.
Emmanuel: All of you who are here today participating, you know that this dispute is 
easy and it will not be dif ficult to mediate both, mother and son, am I lying?
Beatrice confirms that the mediator is of course not lying, but she upholds her 
critical distance and remains distrustful to the impending mediation based 
on shared family relations. Even though she states that she is fine with ac-
knowledging her son in dispute, she recalls how Gregoire already ‘refused to be 
mediated’ before abunzi at the level of the cell. In response to her sensible mis-
trust in the promise of mediation, abunzi continue to invest their confidence by 
reinstating that they ‘will see whether Gregoire again refuses mediation.’ The 
mediators seize a certain capacity of enunciation. Actors in dispute may discard 
rules and forget about procedures initially laid out. This underscores the sense 
of a moral community in which all actors in mediation participate (Gulliver 
1977: 29). However, this initial or pre-mediation encounter between mediators 
and parties in disputes already suggests that trust is a fragile commodity, re-
quiring especially delicate handling when interconnectedness between people 
and institutions is a prerequisite for fulfilling an agreement (Dasgupta 1988: 
50), such as mother and son agreeing to be mediated by abunzi on the premises 
of recognizing their mutual bond.
‘a sMall l anD anD a forest’
After the conditions for the unfolding mediation have been laid out between 
all involved parties, a process of negotiation over the actual substance of the 
dispute unfolds. However, as becomes clear in the following, this process will 
not result in a clear outline of what the parties are disputing over, since neither 
of them accepts the mediators’ proposition of disputing over ‘a small land and 
a forest’. It will moreover reveal the underlying dynamics of adversary rela-
tions between parties in dispute. Thus, the process of negotiating the litigation 
pushes mediation and its mediators to the limits of their capacity in providing 
resolutions such as the mutual acknowledgement of kinship or family rela-
tions. In other words, what becomes evident is how mediation fails and there-
fore requires alternative itineraries for parties in dispute to get along with each 
other, even if they do not ‘get over it’ and completely repair the relationship. 
In the specific case laid out here, mediators will rely on external stabilizing 
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objects which come in the form of written evidence, such as a land title issued 
by the land titling commission, external to the mediation committee. Due to 
the inability or unwillingness of the parties to reconcile in a common resolu-
tion of their dispute, this evidence will support the final decision rendered by 
the mediators. They set out to leave the material side of the dispute behind, 
which they refer to as ‘the thing you are quarrelling over’, and instead focus on 
social bonds and the imminent filial relationship. Yet, their anticipated path is 
interrupted by Gregoire who requests the presence of his brother as he is a third 
actor involved in the dispute. Abunzi admit their surprise as they did not issue 
any ‘summons’ to a third party.
Emmanuel: Why didn’t you tell us to summon him?
Gregoire: I thought that my mother would tell him and he would come because the case 
involves many people. He was summoned to come to the mediation in the cell, but he 
was not there.
Emmanuel: Why didn’t he come? Is he above the law?
This is a noteworthy turn, since it depicts what mediators will rely on when 
faced with an overwhelming complexity of ‘facts’ and ‘actors’ in a case. Whereas 
Gregoire persists in mobilizing others to achieve support, he trusts in the rela-
tionships between his mother and brother to inform each other and fairness for 
his claim, abunzi strictly rely on written forms of evidence and facts of a case. 
Abunzi act according to their situated knowledge in the heat of the on-going 
mediation and rely on written transcripts of the documented history of the 
case, such as the case registration book shared between local authority and 
abunzi and what has been described above as the ‘summarizing protocol’. Us-
ing these written devices in the mediation, abunzi rule that the dispute will be 
confined to two parties only. This goes along with their positioning of Beatrice 
and Gregoire, to show that their relationship is stronger than their dispute. The 
lead mediator turns to another woman in the audience who turns out to be 
Gregoire’s sister who is brought in to share her perspective on a case entangled 
in filial relationships.
Emmanuel: What do you want to tell us?
Gregoire’s sister: I want to tell you that Gregoire is lying. My brother is not here today 
because he is not involved in the case, he only used to accompany my mother to the 
authorities.
Gregoire’s attempt to be trusted in his account of the case by mobilising others 
is countered by the sister’s witness statement, judged as truthful by abunzi. 
Gregoire, however, is fiercely rejected by them when being corrected.
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Emmanuel: The mistake that you made is that you didn’t tell us about a second defen-
dant. We gave you a summon for one defendant only.
Since there is no written evidence, abunzi cannot invest their trust in Gregoire 
even on the procedural aspect of the sheer number of involved actors in dis-
pute. Gregoire steers mistrust of abunzi by ‘adding up’ to the dispute, whereas 
abunzi try to foster their trust in him through simplification of the matter at 
hand. Still, Gregoire remains at a distance and is reluctant to submit to medi-
ation without the mediators giving in to his demand of involving other family 
members. He expects a logical sequence of hearing his arguments about how 
the ‘small land and the forest’ were given to him by his father. He wants to be 
heard about how he is fighting violence and ‘terrorism’ in his family whose 
members have betrayed him. He wants to see acknowledgement for the forms 
of evidence, arguments, witnesses and truth claims he attempts to mobilize. 
Gregoire relies on stabilizing objects for overcoming mistrust and crafting re-
lationships of trust. Abunzi, however, rely on a strategy, probably less or not at 
all anticipated by actors in dispute, to move beyond law. They push for a mutual 
resolution where they would like to see the authority of actors in dispute taking 
centre stage – a mutual recognition of the filial relationship and amicable re-
lations in more general terms. But the disputants only see semi-standardized 
practices in what abunzi have put forth. Their less standardized approach re-
duces actors’ trust in mediation.
The mediators ultimately define the dispute as violation of property rights. 
Gregoire occupied a forest and cut down its trees, wrongly believing that he 
owned the land when, in fact, he did had not inherited the concerned piece of 
property from his father. However, Gregoire maintains that he can mobilize 
witnesses who can testify that his father handed him down the disputed piece 
of forest during his lifetime, the common practice of ‘ascending partition’. That 
is why, according to him and against the opinion of the mediators, the case 
is easy but also hard. With these distancing statements, Gregoire is careful 
to avoid submitting to the arguments and measures of proof common in me-
diation. His comments are rather situated on a meta-level of critiquing and 
maintaining a mistrusting ambivalence towards any committing positions as 
anticipated by the mediators. What is more to Gregoire mistrusting the ongo-
ing mediation process is the opaqueness of opponents, he alleges, to consist 
of more than one party. Beatrice, he believes, makes common cause with the 
authorities due to certain promises, ‘my mother is supported and pushed to 
engage in disputes by the authorities’. Gregoire’s mistrust evokes something 
going on behind the scenes, something obscure unfolding silently in the back-
ground, whereas the mediators intend to increase the pace of the mediation 
going on in the foreground.
Stefanie Bognit z164
Mediators and disputing party reside in different regimes of action and 
practices of truthfulness. To establish some clarity, the mediators start moving 
towards forms of evidence in support of one or the other party. They ask both 
parties for their land titles. Gregoire believes his land title in the hands of his 
brother’s wife, who immediately protests: ‘he is lying; we don’t have his land ti-
tle.’ The mediators turn to Beatrice who acknowledges that she is in possession 
of the required title. Gregoire shouts out that the title is forged; ‘all Rwandans 
who are here, you have to listen to me, they have a lot of documents evidencing 
that it is their own land, but these are forged.’ Since he claims that all docu-
ments brought forth as evidence by his ‘mother’s side’ are forged, he is required 
to produce his land title as proof of him being the rightful owner of the small 
land and the forest. The mediators bluntly abject any further inquiry: ‘Gregoire, 
go back and prepare your case. You confuse a lot of things and we waste pre-
cious time. We only want the land title and the paper of inheritance. I think you 
can go so that we can mediate other people.’
ConClusion – 
Be t ween trust in l aw anD Mistrust in MeDiation
‘Tomorrow’s things are brought by those who will come 
tomorrow’.
Iby ‘ejo bibara ab’ejo.
rwandan ProvErb
This chapter followed practices of mistrust as strategies in mediation. The 
ethnographic situation reveals how disputes are perpetuated and can have 
long-lasting impacts on relationships between actors in dispute when mistrust 
prevails. I consciously did not consider all aspects of the litigation in question 
for the dispute laid out here. Alluding to some of the fragments of mediation 
allows, as I believe, for more space in the analysis of practices and strategies in 
mediation.
The fragments of an attempt towards bringing people together in media-
tion that I laid out here, show how strategies to navigate between trust in law 
and mistrust in mediation are intertwined. ‘Suspicion (like doubt) occupies the 
space between the law and its application’ (Asad 2004: 285). In this chapter, I 
went along with mediators working towards putting suspicions to rest. In doing 
do, parties and mediators draw, though in different modes, on practices of evi-
dence and written forms to establish how things really are. However, relation-
ships of mistrust among actors prevailed throughout and beyond mediation. 
‘Suspicion opposes and undermines trust’ (ibid. 285). Mistrust is a strategy in 
mediation on the threshold of the legal system.
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Intervention 
Doubt, Suspicion, Mistrust ... Semantic Approximations
Mathijs Pelkmans
Doubt, suspicion, and mistrust are closely related concepts. Consider the fol-
lowing sentence: In the absence of trust, people approach an object with sus-
picion, and are likely to cast doubt on any information emanating from it. The 
ease with which these concepts can be meaningfully placed in a single sen-
tence is suggestive of the overlap between them. But reordering the sentence 
causes complications. It cannot start with doubt because to be doubtful does 
not necessarily imply being suspicious or mistrusting. That is, while suspicion 
and mistrust refer to negatively charged dispositions, this is not always the 
case with doubt. Moreover, suspicion needs to stay in the middle because its 
focused directionality makes it a sort of connector between the other two con-
cepts. Suspicion denotes a direct and active engagement with an object, and, al-
though mistrust and doubt also imply engagement, mistrust can equally refer 
to a latent disposition, while doubt can also be used to refer to largely internal 
processes of the mind. 
Before elaborating on the differences between these concepts, it is import-
ant to ask what it is that they hold in common. Doubt, suspicion, and mistrust 
refer to a tension between a subject and that which is doubted, suspected, mis-
trusted. I say tension rather than rupture because the mistrustful, suspicious, 
or doubtful relationship has substance, which can be productive or destructive. 
Moreover, they are relative in the sense that radical doubt and radical mistrust 
are untenable. In addition to this, assertions of mistrust and doubt at one level 
tend to assert trust and certainty at different levels, even if only implicitly. Fi-
nally, while each term implies an epistemic crisis, this entails more than the 
logical operations of falsification, verification, and probability attribution. The 
crisis extends to the intention and integrity that underpin the epistemic asser-
tions. In other words, mistrust, suspicion, and doubt entail not a detached but 
an affective position towards knowledge, carrying evaluative (aesthetic, moral, 
political) dimensions.
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The point of highlighting these commonalities is to establish a compara-
tive framework within which to make sense of the differences. Tension, rel-
ativity, and affect are manifested differently and with different consequences 
in the cases of doubt, mistrust and suspicion. This is what the next three sec-
tions set out to explore, in reverse order. Let me be clear that the point of these 
semantic reflections is not so much to gain terminological clarity (although 
there is nothing wrong with that) but rather to highlight important aspects 
of human practice that are addressed through these terms. Such attention is 
warranted because these aspects have received insufficient analytic attention 
(see Mühlfried, introduction to this volume). It is also of particular relevance 
given that political mobilization in the contemporary world seems to be based 
less on hope and idealism than on mistrust and fear. In order to connect the 
semantic explorations to current political processes I will use vignettes from 
the 2016 U.S. elections, starting the next two sections with quotes taken from 
a July 2016 episode of the Daily Show, a popular American political comedy 
show. Here we follow reporter Jessica Williams who interviews a small group 
of voters who had initially supported the Democrat Bernie Sanders, but shifted 
their support to Donald Trump when Hillary Clinton clinched the nomination 
of the Democratic Party.1 The Daily Show obviously selected and presented re-
sponses of supporters for comic effect, choosing those with particularly stark 
features. While this comical bias should be kept in mind, the responses do still 
offer good starting points for an analytic discussion of how doubt, suspicion, 
and mistrust work in contemporary political processes. 
affeCtive knowleDge
Hillary Clinton has been a scam artist all her life. She 
will bring us to war within the first ninety days ... Hillary 
Clinton is just a stack of garbage ... She disgusts me.
SandErS-turnEd-trumP SuPPortEr, Daily Show, 30 June 
2016.
Mistrust, doubt, and suspicion denote an epistemic crisis of sorts, one in which 
appearances, assumptions and assertions are being interrogated. With regards 
to doubt, philosophers have often employed this feature in their metaphysical 
contemplations. Descartes famously depicted himself as a ‘being that doubts’ 
and set himself the task of systematically discarding all opinions and precon-
ceptions, because this would enable him to build from a solid and unques-
tionable foundation a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences (1996: 
1 | See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rwfM5LGMmxg
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12-15). While such systematic doubt has obvious value in scholarly work, it is 
important to point out that ‘lived doubt’ is usually less deliberate and systemat-
ic, and as a result has very different qualities. As some critics have pointed out, 
the doubt Descartes advocated was ‘staged doubt’ (Skirry 2005) and, therefore, 
offers us little insight into the doubting subject and their engagement with the 
objects of their doubt. Peirce captured the central problem when rebuking this 
staging of doubt: ‘Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not 
doubt in our hearts’ (Peirce 1868: 141). 
That is to say, in discussions of lived reality the ‘epistemic crisis’ that is con-
noted through terms such as doubt, suspicion, and mistrust is not only a logical 
one, but an affective one as well. The challenge therefore is to examine the var-
ious ways in which thought and feeling come together in such epistemic crises. 
Looking at the everyday use of the terms under review, it is clear that doubt is 
associated with a wide range of affective states. Doubt can refer to a sense of 
curious wonder about, say, the existence of an afterlife; it can also refer to the 
teasing assertion ‘I really doubt that,’ such as in response to a truth-statement 
by a know-it-all-friend. It can also refer to the to worrying or even desperate 
thoughts that emerge in situations of intense uncertainty (such as after a be-
trayal or conflict) about what to believe, whom to trust, and what to do next. The 
person who doubts is never indifferent, but actively engages with alternatives: 
he or she is of ‘two minds’, as the number two in the German Zweifel and the 
French douter already suggest (see Pelkmans 2013: 4).
The affective dimension is even more conspicuously present in the cases of 
suspicion and mistrust. Here, it is not so much engagement with ‘alternatives’ 
that creates the tension, but rather the negative perception of the institution 
or person that stands behind a statement or publicly available information. In 
other words, as soon as Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, or other 
right-wing populists open their mouths, I personally have an immediate neg-
ative gut feeling that their words need to be treated with suspicion. And as the 
opening quotation from the Daily Show suggests, many American voters expe-
rienced similar negative feelings when they heard Hillary Clinton speak. Their 
mistrust of Hillary Clinton, of the government, or of the Democratic Party, 
complicated their epistemic engagement with information. Whatever Clinton 
said was filtered through aesthetic registers (a ‘stack of garbage’) and through a 
moral prism (a ‘scam artist’). In this highly polarized environment, statements 
or claims emanating from ‘the other side’ were immediately treated as a front 
for some deeper truth. 
Tying these reflections together, several overarching questions concerning 
the relationship between subjects and knowledge can be formulated. Crucially, 
we need to ask how epistemic dispositions and probes are amplified, modified, 
and tempered by the affective ties between actors. We also must consider what 
stands behind the statements and the available information. Moreover, we need 
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to think about how these affective-epistemic engagements emerge from and 
have an effect on larger socio-political landscapes.
rel ative Positioning
[Trump] has diarrhoea of the mouth, but he will say what 
many people think ... He is a bigot and a racist, howe-
ver ... Hillary Clinton has been a scam artist all her life.
SandErS-turnEd-trumP SuPPortEr, Daily Show, 30 June 
2016.
The word ‘however’ in the quotation above forms the crux of what this section 
tries to convey. The Sanders-turned-Trump supporters were clearly not enthu-
siastic about Donald Trump’s oral diarrhoea and his bigoted and racist persona. 
But they were ready to suspend their reservations, and view as positive that ‘he 
will say what many people think.’ Their willingness to do so is captured by the 
‘however’, which suggests that their greater mistrust and suspicion of Clinton 
pushed them to be more accepting of the disliked but not mistrusted Trump. To 
be mistrustful of everything and everyone is untenable, or as Mühlfried (this 
volume: 18) points out, ‘radical forms of mistrust are difficult to live’.
A comparison with the impossibility of radical doubt is valuable here. In 
his treatise On Certainty, Wittgenstein wrote: ‘If you are not certain of any fact, 
you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either. If you tried to doubt 
everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubt-
ing itself presupposes certainty’ (1969: 114-115). I support Wittgenstein’s point 
about the impossibility of radical doubt not only because of its logical signifi-
cance, but also because it illuminates an important aspect of the manifestation 
of doubt in everyday life. This aspect has been empirically illustrated in sever-
al ethnographic explorations. In her work on gold mining in Mongolia, Mette 
High analysed how informally operating miners dealt with uncertainty and 
unpredictability. They conceptualized their misfortunes as part of a ‘destabili-
sation of the cosmos’ and were preoccupied with the role that spirits played in 
this disordering. While doubting the intentions and questioning the strength 
and actions of these spirits, the miners could not help but reaffirm their real-
ity (High 2013). A similar logic emanates from the doubts expressed by Old 
Believers living in the Danube delta as studied by Vlad Naumescu. These Old 
Believers despaired that they no longer had the knowledge to properly carry out 
rituals, but through their worries and doubts they ended up affirming the im-
portance of leading a Christian life (Naumescu 2013). Doubt denotes an active 
engagement with the world, and it is this engagement that affirms certainty 
about reality at other levels.
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In other words, what starts out as an epistemic crisis ends up as an epis-
temic affirmation. This dynamic is equally visible in the case of suspicion and 
mistrust. As Victor Vakhshtayn (2016) argued, there is a negative correlation 
between institutional and interpersonal mistrust. The point here is that when 
people are more mistrusting of the institutions of the state they are more likely 
to invest in interpersonal relations. Every mistrustful assertion needs to be 
hinged on a solid foundation. Returning briefly to the quotation with which 
I started the section, mistrust of Hillary Clinton and ‘the establishment’ of-
ten led to a suspension of doubt with regard to the alternative, Donald Trump. 
Trust and mistrust, doubt and certainty, suspicion and acceptance, feed off of 
each other. In other words, the interrogatory focus not only leaves unseen and 
thus unchallenged what lies in the margins, but, moreover, its recoil effect 
strengthens those elements that are needed for launching the interrogation in 
the first place. 
What are the implications of these observations? Clearly, what we are ob-
serving is how people strive to create liveable situations, about how they nav-
igate landscapes that are replete with unknowns and uncertainties, in which 
they focus their doubts and suspicions on certain objects, leaving issues that 
are less immediately problematic or threatening for what they are. The follow-
ing questions are of vital interest: what forms of certainty are produced in the 
process of doubting? What relations of trust are intensified when people are 
mistrustful? What does generalized doubt and mistrust look like?
ProDuCtive tensions
In politics and economics, prolonged reflection and contemplation is often 
seen negatively as a sign of indecisiveness. Contemporary political leaders 
therefore are unlikely to present themselves as doubters. This tempering or 
even obstructing effect of doubt is even acknowledged by those who refuse 
to dismiss its value. In his poem ‘In praise of Doubt’, Bertold Brecht tellingly 
writes: ‘the thoughtless who never doubt/Meet the thoughtful who never act’ 
(Brecht 1979: 334). On the other hand, doubt is also seen as the driver of quests 
for knowledge. It is only when things are no longer taken for granted – when 
doubts are raised – that people reach out for knowledge, and in the process may 
end up finding new insights.2 Moreover, commitment and conviction are not 
uncommonly the product of an active side-lining of doubt. Examples of this are 
presented by studies of recent converts who fervently proclaim their newfound 
2 | In academia this doubting approach is institutionalized as ‘organized scepticism’, 
a term used by Merton in his discussion of the four norms of scientific communities 
(Merton 1973: 267-280).
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conviction, in part because of their greater need (and momentary ability) to 
suspend lingering doubt (Pelkmans 2013). It thus appears that doubt is a con-
stitutive aspect of commitment and conviction. At the same time, its effects 
depend on how these doubts are acted on: powerful energies are released when 
doubts are dismissed (or side-lined) during a moment of intense wavering. On 
the other hand, when doubts are allowed to linger they tend to have a tempering 
effect or may even prevent any action from materializing.
The emotive energies released by mistrust and suspicion suggest a some-
what different dynamic. Rather than the doubter’s ‘wavering’ that can go in 
either direction, mistrust and suspicion are already negatively predisposed 
towards the object of their engagement. It is because of this that suspicion 
and mistrust are seen as an eroding and disrupting force. Modern institutions 
cannot operate without some level of trust. It is on the basis of this that An-
thony Giddens argues that ‘trust relations are basic to the extended time-space 
distanciation associated with modernity’ (1990: 87), and he rightly suggests 
that without trust, modern societies would grind to a halt. However, we have 
already concluded that generalized or radical mistrust is untenable, and hence 
this correct theoretical statement is unhelpful in a practical sense. Another way 
to put this is to say that in as far as mistrust denotes an active rather than a pas-
sive disposition, mistrust bespeaks a positive engagement with the world. As 
Rosanvallon (2008) has insightfully argued, it is problematic to speak of ‘dis-
enchanted citizens’ precisely because their rejection of mistrusted politicians 
and institutions results in the channelling of energies in alternative directions. 
A useful example of the alternative ways citizens express their political en-
gagement is conspiracy theorizing, not least because it can serve as the basis 
for the creation of alternative political communities. We see this logic play out 
in the current political landscape of North America and Europe, where wide-
spread mistrust of ‘the establishment’ has translated into an explosion of con-
spiracy theorizing that has invigorated numerous populist movements. A good 
example is speculation surrounding the role of the CIA in bringing about (or 
facilitating) the 9/11 attacks. These conspiracy theorising activities crystallized 
in the formation of the ‘9/11 truth movement’, which became a platform for 
voicing concerns about the collusion of power and capital in the higher eche-
lons of American society.3 Although some conspiracy theories are clearly fan-
tastical, many of the less spectacular but more realistic theories on display, 
such as those concerning secret deals between corporate business and politics, 
3 | Regarding the 9/11 conspiracies, see the various contributions to the website of the 
9/11 truth movement (http://www.911truth.org) and the books of David Grif fin (2007; 
2012) about the possible collusions of power and capital in relation to these acts of 
terror.
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can potentially play a positive role in holding authorities accountable (see also 
Pelkmans and Machold 2011). 
While conspiracy theorizing that is informed by distrust of dominant pow-
er can serve as a ‘counter democracy’ (Rosanvallon 2008: 9), when such mis-
trust merges with dominant (and racial) prejudices and stereotypes its effects 
tend to be more nefarious. This kind of conspiracy theorizing has been partic-
ularly prolific in right-wing corners, ranging from the insistence that climate 
change is a hoax to claims that Barack Obama was in cahoots with Jihadists.4 
Irrespective of effect, in all of these instances, mistrust of ‘the establishment’ 
was translated into conspiracy theorizing, a channelling of suspicion that has 
lent a voice to those who found themselves on the margins of political and eco-
nomic processes.
final refleCtions
The concepts of mistrust and doubt allow us to engage analytically with a frac-
tured and unstable world that is constantly changing. With economic forces be-
coming increasingly elusive, extensions of the state increasingly invisible, and 
the sources of news increasingly untraceable, our ‘modes of coping with the 
unfamiliar’ (Luhmann 2000: 102) are changing. For the moment this seems 
to play into the hands of those who are able to mobilize sentiments of mistrust 
and suspicion while promising a return to authentic power. The ‘anti-expert’ 
mood in the UK and the populist movements of the extreme right in Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands are examples of this trend. The rise of Donald 
Trump is particularly interesting (and worrying) in this regard. His election 
victory embodied the elevation of suspicion and mistrust to the highest levels 
of political power. Even before the 2016 elections Trump had become, as one 
commentator aptly put it, ‘conspiracy-theorist-in-chief.’5 His theories of voter 
fraud, his claims about Barrack Obama’s alleged foreign birth and his allega-
tions of secret ties between Clinton and global business, much of which was 
offhandedly tweeted, played a significant role in his ability to mobilize anti-es-
tablishment sentiment. 
Writing in March 2017, two months after Trump assumed the presidency, it 
remains unclear what the ultimate outcome will be. Are we witnessing a move-
4 | For a discussion of these conspiracy theories, see the thoughtful ar ticle in the At-
lantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/06/obama-radical- 
islam/487079/
5 | Tim Murphy, ‘How Donald Trump Became Conspiracy Theorist in Chief’, Mother 
Jones, 4 October 2016, see: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/10/trump- 
infowars-alex-jones-clinton-conspiracy-theories
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ment from anti-establishment sentiment to a form of generalized mistrust and 
doubt, leading to chaos and uncertainty? Or, alternatively, are we seeing a shift 
from a situation in which suspicion and mistrust was projected onto the polit-
ical establishment, to a situation in which suspicion and mistrust becomes a 
tool used by the new establishment to control, subject, and exclude?
A truly disturbing prospect is that in its elevation to the apex of political 
power, mistrust will be redirected outwards by an increasingly self-confident 
political establishment. The first months of the Trump presidency provided 
signs that this might be the case. The travel ban of people from a limited num-
ber of Muslim-majority countries, and the tweets accusing foreign governments 
of hurting American interests suggested that mistrust was increasingly being 
projected outwards. In other words, suspicion and mistrust were increasingly 
used as defence mechanisms to shore up the powers of the establishment, in 
the process intensifying dynamics of gagging, marginalization and exclusion, 
perhaps with even worse still to come. However, this strategy has so far had 
limited effect because of considerable pushback from within various corners of 
American society, resulting for example in the collapse of the travel ban and an 
increasingly defensive White House.
So what are some of the other possibilities? If Trump continues to spout 
unfounded conspiracy theories and express suspicion about the establishment 
that he himself is supposedly leading, then this may well result in the actual 
realization of a ‘post-truth era’, that is, a situation in which ‘truth’ truly be-
comes irrelevant. And there are serious indications that this is the direction 
into which events are headed, at least for now. Faced with significant disgrun-
tlement within the electorate and opposition within state institutions, Trump 
and his associates have increasingly projected their frustrations onto the ‘deep 
state’, that is, voicing the (conspiracy) theory that career government employees 
are colluding to upset and oust the elected government. A government whose 
leaders are themselves deeply suspicious of the establishment that they repre-
sent may well lead to generalized paranoia and as such to the implosion of the 
system. Generalized mistrust prevents cooperation and radical doubt implies 
chaos, thereby fostering confusion and apathy. 
At this point it remains unclear which of the indicated tendencies will pre-
vail. It is possible that the Trump government will overcome its first disap-
pointments and develop into a regime that self-confidently projects its paranoia 
outwardly, with exclusionary and marginalizing effects for those groups that 
do not fit the political, economic, sexual, religious, and racial proclivities of the 
Trump government. It is against the background of this very real possibility 
that the prospect of chaos sounds desirable indeed. After all, the possible de-
scent of the Trump government into a destructive chaos may very well create 
the conditions that allow progressive political movements to capitalize on peo-
ple’s disenchantment. Perhaps they would even be able to focus the disillusion-
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ment and the associated suspicions to address the tremendous convergence of 
political power and capital (such as is evident in the number of billionaires in 
Trump’s cabinet), and thereby to set a first step in the direction of badly needed 
real change. 
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Don’t Trust, Don’t Fear, Don’t Beg
Florian Mühlfried
Mistrust can lead to the desire to turn away from a world one does not trust. 
Even then, mistrust needs be understood as a mode of interaction with the 
world, a mode based on detachment. Practices of detachment – not in the sense 
of the cultivation of distinction for the purpose of gaining social prestige (see 
Bourdieu 1987) but as forms of self-sought isolation – have only recently been 
taken seriously in social anthropology (Candea et al. 2015: 2). The heritage of 
Émile Durkheim, who saw social relations everywhere, was too strong, as was 
the power of the ‘fetish of connectivity’ (Pedersen 2013). If everything within 
the social world is regarded as relational and relations as such are ascribed a 
positive value (Strathern 2014: 4), the attempt to distance oneself from things, 
people or places will be assessed as inherently irrational and potentially de-
structive. This ‘dark side’ of human behaviour remains understudied to this 
day.1 
It is this ‘dark side’, then, that is at the centre of attention in this chapter. My 
focus is on a mode of mistrust oriented towards radical detachment, that is, the 
attempt to distance oneself from the environment as much as possible. Time 
and again, groups of people attempt to distance themselves from the world. The 
Jains in India, for example, renounce the world for religious reasons, and the 
most radical among them seek to detach themselves from the world by means 
of fasting until death (Laidlaw 2015). Other groups are spiritually or politically 
motivated and aim at a maximum of economic, social and cultural self-suffi-
ciency in the form of a commune. As experiments with alternative ways of life 
from the 1968 movement have shown, such life forms in most cases have only 
limited endurance. This reaffirms the assumption of the anthropologist Victor 
1 | Another reason for this gap is the crisis of the concept of culture, which has hit social 
anthropology in the last decades. Through the deconstruction of culture as a superordi-
nate system of reference, the remaining ‘relationships’ as the former constituents of the 
social system have become the primary subject of investigation (see Strathern 2014).
Florian Mühlfr ied180
Turner (1998) that human communities can only remain in a state of liminali-
ty, that is, in extra-sociality, for a limited period of time.
Attempts to cut ties with the ancestral world usually result in a doubling 
of the world. The world ‘out there’ is radically distrusted and demarcated from 
one’s own world, in which trust is placed, for instance in the family or the vil-
lage. Some cultural anthropologists have argued that this division of the world 
– one that is familiar, another that is distrustful – is grounded in collective 
mentalities, for instance, the ‘southern mentality’ of the inhabitants of south-
ern Europe. Edward Banfield (1958) coined the term ‘amoral familiarism’ for 
this alleged mentality, which he attributes to the villages of southern Italy. This 
essentialist model finds its reverberation in the often-read assertion that people 
retreat into their families if they no longer trust the state (e.g., Sedlenieks 2013). 
In addition to social or spatial proximity, such networks of trust (Tilly 2005), 
characterized by a fundamental mistrust of the environment, can be based on 
fictive kinship, such as brotherhoods. Examples of this can be found in reli-
gious sects like the Waldensians, motor clubs like the Hells Angels, or criminal 
associations like the mafia.
In the functioning of these networks of trust, another form of mistrust 
becomes clear, namely, the displacement of trust. But what about the relation 
between one’s own world, characterized by trust (or a desire for it), and the 
distrusted outside world? Several such networks, like the Waldensians, seek to 
attract as little attention as possible and to operate in secret. Other groups, like 
the mafia, regard the outside world as a legitimate victim and go on the prowl 
for loot. Still other groups, mostly messianically motivated, devote themselves 
to fight the outer world and are willing to risk or even sacrifice their lives.
These people are the protagonists of the present chapter, which explores the 
most extreme form of what the sociologist Niklas Luhmann (2014: 1) refers to as 
‘defensive arrangements’ resulting out of mistrust: a complete breach of the ex-
isting relations, the absolute displacement of trust and the defence of one’s own 
world by all means. As a case in point, I will look at young men from the Cau-
casus who have broken with their former lives and joined the self-proclaimed 
Islamic State (IS) to fight in Syria or Iraq.2 Chechen fighters are in especially 
high demand of the IS because of their combat experience acquired during the 
second war against the Russian Federation (1999-2009). They form their own 
2 | Taking this case as a star ting point, I am not interested in speculating on the mo-
tives of young men joining jihadist groups, as such speculations are dif ficult to back em-
pirically and should thus be avoided (Assad 2007). I also do not treat ‘the Jihadists’ as 
a homogeneous group containing individuals primarily motivated by Islamic theology.
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troop contingents and provide military leaders such as Abu Omar al-Shishani 
(the ‘Chechen’, civic name Tarkhan Batirashvili), who died in 2016.3
For male jihadists, an essential element in their detachment from the every-
day world comprises death, in a double sense. In the first sense, this concerns 
a fictitious death that takes place when pledging the oath of allegiance to the 
caliph of the IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. With this oath, the initiate not only 
rhetorically ends his former life, but practically transforms into an undead: no 
longer belonging to the world, but at the same time capable of action. Dogmat-
ically, this is an empowering experience: life can no longer harm him, he no 
longer has anything to fear from the world (the worst has already happened) 
and he does not have to ask anymore, but can simply take.
In the second sense, death becomes very real during the suicide attack. 
Due to the high number of suicide attacks, the troops of the IS gain a military 
clout that is difficult to anticipate and calculate. According to the billionaire 
and philanthropist George Soros, jihadist groups such as IS and al-Qaeda have 
found the Achilles heel of Western societies: the fear of death.4 In fact, the lead-
ership of jihadist groups seems to be aware of the effects of this form of terror 
and aims at capitalising on its members’ defiance of death. This is what the 
al-Qaeda spokesman Abu Dujana al-Afghani told the Western public after the 
bombings of Madrid in the spring of 2004: ‘You love life and we love death.’5 
Death becomes something to be proud of; it is not by accident that many suicid-
al jihadists leave their passports at their crime spot as a kind of business card.6
Jihadists are not the first to proclaim a preference of death over life; Spanish 
fascists fighting the Spanish civil war, for example, were united by the slogan 
‘viva la muerte’ (long live death). This ideological overlap may not be arbitrary 
– it could indicate that the founders of IS did some research on totalitarian 
movements. Apparently, those who have declared their rejection of life are 
more inclined to commit deeds that seem to be beyond any sense of humani-
ty. Caucasian IS recruits may refer to other, regionally popular role models of 
death-seekers cum fighters. One is the figure of the Abrek that emerged when 
3 | In spite of his nom de guerre, Batirashvili did not hail from Chechnya, but from the 
Pankisi Valley in Georgia, mainly inhabited by descendants of the Chechens, the so-
called Kist. They migrated from the Northern Caucasus to northeast Georgia during the 
nineteenth century. Batirashavili did not fight in the Chechen wars, but was an employee 
of the Georgian army from 2007 until 2010. Within this function, he was involved in the 
2008 war between Georgia and the Russian Federation.
4 | See: ht tp://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/ar ticle151343328/Nur-eine-of f 
ene-Gesellschaft-kann-den-IS-besiegen.html
5 | See: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/bekenner-video-ihr-liebt-das-leben- 
wir-lieben-den-tod-a-290529.html
6 | See: http://www.br.de/nachrichten/personaldokumente-is-100.html
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the Russian army subdued the Caucasus during the nineteenth century. An 
Abrek was, in the sense of Eric Hobsbawm (1972), a social bandit who took from 
the powerful but spared the weak, and who not only had no fear of death but 
also longed for it. The figure of the death-defying Abrek allowed for a revalua-
tion of values: the military losses suffered in the Northern Caucasus could be 
transformed into a moral victory if defeat was no longer of concern. This moral 
superiority explains the popularity of the Abrek in the Caucasus even today 
(Gould 2016).
Another role model comprises the so-called thieves-in-law, many of whom 
are from the Caucasus (especially from Georgia). Established in the early Sovi-
et prisons and labour camps, the members of this criminal caste rejected any 
form of cooperation with state institutions and officials, only considering their 
own, strictly regulated code of conduct as binding. Amongst them, too, the 
symbolism of death was widespread, as they took the prison as their home and 
grave at the same time. It is in the wider context of this group, that the motto 
cited in the title of this chapter originated: Don’t Trust, Don’t Fear, Don’t Beg.7 
Also in their case, dependence on the outside world was meant to be resolved 
by means of being detached from it.
Caucasian jihadists must be well aware of these role models. Many Chech-
en children born in deportation were named after famous Abreks, e.g., the 
later President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev after the renowned Abrek Zelimkhan. 
Some later-born ‘Zelimkhans’ are among the contemporary jihadi fighters 
(Ratelle and Souleimanov 2017: 585). During the 1990s, the First Chechen War 
(1994-96) further enhanced the popularity of these iconic figures. The insur-
gent Chechens, claiming full state sovereignty for their country, regarded their 
struggle as continuing resistance to Russian colonisation that started during 
the nineteenth century. This involved occasional reinterpretations of the figure 
of the Abrek. In this vein, the Chechen Interim President, Zelimkhan Yandar-
biyev, claimed in an interview that ‘[e]ven the Abreks (...) fought in the name of 
God.’8 The figure of the Abreks is also cherished by Caucasian thieves-in-law; 
one literary representation of the Georgian Akrek ‘Data Tutashkhia’ by Chabua 
Amirejibi (1985), for example, is a much read book in these circles (Kupatadze 
2010: 73).
7 | Russian: Ne ver’, ne boysya, ne prosi. Sometimes this motto is translated as ‘no 
trust, no fear, ask nothing,’ for example in the title of the documentary by Peter Rippl 
(2012) on Blatnjak [criminal] songs and their per formers. The Russian duo t.A.T.u per-
formed the song ‘Ne ver’, ne boysya, ne prosi’ at the 2003 Eurovision Song Contest, 
finishing third. The expression entered Russian culture through Solzhenitsyn’s book The 
Gulag Archipelago (2007 [1973]).
8 | Documentary ‘The Smell of Paradise’ (Mamon/Pilis 2005, Canada), see: https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=quqF_STyHXc (7:55)
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As for the thieves-in-law, they enjoy great popularity among admirers of 
the jihadist movement in the Caucasus. For example, young Muslims from 
the Pankisi Valley often post on Facebook contributions from the world of the 
blatnoy (a Russian term that can roughly be translated as ‘gangster’) alongside 
posts from the haze of the IS.9 The charisma of thieves-in-law and Abreks thus 
enters the imaginary realm of the jihadists. Discursively, the three types form 
up a fictive genealogy, with the Abrek being the predecessor of the thief-in-
law, and the thief-in-law the predecessor of the jihadist. Thus, as unique as 
the struggle of the Caucasian jihadists is, it is also part of regionally specific 
semantic field. This field is further explored in the conclusion, with the aim to 
understand the premises of radical detachment based on profound mistrust 
towards the outside world in the cases of the jihadists, Abreks, and thieves-in-
law.10
In order to allow for comparability, the following description of the world 
of the Abreks and the thieves-in-law will (1) elaborate the context of origin 
(‘Whence does the mistrust derive?’), (2) describe the group ethos inherent to 
the mode of detachment from the outer world (‘Where does the mistrust lead 
to?’), and (3) outline the kind of relation with the social environment (‘How to 
live with the mistrustful other?’).
aBreks
Context of Origin
The term ‘Abrek’ (Russ. abrek) derives from the Persian ‘avara’ meaning ‘vag-
abond, thief’ and has spread across the Caucasus through Turkic languages 
(Bobrovnikov 2008: 29). Abreks are the Caucasian variant of brigands, i.e., the 
social bandits in the sense of Eric Hobsbawm (1972): involved in theft, but for 
apparently righteous reasons. Behind the ideal of the (male-only) Abreks lies 
the theme of a rebellion against an oppressive order, in this case, against nine-
teenth-century Russian colonialism. Only for lack of an alternative does this 
rebellion take on the form of banditry – at least in the view of the Abrek’s nu-
merous admirers now and then.
Abreks were regarded as loners, even if they occasionally came together 
to form groups or joined anticolonial resistance fighters. What connects them 
9 | However, this does not seem to be a peculiarity of post-Soviet societies, as many 
German jihadists have a criminal past, too.
10 | Suggesting that the discursive representations of Abreks, thieves-in-law and Cau-
casian jihadists overlap and form part of a semantic field in no way means that there is 
something like a coherent and distinct Caucasian culture of violence.
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with the self-image of the later thieves-in-law and the jihadists is the ideal of 
renunciation, a complete withdrawal from the secular world. An individual was 
considered an Abrek when he had moved away from existing social relations, 
was no longer bound by them and did not enter upon new binding relation-
ships. Living outside the existing order, which was considered unjust, he creat-
ed a gap to the structures that did not deserve trust.
In the pre-colonial Caucasus the Abreks were lawless people, residing far 
away from their homeland, which they had left due to a crime. The majority of 
them had committed this crime themselves and had to fear a vendetta or blood 
feud. Some, however, were family members of a victim, having retreated into 
the mountains in order to take revenge. In any case, an Abrek was a person 
without a home. This homelessness was either involuntary (if a criminal was 
cast out by the village community because it feared revenge) or self-chosen (if 
someone had fled or was devoted to taking revenge) (Gould 2007a: 278).
The Abreks’s fame rose only with their transfiguration into resistance fight-
ers against the Russian colonisation of the Caucasus during the nineteenth 
century. Any landowner, who did not wish to lose his privileges with regard 
to status and property, was forced to join the Russian colonial administration. 
He had to accept co-optation, to apply a present-day term. The underprivileged 
population was confronted with taxes, forced recruitment of labour and mili-
tary service as well as with collective, often draconian punishment, whenever a 
member from their own ranks behaved in an insubordinate fashion.
In line with this attack on the existing social order, procedures such as the 
blood feud were declared illegal. Together with the Shari’a (and competing with 
it), the institution of blood feud constituted the most common principle of con-
flict management during this era. Moreover, village communities in the North 
Caucasus were no longer permitted to set up armed federations in order to 
further their interests (Bobrovnikov 2007: 253). These regulations depreciated 
key legal practices and social hierarchies within the region, affecting both the 
poor and the rich inhabitants of the Northern Caucasus.
In addition to various forms of voluntary and involuntary co-operation, 
these conditions of pressure generated passive and open resistance. One form 
of the latter comprised guerrilla warfare. Led by religious leaders such as Imam 
Shamil (1797-1871), armed federations successfully attacked the new masters in 
well-organized ways. In the course of the armed resistance against the Russian 
military invasion, the image of the Abreks acquired a new profile, as they pre-
ferred to target Russian garrisons and Cossack settlements during their raids.
The bandits transmutated into resistance fighters, and their retreat into the 
wilderness was interpreted as an act of resistance. Abreks where now seen as 
those who did not want to submit to the new legal status and, therefore, turned 
their backs on their homes, villages and clans. In the course of this re-evalua-
tion of the Abrek phenomenon, the meaning of the term transformed. By the 
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middle of the nineteenth century, ‘Abrek’ had become a term of respect de-
scribing avengers of the deprived and fighters against colonial rule: ‘The pow-
erful terrorized the peaceful population and the Abreks terrorized the power-
ful’ (Aslanbek Sheripov cited in Gould 2007a: 40).
Ethos
With Imam Shamil’s capture by Russian troops in 1859, the period of open 
military resistance against the Russian colonisation of the Northern Caucasus 
came to an end. In this context, the on-going resistance of the Abreks towards 
the Russian invaders was a lost cause. It was precisely the ‘lost cause’ factor, 
however, that rendered the Abrek braver and more powerful in the eyes of many 
Caucasians. In contemporary poems and narratives, the Abrek were seen to 
yearn for their own death without fear, struggling to the end without any hope 
of victory (Gould 2007a, 2007b, 2014).
In the final battle, which in local legends almost always follows a betray-
al, the Abrek takes on a multitude of opponents and can nevertheless not be 
defeated. In the narrative ‘Abrek Gekha’ by Ahmat Avturinskii, recorded by 
Aslanbek Sheripov in 1916 and translated into English by Rebecca Gould in 
2014 (Gould 2014: 216-19), the hero is hit by a large spray of bullets but still 
keeps on fighting, in classic zombie-like fashion. It is no wonder that, in the 
many narratives of this era, the Russians approached shot Abreks with extreme 
caution, always uncertain of whether the deceased was still alive.
The figure of the undead Abrek allowed for a revaluation of values: the mili-
tary loss in the North Caucasus could become a moral victory if the loss did not 
matter. The Abrek slid out of the sacrificial role and became a saint because he 
had overcome his attachment to the world and his fear of death. This differenti-
ated him from ordinary mortals, and especially from the Russian soldiers, who 
were seen as possessed by the will to control the world and, in the Abrek-stories 
from this era, were always afraid to loose their lives. The Abrek had left his life 
behind while still alive; this self-empowerment with a simultaneous loss of the 
self was considered superior to the power of the Russians.
This elevation of the Abrek was not of his own making. His actions spoke 
for themselves, his silence made him even more powerful. The ethos attributed 
to the Abrek by his fellow Caucasians expressed radical mistrust – a mistrust 
towards any form of mediation, dialogue or contact with the outside world, 
spilling into aversion and a contempt that was also a disdain for death. Anyone 
who still relied on making a living under the new conditions might be able to 
accommodate himself, but could never be a role model. The Abrek, in contrast, 
stood for a fundamental mistrust of the possibility to lead a right life amidst 
wrongs, as well as the consequent contempt for the value of life itself. This was 
clearly an idealisation – the formative stories of the Abrek are not literary works 
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by chance. However, what we find here is a figure of radical mistrust with deep 
cultural roots and positive connotations, effective to the present day.
Relations with the Outside World
Although Abreks broke away from their habitual environment and sought the 
expanse, they could still count on support from local communities. As Rus-
sian archives indicate, Abreks would continue to be received as honorary guests 
(kunak) in Caucasian villages, and enjoy the protection of the host who, in the 
event of betrayal by a neighbour, would retreat into the wilderness together 
with the Abrek (Bobrovnikov 2007: 256). Thus, the separation was a unilateral 
act; the solidarity with the retreating person remained intact, maybe only arose 
(or intensified) through the act of the detachment. An Abrek would never steal 
from the people with whom he was related, he would never attack the villages 
located in his habitat, otherwise his reputation would be ruined.
In contrast, the colonialists from the north were attacked and robbed. In 
addition to civilian travellers, state ambassadors, and mounted military troops, 
Abreks preferred to raid Russian garrisons and Cossack settlements in order 
to seize spoils. The Cossacks were targeted, because they were treated as equal 
to the Russians or regarded as their military spearhead. Ossetian villages were 
also popular objectives, as Ossetians were viewed as henchmen of the Russian 
invaders.
The Abrek reputation as a popular hero and social bandit à la Hobsbawm 
(1972) was not based as much on the fact that he (like Robin Hood) took from 
the rich and gave to the poor, but that he took from the strong and spared the 
weak. This indicates a clear division of the world, and the mythical work of the 
Abrek aimed at keeping both worlds apart. However, there was also a middle 
world, that of the local population, which had been unable to resist the advance 
of the Russian colonists but nevertheless maintained its links with the free-rid-
ers. This middle-world was evidently respected by the Abreks.
tHie ves-in-l aw
With the end of the Tsarist Empire, Abrek-hood also came to an end. Several 
Abreks joined the incoming rulers (aka the Soviets), transforming from being 
undead into supporters of the new order (thus ceasing to be Abreks). Others 
continued to resist, remained in the other world and fought the newly imposed 
order. Their struggle did not last long, however, as they were soon defeated. The 
last surviving Chechen Abrek, Khasukha Magomadov, hid for decades in the 
impassable border zones between Chechnya and Georgia. As one of the very 
few, he had been able to escape the deportation of all Chechens to Central Asia 
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under Stalin in 1944, a deportation ending in the death of tens of thousands. 
At the invitation of his friends, the 71-year-old Magomadov secretly travelled to 
the plains in March 1976 in order to receive medical care. Betrayed to the Soviet 
rulers, he was apprehended and shot dead.
In the early days of the Soviet Union, a new type of honourable bandit 
emerged, who quickly took the Abrek’s place, thus also contributing to the de-
mise of the Abrek. This was the so-called ‘thief-in-law’ (Russ. vor v zakone), a 
character born in Stalin’s forced labour camps.
Context of Origin
To the early Soviet ideologists, crime was justifiable in service of the socialist 
cause, such as in the struggle against feudal or capitalist exploitation, or the ex-
propriation of the exploiters. The prevailing view was that, once the conditions 
for exploitation had ended, i.e., at the dawn of communist society, crime would 
disappear. An Abrek no longer would have any reason to remain an Abrek. 
Those who persisted would be isolated and re-educated.
Accordingly, the first Soviet prison camps were planned as re-education 
camps. In 1929, the writer Maxim Gorky hailed the ‘accomplishments gained 
in “forging human material”’ (Schlögel 2001). From the beginning, this ‘forg-
ing’ was carried out with utmost brutality. Shortly after the October Revolution, 
prisoners were detained en masse in labour camps that Lenin referred to as 
‘concentration camps’ (Applebaum 2003: 47).11 In addition to ‘forging’ a new 
human being, another priority was the economic exploitation of forced labour 
(Khlevniuk 2004: 27).
In the course of the 1920s, the Soviet Union was covered with a network 
of ‘corrective labour camps’ in which, in addition to criminals, political pris-
oners and so-called kulaks (large-scale farmers) were detained. This network 
stretched from the White Sea-Baltic Canal to the Pacific, from the Arctic Ocean 
to Central Asia. In the Kolyma region in the Far East alone, hundreds of camps 
existed in an area of 3.5 million square kilometres, equivalent to one-seventh of 
the USSR’s territory and nine times the current size of Germany (Spray 2014: 
83; Panikarov 2007: 267). This pan-Soviet camp system constituted a parallel 
world, which Solzhenitsyn (2007 [1973]) mapped in detail as the ‘Gulag archi-
pelago’: an isolated world of penal colonies, in which the life of a human being 
was worth nothing. Countless prisoners died of hunger, forced labour and the 
harassment by camp leaders or fellow prisoners, to a large extent unnoticed by 
the outside world (Naimark 2007: 18-20).12
11 | Lenin was the first to use the term ‘concentration camp’ (Hosking 1992: 71).
12 | GULAG is an abbreviation of Glavnoye upravleniye ispravitel’no-trudovykh lagerey 
i koloniy, the ‘Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps and Labour Colonies.’
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The number of inmates sharply increased. In 1928, 300,000 prisoners were 
held captive; during the Great Purge or Great Terror of 1937-38 almost two mil-
lion people were contained in the Gulags. By 1940, approximately eight million 
prisoners had passed through the camp system. The historian Ann Applebaum 
estimates the total number of those imprisoned in the Gulag system between 
1929 and 1953 as 18 million. In addition, over ten million other Soviet citizens 
were employed in forced labour (Applebaum 2003: 615ff).
In the camp hierarchy, inmates condemned for criminal offenses ranked 
above the political prisoners, whom they could dispose of at will, unhindered by 
those in charge of the camp. Solzhenitsyn (2007 [1973]) describes in detail how 
‘criminals’ mistreated the ‘politicals.’ Certain ‘criminals’ connived with the se-
curity guards who used them as an instrument in camp management, such 
as in providing ‘special treatment’ for the so-called ‘58s’: political prisoners 
imprisoned according to paragraph 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code regarding 
counter-revolutionary activity. Another group of criminal inmates, however, re-
fused to enter into any form of cooperation with state officials. This comprised 
the so-called ‘thieves-in-law,’ who lived according to their own rules and only 
acknowledged their own authorities. With their appearance and tattoos, they 
openly expressed their anti-establishment attitude and willingly accepted the 
harsh punishments meted out to those who violated these rules. The thieves-
in-law formed their own universe within the world of the Gulags.
The thieves-in-law and their followers declared the Gulag archipelago to 
be their homeland. Thus the tattoo of a thief-in-law declared: ‘Boss of the zone 
[camp, prison]. Everything for me – nothing from me. Here in the zone I am at 
home’ (Baldaev 2003: 198). Another tattoo reads: ‘I was born in prison, I will 
die in prison’ (Plutser-Sarnov 2006: 45). In the realm of the camps, their code 
of conduct prohibited any cooperation with state organs. Anyone cooperating 
with camp officials or the police was brandished a bitch (Russ. suka). However, 
not all Gulag prisoners convicted of criminal offenses were prepared to submit 
to the canon of the thieves. Time and again, attempts were made to break the 
power of the thieves-in-law. Opposition to the thieves-in-law was supported by 
the camp officials, who simultaneously attempted to exploit thieves-in-law for 
the harassment of political prisoners (Shalikashvili 2009: 15ff).
When the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany in 1941, Stalin also re-
cruited prisoners for the Great Patriotic War, which offered the Soviet war ma-
chine a considerable reserve comprising of an estimated 2.3 million (ibid. 12). 
In return for military service, they were promised a reduction of their sentence 
or even release from prison. For thieves-in-law, this was an unacceptable offer, 
as all cooperation with the state and participation in life was considered a sin. 
However, together with other criminals, some rebellious thieves-in-law accept-
ed this offer.
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In the course of the war, no small number of the ex-gulag prisoners was 
detained inside German war prisons. After the defeat of the Third Reich, they 
returned to the Soviet Union where they were imprisoned again – on the basis 
of not having resisted the enemy until the bitter end.13 Thus, after the war, the 
thieves-in-law and those outside the law met each other in the Soviet camps. 
The Gulag archipelago became the site of bitter conflicts between both groups, 
which was fought out with a hitherto unknown brutality. It ended in 1953 with 
the defeat of the thieves-in-law. 
The state organs regarded this confrontation, referred to as the Bitch War, 
as an opportunity to break the dominance of the thieves-in-law and supported 
their opponents (the criminals or bitches, suki) with arms. The defeat of the 
thieves-in-law was so thorough that they ceased to exist as a criminal caste 
(Varese 1998). However, in the post-war Soviet Union, the reputation of the 
thieves-in-law was revitalized by resourceful brokers in violence and applied in 
order to sell protection – quite similar to the Italian mafia in its early days. Cau-
casians, especially from Georgia, were found at the forefront of this process of 
reinventing the thieves-in-law. Meanwhile, the thieves-in-law (nowadays often 
referred to as the ‘Russian mafia’), are active on a transnational level, even if 
they no longer have much in common with the thieves-in-law from the Gulag 
labour camps.
Ethos
‘Thieves-in-law’ is the literal translation of the Russian vory v zakone. The law 
to whom the thieves confess is not the state law, but a distinct code of the crim-
inals. This law is exclusively handed down verbally and has changed over time. 
The Georgian criminologist Moris Shalikashvili (2009: 35-43) introduces six 
versions of this law, forwarded by various authors at different times. However, 
certain principles appear in all variants and identify norms and taboos.14 
A taboo rests on each form of cooperation with the state, social commit-
ment, work, family, wealth and sedentary existence. The principle of the prohi-
bition to work with state institutions and state officials begins with the precept 
of silence, i.e., the principle of refusing to provide any information to outsiders. 
However, it is likewise forbidden to deny you belong to the world of thieves. In 
labour camps and prisons, this taboo rests on cooperating with the camp or 
13 | This concerned not only the former prisoners captured in Germany, but all Soviet 
soldiers who had fallen into the hands of the Germans, who were accused of treason.
14 | The following account is based on: Varese (1998), Slade (2013), Shalikashvili 
(2009), Humphrey (1999), Kupatadze (2010), Oleinik (2003), Lobjanidze and Ghlont’i 
(2004), Nordin and Glonti (2006) and Stephenson (2015).
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prison officials. It is particularly despicable to take up a gun in the name of the 
state – as a soldier, a militia officer or a policeman.
A thief-in-law does not regard himself as a political dissident, who rejects 
injustice for the sake of society. Similar to the world of the camp, the world of ci-
vilians is seen as foreign and thus as a legitimate target of raids. A thief should 
not join a federation, party, or organisation except that of his own. In addition, 
it is forbidden under all circumstances for a thief to do regular work. He has to 
exclusively earn a livelihood by means of criminal activities. Labour is equated 
with enslavement, whereas a thief-in-law regards himself as free.15
Similarly, a thief-in-law may not be married. If he takes on a sexual relation-
ship with a woman, he has to share her with his thief colleagues. A thief has 
to dissolve his commitments to his biological family; after entering the world 
of thieves he no longer holds obligations towards them. Nevertheless, there are 
indications that the glorification of one’s own mother is part of the code of hon-
our, especially for Caucasian thieves-in-law (Nordin and Glonti 2006: 64). It is 
important to note, however, that the term ‘mother’ underwent a revaluation: by 
tattooing her portrait on the body of a thief-in-law, he proved his unconditional 
fidelity to the family of thieves. ‘I will never forget my mother’ as a tattoo is 
supposed to indicate his unbreakable solidarity with the world of thieves (Gurov 
cited in Varese 1998: 519).
A thief-in-law must reject material wealth; anything beyond the strictly nec-
essary personal needs is to be deposited into the treasury of the thieves (Russ. 
obchshak) and thereby collectivized. Finally, at least during the first decades of 
the Soviet Union, a thief-in-law was forbidden to officially register himself, that 
is, to obtain the actually required confirmation of registration (Russ. propiska). 
Just like an Abrek, he should be homeless.
Overall, these taboos present the ideal of renunciation and of detaching 
oneself from the outside world. This detachment has to be complete and is 
propagated as a detachment from the world as a whole. By the assumption of 
the prison or the camp as ‘home’ and ‘grave,’ attested by numerous tattoos 
and sayings handed down (Plutser-Sarnov 2003: 39, 2006: 45), the thief-in-
law seeks to turn from a living being to an undead. Through this revaluation 
of values, the former life suddenly comes to a standstill.16 Not only that social 
obligations have lost their validity, it is now also completely irrelevant who you 
15 | In this context, it is sometimes pointed out that the Russian verb ‘to work’ (rabo-
tat’) is etymologically related to the noun for slave (rab).
16 | Even some prisoners who did not belong to the world of thieves had the experience 
of complete, boundless freedom in labour camps, such as the author Edward Limonov. 
His biographer Emmanuel Carrère (2012: 399) stated: ‘Possibly the camp is hell, but 
solely through the power of his mind has he been able to make it a paradise.’
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were and what you had done before.17 Initiation into the world of thieves is pow-
erful enough to completely annihilate one’s old life – just as initiations in very 
different contexts end the days of youth (van Gennep 1986 [1909], Turner 2005 
[1969]). Whoever cares for life tries to avoid the world of thieves – also because 
the weak are tormented relentlessly. ‘I wanted to live,’ a young criminal in the 
documentary ‘The Marc of Cain’ gave as a reason for becoming a ‘goat’, i.e., to 
cooperate with the camp officials.18
In addition to these taboos on behaviour, there are further ascetic ideals, 
formulated in the form of behavioural norms, which can be summarized as 
follows. Self-control is a prerequisite for the control of others. In order to test 
the self-restraint of a thief, he can be exposed to extreme situations in which it 
is difficult to maintain one’s command – for example, in an alcohol or drug-fu-
elled frenzy. A very strong concentration of tea (Russ. chifir) is used for these 
kinds of intoxicating rituals in prison. In addition to controlling his body, a 
thief-in-law should control his language, leaving excessive cursing to his stoog-
es.
In addition, mastery of the thieves’ cant is one of the requirements for a 
thief-in-law. Rudimentary, a special variant of this secret language of criminals 
(fenya) has existed in Russia from the sixteenth century on. It differs so strong-
ly from Russian that it can almost be called a language of its own. Its vocabu-
lary is estimated to comprise between 10,000 and 27,000 words (Shalikashvili 
2009: 73). This secret language allows the thieves to conceal the true meaning 
of their internal communications.
Moreover, a thief-in-law has to master the game of cards. Playing cards is 
the most popular leisure activity in Soviet prisons. Through high stakes (in the 
extreme case, one’s own body parts), a thief-in-law proves courage and careless-
ness. He proves that he does not care about anything, not even the integrity 
of his own body. Game debts must be settled at all costs. Luck in the game is 
considered a good omen. The colour system of the playing cards also serves 
to classify the world: black is the colour of the thieves, red is the colour of the 
others. Accordingly, prisons were divided into red (state-controlled) and black 
(controlled by the thieves-in-law). A thief-in-law should never wear red clothes 
(Danzig Baldayev cited in Shalikashvili 2009: 40).
A thief-in-law is obliged to recruit new thieves. Soviet prisons and labour 
camps provided an especially suitable environment for recruiting young 
thieves. An established thief-in-law was expected to charm other prisoners 
17 | This may also be a motive for some jihadists, whose life before joining the jihad had 
been stained by crimes, drugs and violence, which completely looses relevancy after 
their complete surrender to the sacred struggle (according to dogma).
18 | The Marc of Cain’, documentary by Alix Lambert (2001); see: https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=DJCAPlnjEkc (28:30)
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and thus to enlist prospective applicants by playing on their mistrust towards 
‘the authorities’ and publicising an alternative law hand tailored to the mor-
al reasoning of criminals, or by emanating a romantic view of the criminal 
life by spreading stories or songs from the criminal underground.19 As many 
prisoners were illiterate, storytelling and singing was a valued commodity in 
the camps. Once this courtship had been successful, the applicant became a 
candidate and was ordered to carry out petty crimes or cover up someone else’s 
criminal offense. After a probationary period, the candidate could be raised to 
the rank of a thief-in-law. This change in status was carried out by means of an 
initiation, the so-called baptism.
In the world of thieves everybody had to stand by the other at all times. If 
the outside world could and should be deceived, the commandment of honesty 
and sincerity applied within the community. A demand for moderation in the 
exercise of violence was to be observed in contacts with the outside world. Even 
if violence was part of the daily practice of the thieves-in-law, indeed the basis 
of their activities, the excessive use of force was considered bad form. For this 
reason, certain thieves renounced firearms (or at least their utilisation) during 
raids. Of other thieves it was said they took heart medicines with them in order 
to be able to provide first aid if the victim suffered a cardiac arrest (Paul Erich 
Roth cited in Shalikashvili 2009: 29).20
Apart from the ideal of asceticism, expressed in the taboos, other reli-
gious-sectarian ideals become evident in the behavioural norms: self-control, 
moderation, and fraternity. In addition, there is the linguistic detachment from 
the outside world, the imperative of the secrecy of the rites, and the missionary 
dissemination of belief – traits of religious sects, too. These religious remi-
niscences are not accidental but fed by the detachment from an outside world 
regarded and experienced as genuinely unjust. The rejection of the profane 
world as unjust creates a link to the suffering of the crucified Christ. In this 
context, it is significant that the thieves-in-law hand down a legend, in which 
a thief stole a nail falling to the ground during the crucifixion of Jesus, which 
was thus deprived of its use. Observing this deed, Jesus blessed the thief (after 
Di Puppo and Dugladze 2004). Here the themes of ‘thief’ and ‘believer’ coin-
cide. Viewed from an emic perspective, the code of the thieves-in-law is thus a 
deeply moral one.
19 | On thieves’ songs, see Hufen (2010).
20 | This did not stop thieves-in-law, however, from maltreating women or inferior 
prisoners.
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Relations with the Outside World
Connected by the unconditional submission to their code of conduct, and fol-
lowing the model of a religious sect, the thieves-in-law represent a powerful 
elite of criminals to the outside world, and an egalitarian community to their 
inner world. Among the thieves-in-law, decisions are always made in consen-
sus during meetings called skhodkas. As in the case of the early Christians, 
national affiliation does not play a decisive role for the thieves-in-law: their code 
transcends not only the family but also ethnic origins. All thieves-in-law had 
to be regarded as equal and must treat each other as equal. This is the differ-
ence between the thieves-in-law and the regionally bound Abreks or ethnically 
defined mafia groups such as the Chechen mafia, the Cosa Nostra in Sicily, or 
the Yakuza in Japan, where ethno-national affiliation is a major criterion for 
recruitment. Thieves-in-law are always men. Women can feel committed to the 
ideals of the world of thieves, but may never be ordained.
If the world of the thieves-in-law is egalitarian in itself, the system into 
which their world is integrated is hierarchical. In carrying out assignments up 
to assassinations, the thieves-in-law resort to henchmen, the so-called shestyor-
ki (Russ.; Georg. k’ai bichebi), as they themselves do not dirty their hands. War-
dens (Russ. smotryashchie; Georg. makureblebi), manage the economic resourc-
es and represent the interests and rules of the thieves-in-law.21 People below 
these ranks and thus outside the ‘law’ may be robbed and abused at will. At the 
lower end of the prison hierarchy are the humiliated (Russ. petukhi, chicken), 
who are subjected to the thieves-in-law and their helpers without no protection 
at all; petukhi are not worthy of being looked at, and are in no case to be touched. 
Talking to these people could cause a thief-in-law to jeopardize his status. Cer-
tain petukhi were cut in the face with knives, tattooed with swastikas or words 
such as ‘whore’, ‘chicken’, ‘rat’, ‘gay’, ‘Balt’, ‘blabbermouth’, ‘Little Jew’, ‘beast of 
burden’, ‘animal’, ‘scum’, ‘dick’, ‘demon’, ‘camel’ or ‘devil’ (Baldaev 2006: 273).
The world of those who live ‘in law’ is thus clearly separated from the exter-
nal world, which is considered lawless, even if it has the federal law on its side. 
In the thieves’ philosophy, inhabitants of the outside world not only lack the 
‘real’ law, but are seen a different species, devoid of the right to be considered 
human in the way only the vory are (Stephenson 2015: 183). The community 
of the thieves-in-law is separate, exclusive, detached. According to the British 
social anthropologist Caroline Humphrey (1999: 204) it must be regarded as a 
distinct culture, not as a network.
The thieves’ world (Russ. vorovskoy mir; Georg. kurduli samqaro) is attested 
with attributes of purity by their members, whereas the outside world is con-
21 | For fur ther information on the hierarchy of thieves in prisons and the outside world, 
see Shalikashvili 2009: 47-63. 
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sidered ‘dirty.’ Accordingly, servants of the outside world, such as policemen 
or prison guards, are called ‘rubbish’ (Russ. musor). It is significant, however, 
that Stalin also designated his opponents as dirt, which had to be disposed of 
(Applebaum 2003: 35). The semantic reference system is identical, only the as-
signment varies. This also holds true for the oath sworn by the thieves-in-law, 
which, according to Kupatadze (2010: 58) started with a phrase similar to the 
oath sworn by a member of the Communist party. As in many other cases, the 
detachment of one’s own collective identity takes place on the basis of concepts 
with which the other group distinguishes itself, too. Ideas of purity play an im-
portant role here: each group considers itself as pure and ascribes impurity to 
the other group (Douglas 1985). Friend and foe, world and counter-world, have 
more in common than is dear to them.
ConClusion
What similarities and differences can be traced in the contexts of origin, world 
views, and relations to the outside world of the Abreks, thieves-in-law, and Cau-
casian jihadists? What do these similarities and differences tell us about the 
specific forms of turning away from a world into which one was born but in 
which one has lost any kind of trust? What are the premises and restraints of 
radical detachment?
Both Abreks and thieves-in-law as well as jihadists have emerged in the 
context of radical social and political upheavals. In addition to new winners, 
these upheavals have produced countless losers. In the case of the Abreks, the 
Russian colonialism of the nineteenth century destroyed the existing social 
order, assassinating, expelling or subduing the inhabitants of the Caucasus. 
The thieves-in-law were products of Stalinism and its brutal camp system. The 
old oppressive tsarist order disappeared and a new, even more oppressive order 
prevailed. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the thief-in-law replaced the 
figure of the Abrek as a model of ‘criminal justice.’ New eras brought with them 
new heroes of resistance. The Caucasian jihadists, in turn, emerged from the 
chaos resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union – a chaos characterized 
by civil war, mass poverty, political repression and corruption. In any case, the 
legitimacy of the post-Soviet political order left much to be desired for a large 
part of the Caucasian population, and anyone who raised a weapon against this 
order could become a hero.
In this sense, Abreks stood for the individualistic ethos of breaking with 
the world and retreating into the wilderness. The Abrek was a loner, not a so-
cial human being, with his own ideas of right and wrong. His mythical power 
dwelt on a contempt for death, which led to a moral superiority over the Russian 
aggressors, who were held to hang on to life. The thieves-in-law, in contrast, fol-
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lowed a collectivist ethos. The law of their caste gave meaning to their lives and 
differentiated them from the outside world. This distinguishes the thieves-in-
law (social men) from the Abreks (loners). By accepting the ‘grave’ of the prison 
as their home, the thieves-in-law transformed into undead, too; the world could 
no longer harm them.
With their oath of allegiance, the jihadists also become undead. From then 
on, dogma prescribes: others love life and we embrace death. This transforma-
tion to an undead is undertaken in the service of a doctrine of salvation, howev-
er, according to which this transformation contributes to victory. The jihadists 
thus also differ from the Abreks: if the latter invest in the loss, the failure, the 
downfall, the former invest in the victory, or at least the rise of Islam. The 
Abreks are on their own, the iihadists are part of a movement from which they 
draw their strength. What they both share is a radical break with prevailing 
norms and a conscious detachment from the outside world. 
Breaking with the norms of the ‘living’, Abreks, thieves-in-law and jihadists 
enter into a space of liminality, where the old rules do not count and where new 
alliances are forged (Turner 1998). Experiencing liminality usually evokes feel-
ings of euphoria; it also provokes a mindset that is best used for indoctrination 
(the ritual making of a new person). States of liminality are very fragile, how-
ever, and cannot usually be maintained for long. In the ritual process, they end 
with the reintegration of the initiate into society. In case reintegration is ruled 
out (for personal or dogmatic reasons), the unmaintainable state of liminality 
can only be terminated by death. No surprise, then, that the Abrek claims to 
seek death, the thief-in-law considers death the restoration of his natural state, 
and the jihadist loves death more than life. It almost seems as if radical mis-
trust triggering rigorous detachment fulfils itself in death (see Laidlaw 2015).
The relationship between the Abreks, thieves-in-law, and jihadists and the 
outside world is antagonistic. They all shift their trust from the outside world to 
their own world and strive for a hermetic demarcation. As in the case of trust, 
mistrust here leads to a reduction of complexity (see Luhmann 2014). The out-
side world is clearly bad, no ifs, no buts, one has no time to waste on details, the 
main concern is to avoid being dragged into it. The ‘defensive measure’ result-
ing out of mistrust (Luhmann 2014: 2) that we are confronted with here leads 
to a blatant simplification of the world, as well as to a noticeable simplification 
of the ways one can deal with it.
However, there are specifics. Although the Abrek also turns away from 
his relatives and neighbours, he remains closely related to them, and can fall 
back on them in order to hide from his pursuers. Only the external world, not 
linked to him by means of kinship or spatial proximity, comes with antagonis-
tic connotations and may be raided. The code of the thief-in-law, in contrast, 
prescribes the termination of all existing social relations. The world ‘out there’ 
can – and should – be robbed, but not destroyed. Whoever represents the world 
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‘out there’ is referred to as rubbish (musor). A similar dualism was employed by 
members of the state authorities such as Stalin when referring to thieves. This 
mutually constitutive process is based on structural similarities and a shared 
recourse to notions of purity.22 The (male Caucasian) jihadist not only breaks 
off contact with his environment and shifts his trust exclusively to his world 
of salvation. For him, the outside world may not only be robbed, it has to be 
destroyed. He seeks to bring the world to an end, and himself with it.
In the discursive elevation, not only jihadists, but also Abreks and thieves-
in-law are undead. They have left the realm of the living while still alive. They 
have abandoned their families and households, abjured the laws valid for every-
body else. Henceforth they no longer are accountable to the world. Death is 
always with them, has become a part of them. It is this charisma that makes ji-
hadists, Abreks and thieves-in-law appear so powerful. The accompanying atti-
tude towards the outside-world is well captured by a slogan handed down from 
the world of the Gulags which became a dogma for prisoners ‘in the law’ and 
is cited in the title of this chapter: ‘Don’t Trust, Don’t Fear, Don’t Beg.’ ‘Don’t 
Trust’ here means detaching oneself from one’s environment, ‘Don’t Fear’ in-
dicates emotional disentanglement, and ‘Don’t Beg’ relates to the re-evaluation 
of values: a free man rises from the status of a degraded petitioner by turning 
to the tools of mistrust and fearlessness. Mistrust, here, is seen as an emanci-
pating power.
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Suspicion and Mistrust in Neighbour Relations 
A Legacy of the Soviet Mentality?
Ilya Utekhin
In Russia, according to data from 2014,1 excluding actual police officers, 1.4 
million people were employed as security officers, among whom one third were 
contracted by the state, while the rest were employed privately as guards and 
watchmen. If we add their managers, accountants and other people who work 
in private security firms, this number comes to around three million. At the 
same time, the number of people employed in police is around 1 million, which 
puts Russia rather high in the rating of countries according to the ratio of po-
licemen to population. As of 2014, there were 634 policemen for each 100,000 
of population, more than twice the ratio in Germany. Private guards and watch-
men mostly sit all day in shops and offices with little to engage them during 
this work. In Russia they are omnipresent; they can be found in almost every 
shop, school, or institution (not only those institutions which are run by the 
state, but private businesses, too). 
The demand for these security services can partly be explained by the se-
rious crime situation in the country and inefficient work of the police. For ex-
ample, the number of murders in Russia is one of the highest in the world 
(in 2010, it was 14.9 for 100,000 people in comparison to 0.86 in Germany).2 
Business and the population buy the services of security to protect themselves. 
However, this is not the whole story. These days, most institutions with free 
1 | Olesia Gerasimenko, Vyacheslav Kozlov. ‘U okhrannikov sotsial’nyy status chut’ 
nizhe uborshchitsy’. Pochemu v Rossii tak mnogo okhrannikov, kons’yerzhey, storozhey 
i kontrolerov [‘The Status of Security Staff is Lower Than Cleaners’: Why are there so 
many security, concierge, watchmen and check-takers in Russia?] See: http://kommer 
sant.ru/doc/2543130 
2 | Data quoted in Report published by EUSP Institute for the Rule of Law, published in 
September 2010 Reformirovaniye upravleniya vnevedomstvennoy okhrany v kontekste 
razvitiya rynka okhrannykh uslug [The Restructuring of the Commercial security depart-
ment of the Russian Interior Ministry in the context of private security market evolution].
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public access – such as clinics or big libraries – have a guard at the entrance, 
just in case. In the USSR, many of state institutions had free entrance and no 
guards. This is not to say that cities became more dangerous since the Soviet 
time. Street delinquency rose considerably in the 1990s, but has since then 
dropped. Neither is it possible to explain this with reference to the danger of 
terrorist attacks.
When I was a student during Perestroika years, entrance to the university 
building in Leningrad was not protected. Some years ago, however, the admin-
istration of St. Petersburg State University decided to restrict access to universi-
ty buildings. When the new regime of access was introduced, long waiting lines 
appeared in the morning as the guards checked the passes produced by the 
students and professors. The guards (women guards, in this particular case, al-
though this is usually regarded as a male profession in Russia) knew, of course, 
all the professors as they had been working there for many years. For many of 
the professors, some of whom were the classic absent-minded type, it was not 
easy to keep their pass on their person. Moreover, many could not understand 
why they should have to produce this pass to security staff that knew them 
personally. Often acquaintance was enough and Gemeinschaft-logic did work, 
but sometimes for some mysterious reasons the guards referred to formal rules 
and resorted to law enforcement procedures done in terms typical for Russia’s 
unfriendly service personnel who enjoy exercising authority wherever possible. 
I once left my pass in another jacket and at the entrance to Philology Depart-
ment found that instead of the head security guard that I would usually greet, 
there was another woman on duty who also knew me well. She greeted me and 
asked to produce the pass. I told her that to my distress I had forgotten it, and 
asked her whether she recognized me. Despite this recognition, her reply was: 
‘Yes, but what if they already have fired you and you have no right to come here 
anymore?’ 
This episode might have more to do with the fear of losing one’s job for 
appearing lenient than with the detection of masked enemies. On the level of 
rhetoric and argumentation, however, the guard’s answer is curiously reminis-
cent of an old movie from the mid-1930s, when Stalin started to actively con-
solidate his power by means of show trials. Revealing the ‘true face’ of covert 
enemies was a point of concern for zealous Soviet activists who traced enemies 
in the form of spies, ‘former people’ (those from disenfranchised classes), and 
all kinds of foreign elements. These alleged ‘enemies’ were being revealed in 
real life and judged in show trials, but also abounded on the movie screen in the 
films of all genres. The movie I am referring to here was specifically promot-
ed by Stalin, who overruled the initial rejection of the film by the censorship 
committee. This is ‘The Party Card’ by Ivan Pyr’ev (1936). The protagonist of 
the film is a treacherous enemy who is married to an honest, Soviet-minded 
woman. Although Pavel and Anna look like a model Soviet family, Pavel’s true 
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identity is uncertain. At some point he is forced to confess to Anna that he is a 
son of a ‘kulak’, former rich peasant and thus a ‘class enemy’. Later on in the 
film, Pavel steals his wife’s party card, so that some other woman spy might use 
it as a pass to gain access to secure Soviet institutions. However, the woman is 
arrested and Anna, who did not notice that her party card was missing for five 
days, is expelled from the Party for negligence (for a close reading of the film, 
see Kaganovsky 2005). 
The elderly guard at the entrance of Philology Department used the same 
logic of mistrust and suspicion exemplified by the plot of ‘The Party Card’. 
While it seemed outlandish for her to suspect me of being a masked enemy, 
this was a very convenient way for her to account for her actions. Even if this 
behaviour itself seemed strange to me, it was consistent with the logic of suspi-
cion that has its roots in Soviet mentality. After all, the Party called on citizens 
not to relax their vigilance, as enemies were always close enough and had to be 
unveiled and the threat neutralized. Contemporary Russian legislation on so 
called ‘foreign agents’3 directed against NGOs is within the same line of mobi-
lization of Party line followers against all independent civil initiative.
Over the last twenty years, several studies have appeared dedicated to Soviet 
subjectivity that also touched upon the forms of systematic mistrust and suspi-
cion that were practiced in the Soviet society, with purges, imposture, denunci-
ations, public self-criticism and confession among them. As Sheila Fitzpatrick 
says in her study of individual identity practices in successful revolutions, they, 
first, ‘invalidate the conventions of self-presentation and social interaction that 
obtained in pre-revolutionary society’, and force people ‘to reinvent themselves, 
to create or find within themselves personae that fit the new post-revolutionary 
society’ (Fitzpatrick 2005: 3). The title of her book – ‘Tear off the Masks!’ – 
quotes a prominent Bolshevist slogan that was frequently heard during some 
periods of Soviet history, particularly, those when purges took place, when the 
hunt for double-dealers, spies and other masked enemies of the Soviet system 
who were trying to hide their true identity, was especially active. At the same 
time, self-identification and also self-understanding with reference to accepted 
categories of social being involved concealment and editing, that is, selection 
and rearrangement of the elements of personal life-story and the stories of the 
relatives, the origin or class identity, and of a public face. All of this was to 
be reflected in numerous forms (anketa) and narrative curriculum vitae (av-
tobiografiya). To construct a suitable mask became a second nature to Soviet 
citizens, as did the counter-practices of unmasking and denunciation (ibid: 5). 
3 | The bill ‘On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding 
the Regulation of the Activities of Non-profit Organisations Performing the Functions of 
a Foreign Agent’ was adopted by Russian legislators and signed by President Vladimir 
Putin on July 20, 2012.
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After the collapse of the USSR, there was no need for citizens to even symbol-
ically adhere to state ideology, but the rise of state-sponsored patriotism and 
anti-Western rhetoric in Russian propaganda starting from 2010s has exploited 
discursive constructions that recognizably appeal to the stereotypic image of 
the masked enemy. 
On another occasion, in the largest lecture hall of the Philology Depart-
ment I saw something that immediately attracted my attention: four small pad-
locks, attached to both sides of a piano. Obviously, the purpose of those who 
performed the uneasy task of attaching lugs and padlocks to the piano was to 
prevent students from playing it except when sanctioned by some authority 
possessing keys. After my lecture, on my way back, I asked the head security 
guard about the piano. She told me that if I liked I could play anything I wanted, 
because the padlocks did not actually work even though they looked impressive. 
The lock’s fixture broke immediately and the padlocks remained in their places 
even though they could no longer be secured.
I soon recalled the padlocks I often met during my fieldwork in so-called 
communal apartments (CA) in St. Petersburg during the 1990s and early 
2000s. Everyday life in CAs, where dwellers share kitchen, toilet and wash-
room with a number of other tenants, reveals that the practices of everyday life 
in CAs are indicative of a variety of behaviours and attitudes typical for Sovi-
et society (Utekhin 2004; Utekhin et al. 2006). Envy, mistrust and suspicion 
toward neighbours that could be observed in CAs in the USSR – and can still 
be observed in contemporary Russia. This can be accounted for in terms of 
their functions, in such a paternalistic Soviet ‘culture of poverty’, goods and re-
sources (and, particularly, housing) were in shortage, and housing was neither 
owned by the residents nor chosen by them to rent, but rather distributed by a 
housing authority. Hence the term communal that has to do with commune as 
administrative unit, not with commune as a voluntary assembly of like-minded 
people for working and/or living together. In the Soviet kommunalka, all kinds 
of people belonging to a variety of ages, social, ethnic, religious and profes-
sional backgrounds, found themselves forcibly accommodated in cramped and 
compressed quarters, where living space is allocated according to per capita 
sanitary norm and a system of privileges. 
It is most telling that tenants were always concerned about the fairness 
of distribution, their mentality being dominated by the logic similar to what 
George Foster once described as the ‘Image of Limited Good’ (Foster 1965, 
1972), a conceptualization of social relations explaining integration in a com-
munity permeated with envy. Studying a Mexican village, Foster was struck by 
the abundance of fences and by the fact that windows had thick wooden shut-
ters shut close by heavy bolts, so to protect the home interiors from view (Foster 
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1948).4 Based on his prolonged fieldwork, he built a theory explaining cultural 
forms of envy. Within the worldview of those Mexican peasants, when a person 
or a family appeared to possess greater means of subsistence, prestige, love, 
beauty, power, or influence than the average, that used to cause all the others 
to feel that they were suffering from a scarcity of those means. This is as if all 
the good things in the world were allocated in certain limited amounts for that 
village community, not being enough to satisfy everyone. 
In CAs, in a similar way, not only the allocation of housing, but almost ev-
ery aspect of neighbours’ lives in CAs might provoke envy or hurt the feeling 
of justice, due to the high sensibility towards a fair sharing of resources and 
equally dividing the costs invested into the minimally sufficient maintenance 
and cleaning of the premises. This means that everyone’s share is the matter 
of everyone’s concern. In the conditions of transparent environment where one 
cannot build high walls to protect oneself from view and where the life takes 
place under the watchful eye of neighbours, who see, hear, and even smell what 
all the other tenants do or have, the lack of resources for privacy leads to an over-
sensitivity to violations of privacy and its symbolic substitutes. This situation 
is eloquently described by Mikhail Zoshchenko in his short story ‘A Summer 
Breather’.5 In the story, electric power is disconnected in an apartment because 
everyone refused to pay, as one meter for nine families makes it impossible to 
accurately determine each family’s share of the expenditure, a fact that turns 
out to be unacceptable because people mistrust their neighbours.
Actually, many tenants easily transcend the border between overhearing 
and eavesdropping: even though a certain degree of awareness about neigh-
bours’ activities and belongings is unavoidable in CAs, it is also a common 
practice to deliberately monitor neighbours’ life. Among the reasons for such 
monitoring is a continuous concern about one’s belongings in the public space. 
Neighbours keep their salt in the kitchen, soap in the washroom, toilet paper in 
the rest room, and they are anxious about the possibility that other people can 
use their unattended resources or belongings. The point of concern, however, 
is not the material value only, but a symbolic dimension, too: pilferage is also a 
violation of privacy, which has its rather particular configuration in the partly 
transparent everyday world of CA.6 
4 | One might recall the surprising abundance of high non-transparent fences in Mos-
cow downtown areas, to protect mansions and gated communities from the gazes of 
passersby.
5 | The English translation of the story is available in the section From Books of the Vir-
tual Museum of Soviet Life (Utekhin et al. 2006). Andrei Siniavsky discusses the story 
in his book on Soviet civilization (Siniavsky 1990, 165-169).
6 | See for details materials published in the vir tual museum of communal living 
(Utekhin et al. 2006).
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Padlocks are omnipresent in CA public spaces because tenants suspect 
their neighbours of stealing and pilferage, and believe that in their absence 
neighbours are inspecting their property left unattended, including the content 
of refrigerators in the common kitchen. Why is it so hard for people to agree 
over sharing resources in this kitchen? One of the possible explanations has 
to do with so called paranoid disorders whose delirious content is linked to 
neighbours’ relations. This was a most impressive discovery for me, although 
not for Russian psychiatrists who had studied it extensively before my ethnog-
raphy of the kommunalka. The phenomenon of paranoid disorders concerns a 
specific bunch of symptoms sometimes observed in elderly people with a long 
experience of CA life. People accuse neighbours of systematically stealing and 
damaging their belongings, of persecuting them in order to inflict all kinds of 
material and moral damage. They denounce their neighbours before authori-
ties and take all sorts of counter-measures. At the same time, intellectual abil-
ities and memory, as well as general competence in everyday affairs remains 
unaffected – a strange mixture that makes the allegations appear all the more 
plausible to a stranger who hears them for the first time.
These behaviours are given shape by everyday life in CAs, and they appear 
perfectly logical and sensible because they reproduce the normal reactions to 
offences – the only difference being that here the offences are imaginary. They 
could have been real, however. Misapprehension leads to communicative dis-
order that disrupts normal communication with neighbours and substitutes it 
with misplaced patterns based on mistrust and suspicion. It is worth noting 
that some elderly people who are affected with similar disease but live in private 
apartments often accuse CIA or KGB or extra-terrestrials of stealing things or 
controlling their ideas.7
Living together in close contact with people whom one mistrusts is tricky: 
neighbours cannot escape communication even when they are seeking to avoid 
communication. Involvement in communal neighbours’ relations and mutu-
ality of concerns creates a system of relations where victims and perpetrators 
depend upon each other. People affected with paranoid disorders exchange 
roles with alleged perpetrators: in this case, subjects start to steal and damage 
things that belong to their supposed offenders, in order to retaliate and thereby 
forestall any future offences.
An illustration of how pathological behaviour is similar to what can be ob-
served in normal life is what I refer to as ‘virtual thefts’, or situations when 
measures are taken but suspicion turned out to be groundless. Here is an 
example from my fieldwork. A woman called Olga bought new shoes for her 
7 | A detailed description of how this pathology affects the life of elderly people in 
communal apartments see in Chapter 9 of my book (Utekhin 2004). For a psychiatrist’s 
perspective on this topic, see Medvedev (1990).
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teenage daughter. It was an important event, because the shoes were expen-
sive for their family budget. They were carefully selected and then presented to 
friendly families, which is a common symbolic gesture aimed at preventing the 
destructive consequences of envy. Some days later, the shoes disappeared from 
the girl’s room; another pair of shoes was left in their place, similar, but used. 
Olga was angry and desperate. She accused a young man living far down 
the corridor from her of the theft. The man did not belong to her friendship 
circle and had a somewhat marginal status already; he was viewed as a hippie 
lacking steady employment who received many visitors on an almost daily ba-
sis. Nevertheless, the woman understood that it was be highly improbable that 
this fellow had stolen the shoes for himself. Never before had he been involved 
any thefts in the apartment, or suspected of theft by means of a substitution, 
something known as podmena in Russian: the kind of accident that sometimes 
happens when foodstuffs are left lying about openly in the kitchen. Olga’s sus-
picion fell upon one of the girls who had attended a party in this man’s room. 
The woman explained that ‘it could have even been unintentional’, as result 
of mistake: the drunk girl might have entered the room, in complete darkness, 
and put on the shoes. This version seemed highly unlikely; why would the sup-
posedly drunk girl leave her own used shoes, of a slightly different size, in 
their place? In spite of this contradiction, Olga told her version of the story 
to the policeman whom she called to the apartment. The young man denied 
the accusations as being absurd, but most of the neighbours, however, were 
inclined to find them to be well grounded. By the evening of the same day, the 
guilty person was found out. It was a schoolboy, a close friend of the younger 
son of the woman. The boys played videogames together until late in the eve-
ning, and when the angry parents of the visitor demanded that he came home 
immediately, the absent-minded player put on the first shoes that he found at 
the door. Thus, the entire story of theft turned out to be a mistake. Although 
mistaken shoes story could have taken place anywhere where people cohabitate, 
what is special about Russian communal apartments is the way in which this 
case makes visible latent attitude of suspicion within the neighbours’ group, as 
well as the fact that no apologies have been offered to the neighbour who finally 
proved to be innocent. Life went on as if nothing had occurred.
In the public space of CAs, incidents often occur for which no witness can 
be found. Everyone pleads not guilty, and each neighbour reconstructs the sit-
uation according to her own presuppositions. The problem is that the situa-
tion, which can be reconstructed in different versions, does not exist apart from 
some interpretation. Hence, it becomes difficult to find the objective reality 
that some versions of events distort with groundless suspicions. This is not to 
say that all the versions are equally plausible, but the logic of suspicion, howev-
er groundless, is a systematic transformation of the rationality implied in the 
practices of everyday life in CAs.
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How to link suspicion and paranoid behaviours to micro-mechanics of so-
cial interaction, not only to macro-social features of Soviet society? According 
to the pragmatic approach to language use, human communication is based 
on hearer’s inference of communicative intent of the speaker (Grice 1975). Paul 
Grice proposed a model of inference of non-literal meanings that relies on the 
principle of cooperation: cooperative interlocutors trust in the fact that each 
contribution to the dialogue advances it towards a commonly accepted goal. Ba-
sically, this means that in order for utterances to perform their job of conveying 
messages, hearers should not take the meaning of the words said by speakers 
literally but rather make conjectures about what the speaker had in mind, or, 
in more technical jargon, examine how the most plausible speech act and its 
meaning fits best into currently unfolding situation. All of these are ascribed to 
speaker as part of her communicative intent. This operation involves routinely 
performed mindreading. Without that we would be unable to understand meta-
phors, irony and all kind of tropes based on counter-factual statements that are, 
however, perfectly meaningful for interlocutors. 
Like any communicative signal, speech utterances have an indexical aspect, 
reminding of what we do when we interpret the sound of a car horn. When you 
hear it behind you, you first understand that the signal is addressed to you, and 
then try to guess why in the world it can be directed to you at this particular 
moment. A certain degree of mindreading is thus required for what Levinson 
refers to as the ‘human interaction engine’ (Levinson 2006). Mindreading is 
constrained by the understanding of situation that involves its interpretation 
in terms of this or that rule-governed activity, or language game, as proposed 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1953). To continue the horn example, 
this means that if I hear the beep of my friend’s car and decide that this is not 
a serious message but just a rhythmic pattern in the way of a greeting, I might 
wish to join this musical exercise with my horn. This is acceptable if we both 
agree that we are ‘playing the same game’.8
The sociological concept of face as it was introduced by Ervin Goffman 
(Goffman 1955) emphasizes the dramaturgical nature of social interaction and 
reveals the aspect of cooperation that consists in participants maintaining not 
only their own, but also each other’s faces. More recent theory makes use of 
the category of face in order to analyse performances of politeness, such as 
strategies to treat face-threatening acts (Brown and Levinson 1987). The com-
municative environment of CAs, which may involve or even foster systematic 
8 | It is not by chance that Harold Garfinkel in his treatment of the topic of trust (Garf-
inkel 1963) departs from experimentation with a game. The game has its constitutive 
rules that determine the range of participants’ expectations and that are supposed to 
be shared by the participants.
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suspicion, presents opportunities to study how interpersonal relations shape 
politeness patterns. 
Concepts of trust in partner cooperation and the care about face character-
ize human social interaction universally. However, in some pathological con-
ditions, like autistic spectrum disorders, or paranoia and paranoid disorders, 
these devices seem to stop working properly, leading to difficulties in commu-
nication. Autism and paranoia have something in common: for a variety of 
reasons, affected subjects fail to grasp what the other person has in her mind 
correctly enough for communication to proceed normally. They either present 
no interest (or ability) in taking the partner’s mind in account, or arbitrarily 
ascribe the partner feelings, intentions and attitudes. As soon as we turn to 
culturally specific genres and situations, we can see how suspicion and mis-
trust can bring about communicative environments for which paranoia can be 
a good metaphor.
Denunciation is a good example of how a culture favouring alert and suspi-
cion was embodied in a social practice. Letters, complaints and petitions from 
citizens to newspapers and voluntary reporting of wrongdoings to the author-
ities was an important channel of feedback from the population. Encouraging 
the flow of denunciations, the authorities faced the problem of dealing with that 
ever-growing amount of questionable information, much of which was driven 
by clearly non-altruistic motives.
A large share of complaints sent to the authorities, more than a half in some 
periods, had to do with housing conditions. Although in Stalin’s era the de-
nunciations reporting political non-loyalty or a way of life that was not in line 
with communist moral could be motivated by a genuine belief in the struggle 
against ‘alien elements’ and the necessity of unmasking them, people clearly 
understood the utility of denunciations as a weapon in intra-apartment ten-
sions with neighbours, and a tool that could be used to get the room of a neigh-
bour that was sent to prison. This remained a live practice up to end of the 
Soviet period. 
The documents of the Azadovsky affair recently published by Petr Druzhi-
nin in his topical study (Druzhinin 2016) are very illustrative of the way in 
which obshchestvennost’ was involved in the fight against ‘foreign elements’. 
The word obshchestvennost’ in Soviet language was used, especially since 
Khrushchev’s times, to denote active citizens who were engaged, supposedly by 
their own will but actually as part of advancement of their career in Komsomol, 
trade-unions and the Party, in civic initiatives, or obshchestvennaia rabota, what 
roughly translated means ‘work in society’, or work to the benefit of society. 
This usually involved activities related with leisure, sports, and ideological in-
doctrination, but the authorities also relied on the people’s assistance in main-
taining public order (see details in Matsui 2015). Hence, vigilance and readi-
ness to reporting to authorities were appreciated. Konstantin Azadovsky was 
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professor of philology who, together with his wife Svetlana, in December 1980 
was falsely accused by the KGB of possessing narcotic substances, all these 
being an organized fabrication that involved police, civilian militia (druzhinni-
ki), and also the participation of a kommunalka neighbour who had denounced 
Svetlana and took an active part in her prosecution, with the obvious interest of 
occupying her rooms in the apartment. The neighbour succeeded in her plans 
to better her housing conditions.
Among the exhibits of the Virtual Museum is an item of denunciation 
showing something of a Dostoyevskian twist: in order to protect a person from 
eventual slanderous accusations, tenants recur to denunciation. The petition 
is written by some apartment residents and is addressed to the boss of one of 
the women with whom they live.9 Its function is proactive: the residents expect 
that the boss will get a denunciation against this woman from another neigh-
bour, who is depicted in the letter as a pathological complainer, a type of person 
well-known to Soviet (and post-Soviet) officials. This letter is their attempt to 
warn the boss by means of their own denunciation. For some reason (perhaps 
a cross-out that resulted from attempts to find the right word), this particular 
document was not sent, and remained as a draft. There were citizens who spe-
cialized in sending off complaints about everything and everybody, so that the 
situation described in this collective letter is completely plausible. 
A translation of the document (with additional information provided by me 
in square brackets) reads as follows:
To the directors and local committee of the department store Gostiny Dvor.
From the tenants of 3 Petrov Street, apartment 20.
Declaration
Bella Markovna Beilin, who works in your department store, has lived in our apartment 
together with us for more than 15 years. In the apt. Bella Markovna behaves modestly, 
normally, politely, and all of us tenants respect her a lot. We are sending you this de-
claration in case you receive a slanderous declaration from Mrs. Romanova B.A., who 
has done more than once in all these years in attempt to slander and smear respectable 
people. The truth is that the Romanov family [mother 60, daughter 40 and two children] 
is the scourge of our apartment—they terrorize all the tenants. They do mean things to all 
the tenants, they are the ones who make scenes and star t fights and they are the ones 
who write slander-denunciations to dif ferent organizations against all of the tenants 
including children.
Mrs. Romanova even went to school to lodge a complaint against first-graders Sveta 
and Tanya.
9 | The document is published in a slightly modified form in Communal Living in Russia: 
A Vir tual Museum of Soviet Everyday Life, see http://kommunalka.colgate.edu
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Most of the tenants in our apartment are older people, we are sick and we cannot cope 
with this [unclear; crossed out in the text of the letter].
No matter what Mrs. Romanova writes, it is a total lie.
[signatures] Samsonova, Salova, Kuzmin, Stein
5/10/64
This letter dated from more than half a century ago is clearly an example of the 
denunciation culture that flourished in the Soviet society, but some survivals of 
this culture are also present in post-Soviet Russia where the denunciations do 
not work anymore as they did in the USSR. However, the Russian authorities 
appear to have returned to the old Soviet practice of instigating active citizens 
to send letters of denunciation in cases when the authorities need to have a 
formal pretext to neutralize some independent civil initiative.
The communicative environment of CAs is characterized by omnipresent 
mistrust that is embedded in a distorted geometry of social space. On the one 
hand, mistrust and the search for masked alien elements were in tone with 
general ideological orientations of Soviet culture (and are progressively becom-
ing so in contemporary Russia, as of 2017 when I am writing these lines). But 
on the other hand, mistrust towards neighbours is deeply ingrained in the so-
cial interactions between co-residents of shared apartments, and is emblematic 
for the Soviet way of everyday life.10 This might be a factor contributing to peo-
ple’s susceptibility to the ideology that pays much attention to the search of all 
kinds of enemies.
One of the things that attracted my attention when I was collecting ethno-
graphic materials about Soviet everyday life was the fact that the most eloquent 
of my pieces of data appeared very similar to texts and objects that some con-
ceptualist artists used in their creations from 1980s on. Moscow conceptualist 
art has brought to an extreme the discovery of the art of mid-twentieth cen-
tury: any object could become a work of art if put into an artistic frame that 
emphasizes the object’s aesthetic or ideological properties. The poetry of Lev 
Rubinshtein and the installations of Ilya Kabakov use this discovery as a point 
of departure. Some of their creations turn out to be ethnographic in a sense 
that is constitutive for the artistic text: the artists do not invent anything, they 
just pick up elements of a social milieu, separate them from the context and 
embed them into a different, artistic frame. However, the elements which are 
usually singled out in the everyday life of a Soviet citizen and that are able to 
survive and remain recognizable in a different frame, becoming a piece of art, 
are those artefacts, or visually expressive pieces of Soviet propaganda or vernac-
ular artistry, or even speech clichés or just utterances overheard that bear the 
10 | This does not exclude friendship, mutual help and forms of quasi-familial relations 
that might sometimes be inter twined with suspicion.
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mark of their initial context. All of them are small atoms of the everyday world 
of a Soviet citizen, and each of them is illustrative of a typical communicative 
situation and a social practice. 
Actually, this is what an ethnographer usually does in a strange environ-
ment; looking for data, that is, for fragments of reality that can be extracted 
from it in form of descriptions, photographs, narratives by the natives and by 
the researcher herself. And only those fragments are valid that are able to refer 
both to a bigger story, that is, to a meta-narrative constructed by the researcher, 
and at the same time to their context as it was observed by the ethnographer 
and was being re-constructed in the ethnographic text. Reality is always rich-
er than its verbal description, and non-verbal means are more broadband and 
more immediate, so to say, allowing one to convey aspects that are difficult to 
verbalize. That is why contemporary ethnography is so inclined to overcome the 
limitations that are imposed by the textual form and is often trying to include 
audio and video recording, visual materials and artefacts as part of data gather-
ing and also as part of presentation of the results to the audience.
Ilya Kabakov explained that in early 1980s he felt ‘the attraction of the top-
ic of trash, trash as one of the main metaphors of our life’ (Kabakov 2011: 5). 
At that time, he was collecting an ‘Archive of useless things’ that consisted of 
folders and carton boxes where he kept all the daily papers like bills, receipts, 
written notes, certificates etc. This is an essentially ethnographic approach, if 
one selects the materials so that to build out of them a picture or a story reflect-
ing the life whose part these objects used to be. Artistic works can explore (and 
exploit) the materials like these in different ways, and, of course, comparing 
my collection of ethnographic materials to Ilya Kabakov’s installations, I could 
clearly see where the artist was transforming – ‘distorting’ is not a proper word 
here – reality for the sake of artistic effect. 
In any case, the published collection ‘Voices behind the door’ (Kabakov 
2011b) consists of real documents that underwent no modification from the 
part of the artist who just included them into his work, carefully selecting the 
most impressive. These include real minutes of a Comrades’ Court session, 
letters of complaint, etc. The other collection published in (Kabakov 1993) and 
reproduced in Kabakov 2011b, ‘In the communal kitchen’, is a sort of ethno-
graphic-fiction: it reproduces traces of typical situations well-known from life 
experience and also from the collection of real documents – in a focused form. 
Within an aesthetic frame, any detail might turn out to be meaningful. A sig-
nificant share of the exhibits reveal something that has to do with the strange 
mixture of suspicion and trust that is inherent to communal everyday life, that 
is why I dwell here on these ethnographic art objects.
It is the more so as letters of complaint and denunciations by Soviet citizens 
often include some sort of inherent naïve poetic aspect. As Sheila Fitzpatrick 
put it, they reflect ‘[a] delight in the power to use language’ felt by authors who 
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had only recently acquired literacy and for whom writing letters to authority 
could be ‘as much a form of popular culture and an expression of popular cre-
ativity as the amateur theatricals and balalaika playing’ (Fitzpatrick 2005: 167-
8). Such an ‘artistic’ component is also present in the notes to neighbours and 
announcements on the walls found in communal apartments. Along with the 
verbal artistry, there is another and subtler layer of meaning in the texts and 
stories from communal everyday life. Not only the notes that appear in public 
space uncover something that is made public, often denouncing or trying to 
prevent some misdeed. What makes some acts and deeds remarkable, worth of 
memorizing and telling as a story, is their rhetoric value, or theatricality: they 
are not just acts but gestures performed on the stage of the communal kitchen. 
As such they allude to and can be read against the background of the typical 
attitudes and practices of Soviet life. To put padlocks on a piano or chains on an 
oven in a public space, or to remove the bulb after using the toilet so that neigh-
bours could not waste electricity11 – all these are both puzzling and suggestive 
indicators of the same mentality.
Some convincing instances of it can also be found in an exhibition called 
the ‘Kitchen Chronicle, by V. D. Baranov’. Mr. Baranov was invented by Ilya Ka-
bakov as a protagonist of the exhibition. According to the framing narrative, a 
certain Mr. Baranov kept a diary of his life in a communal apartment, and also 
was collecting small pieces of trash as mementos and providing annotations 
for each object in order to not forget the circumstances to which the object 
is linked. As Ilya Kabakov describes the exhibits, the collection ‘consists of a 
significant number (approximately 200) of different objects with small scraps 
of paper the size of a quarter of a page of a notebook glued to them’ with a 
handwritten text of ‘notes (…) about what circumstances or events are connect-
ed to the inclusion of this or that object in the collection (…). Behind these tiny 
crumbs of everyday life, in essence ordinary litter, arise, as though alive, all the 
events which took place in the communal kitchen and around it: fights, argu-
ments, mutual treating, kindness and cruelty, patience and unthinkable anger, 
generosity and stinginess’ (Kabakov 1993; 98-99).
The handwritten comments to the artefacts, ascribed to Mr. Baranov, reflect 
a tightly-knit mess of human relations with a specific distortion that tells us a 
story not only about particular persons, but also about the environment where 
such relations had grown and where they are regarded as normal, and about hu-
man nature as a whole. Each item of the collection is a seed of a full-blown sto-
ry, like stories written Mikhail Zoshchenko or Mikhail Bulgakov. Interestingly, 
the stories and the situations from 1960s by Ilya Kabakov are ethnographically 
11 | A detail from ‘The Guests’ (1927), a short story by Mikhail Zoshchenko, available 
in English in the section ‘From Books of the Vir tual Museum of Soviet Life’ (Utekhin et 
al. 2006).
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representative of the 1990s as well and belong to the same cultural pool as the 
stories by Zoshchenko from 1920s: all of them they illustrate the same Soviet 
civilization.
The plausibility of these stories is beyond doubt for people with a Soviet 
experience. For instance, this one: 
An old wrist-watch with a broken face [tsiferblat]. There is really funny story connected 
with this wrist-watch. I found it in the bathroom on the shelf – someone was washing and 
forgot it. And I wrote an announcement in the kitchen. And no one could name exactly 
that watch which I described. And I kept it. 14.2.64 (Kabakov 1993; 99)
We can guess that the watch had most probably been left by some guest not 
intending to return and retrieve it. We also can try to imagine the proceeding of 
presenting evidence to prove the right of property. Several neighbours claimed 
the watch belonged to them, while the author examined these claims. Claiming 
property when it does not really belong to you was a commonplace event among 
people living together in the apartment, and people whose claims had ‘proved’ 
to be false felt nothing special about this. This makes us think about the perfor-
mative properties of the interaction between neighbours. Although played as if 
it was serious, the act of claiming for the watch is perceived like a funny game, 
or lottery. And the failure is not taken seriously either. The contrast between 
claimers’ hopes of obtaining a watch and the fact the watch had a broken face 
adds symbolic value to this story. As we can suppose, the fact that the watch 
had been broken was certainly not announced by the protagonist. One more ex-
ample of a revealing mini-drama from the same collection is ‘A piece of paper, 
stained with something black. Again this morning Alevtina found this scrap 
of dirty paper in the kasha. But there was nobody in the kitchen this morning. 
Maybe, she’s doing this on purpose? 19.VI.64’ (Kabakov 1993: 101).
Suspecting that a neighbour has planned a provocation is a communal rou-
tine.  Actually, to spoil a neighbour’s meal in the kitchen, adding salt in her ab-
sence from the kitchen, was quite possible for CA residents, not only in folklore, 
as was also to put in there some inedible objects, like scraps of dirty paper. Sovi-
et communal dwellers were prepared for such provocations either because they 
were inclined to doing this themselves, or because they simply regarded this as 
a normal part of neighbour relations. This made it possible to perceive of many 
things in life that occurred without any communicative intent as an action pur-
posely directed, that is, performed ‘on purpose’. There is a whole series of cases 
in Kabakov’s materials where someone suspects that something has been done 
‘on purpose’, like the car horn signal that I believe is addressed to me. 
Paradoxically, Alevtina’s provocation in claiming that someone had put 
dirty paper in her porridge is an attempt to establish a sort of communication 
with neighbours, however distorted, it is an invitation to scandal. The scandal 
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might be purely instrumental in some cases, but here it is not, or at least Mr. 
Baranov believes so, also demonstrating his awareness about his neighbours’ 
lives: he knows that no one appeared in the kitchen that morning. Any scandal 
has an expressive dimension, an aspect that eventually makes out of it a ritual-
ized form of joint performative activity taking place at the stage of the commu-
nal kitchen. This ceremonial confrontation and high spirited competition in of-
fensive rhetoric distracts people from their everyday chores and is appreciated 
– and even sought for – by some of communal residents, because it also brings 
a sort of enjoyment. False accusations of the kind Alevtina is addressing to her 
neighbours are not taken seriously, because in CA, to accuse a neighbour of 
such actions is commonplace. Not everyone scoffs and teases their neighbours, 
only some people provoke scandals with false accusations, but we are bound to 
coexist even with those people who do.
In our ‘Virtual Museum of Soviet Everyday Life’, we have a section dedicat-
ed to messages sent to neighbours, placed in a public space. Unlike in private 
apartments where residents prefer to communicate in person and do not face 
situations when they need to inform strangers about the ways of using the 
place, neighbours in CAs often place notes, announcements, instructions, no-
tices aimed at preventing wrongdoing, and even personal messages. Since such 
messages usually involve the author’s effort at attracting attention, as well as 
some sort of argumentation, with the vernacular creativity behind it contribut-
ing to their use for contemporary art, particularly as in the case of Ilya Kaba-
kov. I have discussed the handwritten rules in some detail elsewhere (Utekhin 
2004). 
Interestingly, Gert Hofstede considers Russian culture to be high on the 
Uncertainty Avoidance scale and links the proliferation of rules and instruc-
tions to this feature: ‘Uncertainty avoidance can (…) be defined as the extent to 
which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown sit-
uations. This feeling is, among other manifestations, expressed through ner-
vous stress and in a need for predictability: a need for written and unwritten 
rules’ (Hofstede et al. 2010, 191). In the Soviet period, people felt that the official 
rules to which they might in principle recur to resolve disputes, were not suf-
ficiently elaborated to embrace all the potentially conflicting situations, and so 
they formulated their own rules stating how to use the washroom, how to wash 
the bathtub, etc. These rules attempted to reduce the amount of ambiguity, 
precisely because the authors mistrusted other people, that is, neighbours and 
their guests, who were suspected of being able to disturb the everyday life in 
the apartment, for instance, by breaking faucets, shower, toilet pan, electric 
switches, or using other people’s belongings. People of trust were supposed 
to know how to act properly, but some neighbours and all strangers were to 
be given a warning. In eventual disputes, the rules and notices were used as a 
resource for argumentation. 
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This brief consideration of mistrust-related phenomena in Soviet and con-
temporary Russian everyday life inclines us to suggest that the communist ide-
ology which implied, among other things, mistrust to strangers, the search for 
enemies, and the idea that one’s face presented to public could actually be false, 
was something that communal neighbours kept in mind and could address to 
when writing a denunciation or complaint. However, routine suspicion towards 
neighbours was not imposed from above, but rather deeply ingrained in every-
day relations in the apartment and in wider social interactions, even though 
the other side of these relations could be a quasi-familial lack of distance. This 
also is at least partly relevant for post-Soviet situation: although contemporary 
Russia differs much from the USSR in many respects, and dwellers of kommu-
nalkas are these days either owners of their rooms or rent the rooms from the 
owners, still the ways of compulsory cohabitation of a heterogeneous group re-
produce attitudes and practices typical to Soviet communal mentality (Utekhin 
2015).
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Afterword 
Mistrust af ter Truth?
Thomas Yarrow
Strangely overlooked as an object of ethnographic enquiry, mistrust comes into 
rich empirical focus through this timely and compelling collection. It does so 
through the move to bracket the analytic questions: of what it is and whether 
this is good. Mühlfried is surely right to insist, as he does in his incisive intro-
ductory essay, that the lacunae is in part an artefact of the functionalist logic 
of mainstream social theory, specifically a persistent interest in trust as an ele-
ment of social cohesion. Once these commitments are suspended we see that, 
as in the cases of ‘ignorance’ (Mair et al. 2012) and ‘detachment’ (Candea et al. 
2015), the existence of mistrust is not just an incidental absence or negation but 
a specific kind of thing – a practice, an orientation, a form of personhood – that 
has qualities and substance of its own. A central insight from these essays is 
that this may be productive, literally in the sense it constitutes social practices 
and relationships, and more profoundly in the various ways that people may 
actively value and cultivate mistrust as a positive virtue. Mistrust is not an-
ti-social in any straightforward sense. Its absence may be incidental (dis-trust 
in Schiocchet’s terms) but is often a more active kind of presence. Beyond the 
vivid details of the cases the collection of these makes clear how mistrust is 
shot through with the multiplicity of its locations and so de-stabilizes what we 
might think we know about it. Mistrust develops through multiple contexts 
and concerns as ethical and ideological sensitivities, orientations performed 
through people, material contexts, domestic spaces and institutional cultures 
of various kinds. Like the phenomenon of mistrust itself, the book achieves 
its overall effect through holding these phenomena together, while remaining 
sceptical of the possibility of aggregation. I want to tease out two strands from 
this complexity, before trying to articulate how these might help us to think 
about the current moment in which the book takes shape – where discourses 
about ‘post truth’, have been contexts for novel forms of mis-trust.
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DeMarCation
According to Mühlfried, mistrust is a way of relating to the world in a distanced 
manner. It is not, he suggests, that interactions are avoided but, in his striking 
phrase, ‘never entered at full stake’ (Introduction: 8). To mistrust is to demar-
cate what can be trusted from what cannot. The contributors here have demon-
strated that there is no straightforward or singular way in which this happens. 
As an orientation that may be primarily epistemic, social, or indissolubly both, 
efforts to distinguish trust from mistrust act to define communities in a range 
of ways.
In Mühlfried’s comparative discussion, profound mistrust of mainstream 
social norms becomes a foundational act of community-making. Through 
renunciation of the social structures into which they were born, members of 
Russian gangs create a radical and profound break between the society they 
reject and the community of ‘thieves in law’ into which they enter. Notwith-
standing some profoundly different orientations, Jihadists likewise strive for 
hermetic demarcation that emerges on the basis of an absolute rejection of pre-
vailing social norms. In both cases mistrust directed beyond a community has 
its counterpart in strong trust amongst a community of believers. By contrast 
the forms of social demarcation at stake for inhabitants of Russian apartment 
blocks described by Utekhin are far less absolute. Ongoing suspicion and mis-
trust emerge here as more or less pronounced elements of most if not all inter-
actions, directed towards a set of relationships in which people are intimately 
enmeshed. In close proximity to familiar and familial relations, suspicion is 
deeply engrained. People withhold aspects of themselves as ‘the other side’ to 
relations of intimate domesticity and a ‘quasi-familial lack of distance’. Like-
wise, in the otherwise distinctive context of Sierra Leone, Bürge discusses how 
trust and mistrust articulate in a never fully resolved form. In a situation where 
trust is understood to be missing, people are concerned to fabricate it: trust 
(locally rendered ‘tros’) links people, objects and practices, in networks that are 
constantly made and un-made, through the situated demarcation of mistrust. 
In both these cases a sharp but un-resolved relation between trust and mistrust 
has its counterpart in suspicions directed towards communities in which peo-
ple continue to engage, and in social boundaries that are situationally specified, 
unresolved and always in question.
These acts of demarcation involve complex configurations of engagement 
and detachment. Mistrust involves a scepticism that can be a way of holding 
elements of the world – people or things – at a distance. This distancing, as 
Brand observes of domestic abuse counsellors in South Africa, can itself be a 
form of engagement – a way of understanding and interacting with the sub-
jects or objects thereby distanced. Mistrust can be foundational to productive 
relationships of distance, including through critique, objectification and epis-
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temic scepticism. From another perspective, mistrust enacts a distance from 
some things that is the very condition through which proximity to others is es-
tablished. Close communities are imagined and made through the distancing 
mistrust from other social worlds. 
trutH
Mistrust entails a sceptical orientation to truth, associated with more and less 
profound questioning. Proximate uncertainties and challenges to authoritative 
knowledge are not new and may ultimately assume and re-inscribe a faith in 
‘the truth’ to which these refer. In the context of South Africa, Brand shows 
how counsellors’ generalized mistrust of clients is ultimately founded on the 
epistemic practices of counselling. Conviction (trust) in their own ability to 
ascertain an objective truth orients mistrust externally – to the subjects whose 
circumstances they seek to understand. In the socio-legal practices explored by 
Bognitz in Rwanda, mistrust is central to the negotiations that surround the 
settlement of disputes. Mediators fabricate trust against this background of 
suspicion, drawing on evidence to establish how things ‘really are’. Objective 
truth is grounded in the subjectivity of the ‘true’ self of the mediator: qualities 
performed in practice through being humble, having humility and listening 
attentively. 
Novel contexts may pose challenges to the truths of experts without nec-
essarily undermining these. Indeed for the crypto-advocates studied by Ruh, 
‘generalized’ and fundamental mistrust in the security of Internet transactions 
not only directs attention to the truths of mathematics but also ultimately am-
plifies trust in their professional-cum-epistemic practices. Moreover, even as 
the internet is associated with a novel explicitness and awareness about the fal-
libility of human interactions, crypto-advocates’ doubts have their counterpart 
in a continued faith in the possibility and desirability of a return to what, as they 
see it, has been lost: an ultimate trust in notions of ‘authenticity’ and ‘integri-
ty’ of interaction. For those involved in online dating scams, Beek highlights 
how online environments are associated with a similar mistrust but involve a 
fundamentally different epistemic orientation. Here the truths in question are 
not those of experts but of the romantic appeal of ‘genuine love’ and the ideas 
of ‘credibility’ that support these. These older romantic tropes remain central, 
even as the medium leads to profound mistrust of the message. In both cases, 
truth and trust become newly explicit concerns in digital environments asso-
ciated with anxieties about the threat to these valued ideals. Mistrust is novel, 
insofar as a truth that was given is now in doubt. 
By contrast, the examples of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Russia, remind 
us that in many parts of the world, there is nothing new about the kinds of 
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mistrust that relate to profoundly doubtful orientations to truth, and so to cir-
cumstances in which trust was never a given. In Russian apartment blocks a 
post-socialist ‘logic of suspicion’ has its roots, according to Utekhin, in a Soviet 
mentality where mistrust was systematic and practices of un-masking were 
second-nature. In Guinea, Somparé and Botta Somparé trace how the Ebola 
epidemic re-animates an already systemic mistrust in foreign organisations 
and elites and so in the medical knowledge that was central to their response. 
The chapter thus makes evident how social and epistemic trusts are intimately 
related in this post-colonial context.
af ter trust?
We are living through a time that many would characterize as a crisis of trust. 
The trust in question is that once reserved for ‘experts’, and the questioning 
involves a form of mistrust that comes in many forms. Over the last three de-
cades, political movements, social activists, media commentators and politi-
cians on both the left and right have sought to undermine the veracity of expert 
authority, alleging a series of vested interests. Accusations of expert fallibility 
emerge through a range of left-wing discourses, including the anti-globalisation 
movement’s challenge to the economic orthodoxy of ‘development’ (Williams 
2008) and participatory challenges to the elitist knowledge of experts (Cooke 
and Kothari 2001). Right-wing discourses more commonly attack experts as 
representing of the bureaucratic antithesis of ‘the market’, where the latter is 
positioned as the ultimate arbiter of value (DuGay 2000). Allegations of expert 
elitism gain particular traction in contexts where class divides and inequalities 
have been sharpened through post-industrial decline and decades of neoliberal 
reform (Green 2016). Commentators have connected the post-modern relativ-
ization of ‘truth’ to digital media technologies, through which perspective pro-
liferates and knowledge is reduced to information (Agar 2003; Tsoukas 1997). 
‘Post truth’ is also ‘post-trust’, at least in the kinds of knowledge and institu-
tions that were once considered the bedrock of liberal democracy. 
Anthropologically speaking, ‘post-truth’ is a significant phenomenon, if not 
one that has yet received much ethnographic attention. It is a set of discourses 
that constitute a newfound explicitness about the limits of experts, and a broad 
mistrust in the truths for which they were once, at least in much of Europe 
and America, un-questioned arbiters. Whereas experts were always subject 
to contingent mistrust, this was rarely systemic in Euro-American contexts. 
What is new is that they are increasingly in the position of having to fabricate 
knowledge, authority and trust in contexts where it cannot be assumed. At this 
juncture many of the things that anchored trust, including ideas about scien-
tific truth, authenticity and integrity remain relevant even as they are newly in 
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question, mistrusted and challenged from various sides, including through the 
auto-critiques of experts themselves. Public doubt and scepticism is connected 
to the explication of what could once be implicit: in multiple ways including 
academic and other forms of audit (Furedi 2004; Strathern 2000), science that 
is oriented to social utility (Nowotny 2003), the authority of expert knowledge is 
reconfigured and re-distributed if not necessarily undermined through entan-
glements with a range of ‘social’ and ‘public’ external audiences. 
While few of the contributors to this volume are explicitly concerned with 
the challenges of ‘post truth’ sociality, they help to locate these recent discours-
es, and to question some of the more general assumptions that inform these. 
They do this by bringing into focus the myriad ways in which truth, trust and 
mistrust are entangled, by pointing to the multiple forms these take, and the 
specific historical and cultural trajectories through which these arise. We may 
still want to insist that things have changed, that mistrust is being re-animated 
in ways that are far reaching and profound, but the careful foregoing descrip-
tions help explain the terrain on which these myriad configurations are now 
taking shape. At this juncture the collection reminds us to remain mis-trustful 
of grand-narratives and singular diagnoses of social change, including of the 
reduction of these changes to a meta-phenomena for which one may be ‘for’ or 
against.
And so I want to return to where the introduction to this volume ended, 
via a plea for ethnography as a method of being ambivalent in relation to the 
question of who and what is trusted. When anthropologists ‘come home’, par-
ticularly to focus on experts and expertise, the prevailing mode of engagement 
has been via a hermeneutics of suspicion that echoes and amplifies some of the 
populist tendencies (from right and left), particularly in the claim or assump-
tion that trust in these people and their knowledge is misplaced. Foucauldian 
inspired deconstructions have sought to make apparent a misplaced trust in 
experts. That served as an important corrective, but has tended to result in 
‘thin’ ethnography that does little to illuminate the ethnographic substance of 
what is involved – ideologically, ethically, epistemologically, personally and so 
on (Boyer 2008; Brown et al. 2017). Methodologically speaking, it might be use-
ful to suspend mistrust for longer, in order to produce a more ethnographically 
nuanced understanding of these practices.
If we want to better understand the current, or indeed any, moment it seems 
important to approach the mistrustful sentiments of ‘angry citizens’, along 
with the scientific and expert purveyors of ‘objective evidence’ in the same way: 
through understanding and critique, derived from empirical enquiry into the 
specific conditions in which others live their lives, through relationships found-
ed on a dialectic of trust and mistrust that is never fully resolved.
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